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ĉis dissertation advocates for a preference analysis of imperative constructions. ĉe analysis is founded
on preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012), a dynamic semantic system that represents declarative, inter-
rogative, and imperative content in a single preference state. ĉis new framework has several explanatory
advantages over the priormodal analysis (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2011) and property analysis (Portner
2004a; 2007).
Under the proposed analysis, imperatives contribute both propositional content (the commanded ac-
tion) and illocutionary content (the imposition of an obligation). ĉis split in meaning explains the in-
ability to use a follow-up uĨerance to challenge an imperative imposition of an obligation, since challenges
can only target propositional content. On the other hand, the propositional content of an imperative can
be used to compare it to the Question Under Discussion (the formalized representation of the discourse
topic) to determine whether the imperative is Relevant. I propose a newmethod of computing Relevance
for any uĨerance type that uses the diﬀerence between pre- and post-uĨerance discourse states and the
QUD.
I examine imperative syntax from the perspective that illocutionary content must be borne by a syn-
tactic element in the clausal leě periphery. I show that this syntactic element does not drive movement in
all languages, contra previous explanations of clause typing (Han 2000; Koopman 2007). I also present
new data on the relative acceptability of contrastive and non-contrastive topic fronting in English impera-
tives. I explain this distinction by showing that clause-typing [Force] and topicalization [Top] features are
encoded on a single syntactic head in English, while focalization [Focus] is independent. ĉe proposed
structure allows the position of do-support in English negative imperatives to be ascertained for the ėrst
time: it is Focus⁰. Additionally, the structure of matrix and embedded imperative clauses is shown to be
identical, predicting several facts about extraction from embedded imperatives.
Finally, I show that the preference analysis is compositional bymapping both illocutionary and propo-
sitional content onto the clausal structure. ĉe result is that all well-formed clauses represent update func-
tions from preference states to preference states. Since this also applies to embedded clauses, embedding
verbs of communication must be able to accept update-denoting constituents as one of their arguments. I
conclude that the preference analysis is superior for analyzing imperative syntax, semantics, and pragmat-
ics, as no other analysis can account for all of the discussed phenomena in a uniėed way.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It can no longer be said that imperative constructions are understudied, but even as they have gained
aĨention in the linguistics literature, they have frequently remained the odd man out. Ever since the tran-
sition from early transformational grammar to more restricted models, declarative and interrogative sen-
tences have been explained as equals, with both types of sentence produced and interpreted by the same
grammatical mechanisms. In contrast, much of the recent literature on imperatives has been imperative-
speciėc, only accurately explaining them by postulating additional sub-grammars. ĉe overall goal of this
dissertation is to close the gap between imperatives and other sentence types within three areasã syntax,
semantics, and pragmaticsãwithout unifying one area at the expense of fragmenting another.
Several areas of linguistic theory lack a standard account of imperatives. ĉe syntax of declaratives,
polar questions, and Wh-questions has been exhaustively studied, and there are widely accepted mecha-
nisms in minimalist syntax that explain their commonalities and diﬀerences. For example, the diﬀerences
between declaratives and interrogatives, or between languages that form questions withWh-movement or
Wh-in-situ constructions are all explained in terms of the same primitives: the syntactic features of func-
tional heads, Merge, and Agree. Many accounts of imperative word order do not use these tools in a way
that highlights the similarities between clause types, instead positing imperative-speciėc structure, such as
the JussiveP of ZanuĨini et al. (2012). Yet these same accounts do not propose DeclarativeP or Interrog-
ativeP projections (with the exception of Rizzi (2004) and cartographic work building upon it). Likewise
in semantics, there are standard representations for declaratives (sets of worlds) and interrogatives (sets
of sets of worlds), but no consensus representation for imperatives. Portner (2004a; 2007) proposes that
imperatives be treated as properties (functions from individuals to sets of worlds), but this requires that
imperatives in discourse are tracked with several pragmatic operations, whereas declaratives and interrog-
atives require just one pragmatic operation each. In theories of discourse relevance (e.g. Roberts 1996;
2004; Simons et al. 2011), straightforward criteria are given for when declarative and interrogative uĨer-
ancesmake fruitful contributions to a conversation, but imperatives are either not addressed or given vague
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requirements.
Another aspect of recent studies of imperatives is that they tend to only address a single aspect of imper-
ative constructions. ĉe most comprehensive recent work on imperatives, Aikhenvald (2010), is largely a
typological study and does not deal with formal theory. Syntactic accounts of imperatives focus on the lo-
cation of an imperative operator within an imperative clause’s structural hierarchy (e.g. Han 2000; Mauck
and ZanuĨini 2005; Koopman 2007; ZanuĨini 2008), but do not deėne that operator’s meaning. Con-
versely, Kaufmann (2011), building on her previous work in Schwager (2006), deėnes an imperative op-
erator in terms of modal semantics, but only provides a cursory syntactic treatment. Similarly, Portner
(2004a; 2007) begins with sentence-level semantic units, and explores how they are handled by the prag-
matic component of the grammar. A later aĨempt atmapping this approach to a syntacticmodel (ZanuĨini
et al. 2012) does not yield a satisfactory explanation of the interface phenomena present in imperatives.
It is impossible to address all the shortcomings of prior accounts of imperatives in a single disserta-
tion. I will aĨempt to make signiėcant progress in four main areas. Chapter 2 looks at two prior accounts,
the so-called modal analysis and property analysis, in detail, and in light of their faults opts for a third op-
tion, a preference analysis. Chapter 3 looks at the distribution of imperative uĨerances in conversation from
two angles: challengeability and relevance. Challenge tests are applied to see what kind of uĨerances can
follow an imperative, and are diagnostic of the imperative’s eﬀect on the discourse. Relevance applies to
imperatives themselves and establishes criteria for when they can be felicitously uĨered. Chapter 4 looks
at several facts of clausal syntax and word order in imperatives, largely focusing on English. Adopting an
extended model of the clausal leě periphery explains heretofore unanalyzed word order paĨerns, includ-
ing information-structural fronting within imperatives and syntactic embedding of imperatives in indirect
discourse. Chapter 5 combines the semantic and syntactic insights of the previous two chapters to provide
a uniėed mapping of clausal meaning onto clausal syntax, encompassing declaratives, interrogatives, and
imperatives. Additionally, I prepose a preliminary semantics for imperative embedding, the ėrst of its kind.
Chapter 2, Previous Approaches to Imperatives, covers three approaches to imperative form and
meaning in turn.
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§2.2 addresses themodal analysis of Kaufmann (2011), which argues that the semantics of imperatives
is extremely similar to that ofmodal declaratives. Sentences such as Youmust take out the trash are treated as
ambiguous between a descriptive interpretation, which asserts an existing obligation, and a performative in-
terpretation, which creates a newobligation. When used in the laĨerway, the performative declarativemodal
is treated as semantically equivalent to the imperative Take out the trash!. ĉus Kaufmann (2011) builds
the semantics for imperatives on the modal semantics of Kratzer (1981), but with additional “presuppo-
sitional” constraints on when imperative uĨerances are felicitous. I point out that choosing an ordering
source for modal meaning contained within an imperative is problematic. Furthermore, some of the con-
straints on imperative use, such as enforcing a non-past commanded action, appear to be too strong; others,
such as requiring the speaker to be in a given epistemic state, are redundant when taking into account basic
principles of discourse.
§2.3 explores the property analysis of Portner (2004a; 2007), which takes an opposite view of impera-
tive meaning. Instead of assimilating it to the meaning of another construction, imperatives are assigned a
type of meaning represented by no other clause type. As properties, imperatives are taken to denote func-
tions from individuals to sets of worlds, with the domain of individuals limited to the addressee(s) of the
imperative. When sentences are uĨered, based on the type of meaning they denote, they are apportioned
to diﬀerent components of the discourse representation: propositions to the Common Ground, sets of
propositions to the Question Set, and properties to one of several To-Do Lists. ĉe number of To-Do
Lists can grow quite large, as separate lists are required for each interlocutor (Portner 2004a) and for each
type of obligation expressed (Portner 2007). I argue that, apart from being inelegant, this proliferation of
discourse structures can be obviated entirely by positing a rich, uniėed discourse representation.
§2.4 introduces preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012), which forms the basis of my analysis. Ex-
tending the uniėcation of discourse structure begun in Inquisitive Semantics (Groenendijk and Roelofsen
2009), preference semantics encodes declarative, interrogative, and imperative meaning in a single object,
a preference state, which is a set of ordered pairs of propositions. An imperative characteristically contributes
a preference for a proposition over its complement ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩. ĉese preferences (and other preferences that
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are part of imperative meaning) are generated by an imperative update rule, which corresponds to the illo-
cutionary relation of the clause, a functionwhich takes a discourse context and a proposition, and returns an
updated, structured context (Murray 2010). Preference semantics combines the best aspects of the other
two analyses, giving imperatives a characteristic semantic representation while allowing imperative mean-
ing to interact directly with declarative and interrogative meaning. ĉis allows for an accurate explanation
of imperative relevance (Chapter 3) and the compositionality of clausal meaning (Chapter 5).
Chapter 3 deals with theMeaning andBehavior of Imperatives inDiscourse, speciėcallywith respect
to challengeability and relevance.
§3.2 introduces the concept ofat-issue status and the challenge tests that diagnose it. Propositions areat-
issue if they canbedirectly challenged, i.e. aﬃrmingordenying their truth; they arenot-at-issue if theyhave to
be indirectly challenged, requiring the ordinary progress of the discourse to be suspended so that their truth
canbediscussed. Imperatives have longbeenknown to resist direct challenges: Take out the trash! cannotbe
felicitously followed by #ĉat’s true or #ĉat’s false (Iatridou 2008). However, I show that imperatives resist
indirect challenges as well, when the challenged content is the imposition of the obligation. Certain direct
challenges succeed with imperatives, if they instead target the commanded action. ĉus I conclude that
imperatives domake an at-issue contribution, but it is not the characteristic contribution of the imperative.
ĉeobligation- or preference-creating content is the illocutionary relation, which is non-propositional, and
therefore has no at-issue status.
§3.3 begins by surveying recentwork onRelevance (Roberts 1996; 2004; Simons et al. 2011), a felicity
condition imposed on all uĨerances requiring that they further the resolution of the Question Under Dis-
cussion (QUD), which encodes the current discourse topic as a set of potential answers. On the standard
view, for an uĨerance to be Relevant it must reduce the number of potential answers (be at least a partial
answer to the QUD), possibly down to a single alternative (a complete answer). To compute Relevance for
imperatives, non-modal propositional content has to be extracted from them to compare to the potential
answers to the QUD. ĉis is diﬃcult under both the modal and property analyses, but simpler on a pref-
erence analysis where the preferred proposition is directly accessible. I then show that using the preferred
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proposition to compute imperative Relevancemakes accurate predictionswhen compared to various types
of questions, so long as information-structural constraints introduced by the QUD are taken into account.
Building on these results, in §3.4 I propose a formalization of Relevance within preference semantics. Be-
cause preference states contain the alternatives that compose the QUD and can accept new information
contributed by any clause type, a simple, fully computable deėnition of Relevance covers all cases.
Chapter 4 turns to the issueof Encoding the Imperative IllocutionaryRelationwithin the structureof
the clausal leě periphery. Given the semantic and pragmaticmotivation for unifying illocutionary relations
as a class, I propose to also unify them syntactically. To accomplish this, there must not be any imperative-
speciėc projections in the clausal structure. Since a single CP projection will not suﬃce for representing
major clausal features ã matrix vs. subordinate status, clause typing, information structure, and subject
licensingã I propose an extension of Rizzi’s (1997) articulated leě periphery as a universal hierarchy and
place illocutionary relations in Force⁰ (§4.2). Word order data fromEnglish demonstrates that Force⁰ does
not universally drive movement, contra the clause-typing proposals of Han (2000) and Koopman (2007).
English imperatives also exhibit restrictions on information-structuralmovement, allowing contrastive
topicalization but prohibiting non-contrastive topicalization (§4.3). I argue that this is due to contrastive
topics being hosted in FocusP, an independent position, while non-contrastive topics are hosted in a mul-
tipurpose CP which cannot contain an imperative [Force] feature and a [+Topic] feature simultaneously.
Tests involving information-structural movement also provide new evidence for the locus of do-support in
negative imperatives in English, which I determine to be Focus⁰.
§4.4 examines the content of English imperative CP further with data on embedding of imperative
clauses and extraction from them. ĉe absence of a complete ban on extraction from embedded impera-
tives shows that they have an open “escape hatch” position, so Spec CP cannot be ėlled by an Operator.
Imperatives donot paĨernwith eitherweak or strong islands, but exhibit a diﬀerent set of extraction restric-
tions, which I argue are largely due to the possibility or impossibility of movement within the imperative
clause.
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Having discussed syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of imperatives separately in the preceding
chapters, Chapter 5 is devoted to Imperatives at the Syntax/Semantics Interface.
Despite the fact that preference semantics is designed to operate on fully-formed propositional con-
stituents, it can be mapped onto clausal structure in a compositional manner (§5.2). ĉe foundation of
the approach I propose is the Clause TypingHypothesis of Cheng (1991): “All clauses contain an element
that scopes over a propositional constituent (TP) and specėes its discourse function.” Illocutionary rela-
tions occupy Force⁰, and are functions from propositions to discourse updates. Since a discourse update
is, in turn, a function from preference states to preference states, the type of Force⁰ is ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑟⟩, where 𝑟 is
the semantic type of a preference state (a set of pairs of propositions). ĉus the content of any well-formed
matrix clause is an update ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩ and is formed in a compositional manner. I also show that in the allegedly
compositional semantics of ZanuĨini et al. (2012), it is not possible to deėne the meaning of Jussive⁰ in
isolation; this is in contrast to the preference analysis, where the denotation of imperative Force⁰ is simply
𝜆𝑝 . ! 𝑝.
ĉe ėnal contribution of the dissertation is a preliminary semantics for embedding imperatives under
verbs of communication, such as English say (§5.3). Just like matrix clauses, embedded clauses contain
Force⁰, so theymust denote updates of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩. ĉe ability to embed a clause thus requires an appropriate
embedding verb that can take an update as one of its arguments. I propose that verbs of communication are
of type ⟨𝑟𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩: functions fromupdates and individuals to sets ofworlds. Based on the semantics given in
Starr (2010) for embedding interrogatives under wonder, I provide a preliminary deėnition of English say,
which can embed clauses of any type (e.g. John said that he jumped, John said who jumped, John said jump!).
Wonder relies on pairing preference states with individuals to indicate their internal information states; say
uses pairs that indicate speaker-oriented discourse states.
ĉere are many open issues in the study of imperatives that I did not have the time or space to address
in this dissertation. I discuss some of these in the concluding remarks (Chapter 6). For one, there is much
room for cross-linguistic application of the preference analysis put forth here. ĉe surprising discoveries
of new facts about English ã imperatives’ sensitivity to QUD type, the distinction between contrastive
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and non-contrastive topicalization, the exact position of do-support, and the mechanisms for embedding
imperative clausesãare signiėcant enough to receive primary aĨention. ĉe preference analysis accounts
for all of these facts in a uniėed system.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO IMPEĆTIVES
2.1 Introduction
ĉis chapter outlines three semantic analyses of imperatives and how they interface with syntax and prag-
matics. Each of the three analyses represents imperative meaning with a diﬀerent type of semantic object,
and thus makes diﬀerent predictions about how those objects are derived and interpreted. ĉe chapter is
organized so that each section covers a single analysis.
§2.2describes and critiques themodal analysisofKaufmann(2011). ĉis analysis assimilates themean-
ing of imperatives to that of modal declaratives, with some additional restrictions on when imperatives can
be felicitously uĨered. Although imperatives andmodal declaratives do overlap inmeaning and use, I argue
that it is impossible to equate one with the other. I provide preliminary data on how the two constructions
diverge, and I elaborate on the maĨer in Chapter 3.
§2.3 describes and critiques the property analysis of Portner (2004a; 2007) and later interface work
based upon it. Opposite to the modal analysis, imperative meaning is represented as properties (functions
from individuals to truth values); no other clause types denote properties. ĉis necessitates fragmenting
the discourse representation,making it diﬃcult to ascertain the relationship betweenuĨerances of diﬀerent
typeswithin a discourse. Additionally, the syntactic analysis of imperative properties proposed inZanuĨini
(2008) and ZanuĨini et al. (2012) requires an additional, imperative-speciėc projection; I return to this
issue in Chapter 4.
§2.4 describes and endorses preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012), which forms the basis of the pref-
erence analysis I propose in the remaining chapters of this dissertation. Preference semantics is a dynamic
semantic system that uniėes declarative, interrogative, and imperative meaning in a single discourse repre-
sentation: a preference state. Each clause type makes a diﬀerent characteristic contribution to the discourse
8
as speciėed by dynamic update rules, but there is no segregation of information as in the property analysis.
Many facts about imperative use that have to be stipulated in the other models fall out as natural conse-
quences of pragmatic reasoning in the preference analysis.
2.2 Imperatives asModals
2.2.1 Reducing Imperatives toOther Constructions
ĉerehavebeen several accounts of imperatives that try to explain their properties in termsof relateddeclar-
ative sentences. Hamblin (1987) discusses three long-standing theories that reduce imperatives to declar-
atives (2), either through use of amodal or by embedding under an explicitly performative verb. He argues
that none of these reductions are perfect equivalents of the imperative. Kaufmann (2011) revisits these
theories, and introduces another potential modal reduction, equating imperatives with necessity modals
in general, but particularly those withmust (3).
(1) Close the door! imperative
(2) a. You will close the door(!)¹ you-will reduction
b. You should close the door(!) you-should reduction
c. I order you to close the door(!) performative embedding
(3) You must close the door(!) you-must reduction
¹Many authors either have no convention for whether they punctuate examples with an exclamation point or period,
while others use exclamation points for all sentences that express a command. I only use an exclamation point to punctuate
sentences that are syntactically imperative; an exclamation point in parentheses indicates that it was present in the original
source, but I do not judge the sentence to be an imperative.
9
Early explanations of these reductions were founded on generative semantic theories, in which the sur-
face form of one sentence may be the result of directly transforming the surface form of another sentence.
Under these systems, imperatives were derived from declarative modals by suppressing pronunciation of
the subject you and the modal will, should, ormust. Since more recent syntactic theories do not permit di-
rectmanipulation of this sort, a diﬀerent explanation is required of anyonewho seeks to equate imperatives
with a declarative construction.
Kaufmann (2011) (and her earlier work in Schwager (2006)) adopts just such an approach, arguing
that despite their syntactic diﬀerences, imperatives and certain declarative modals have largely identical
semantic representations. ĉis is accomplished by the presence of an imperative operator, Op𝑖𝑚𝑝, which
is present in the clausal leě periphery of imperatives. Kaufmann deėnes Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 as taking the same sort of
arguments as a lexical modal in the verbal domain, drawing on the framework of Kratzer (1981) and her
subsequent work on graded modality.
Kaufmann’s (2011) analysis is based on the similarity in function between imperatives and certain uses
of declarativemodals expressingnecessity. It is in thenatureofmodal sentences that they areunderspeciėed
as to what type of modality they express: logical, deontic, epistemic, etc. (Kratzer 1981). Additionally,
modals may be used descriptively or performatively. Descriptive uses “[report on] the way the world is
with respects to…possibilities and necessities,” whereas performative uses “change the way the world is in
such respects.” (Kaufmann 2011:58). Contextual factors, such as those supplied in (4) and (5), are usually
necessary to identify which way a modal sentence is being used.
(4) Descriptive use of ‘must’
Context: Patrick and Veronica are housemates with several other people. ĉey have established
a rotating chore schedule and posted it in the common room. Patrick looks at the chart, and sees
that it is Veronica’s assignment to take out the trash this week.
Patrick (to Veronica): You must take out the trash.²
²ĉe use of ‘must’ in this scenario seems rather stilted or formal. ĉis should not be of much concern, because replacing
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(5) Performative use of ‘must’
Context: Patrick and Veronica are housemates with several other people. Patrick has been ap-
pointed tomake sure that the house is well-maintained by enlisting the help of others as necessary.
At a house meeting, he is giving chore assignments for the week.
Patrick (to Veronica): You must take out the trash(!)
In both (4) and (5), Veronica is expected to take out the trash aěer Patrick’s uĨerance. In (4), the
obligation already held before Patrick’s uĨerance. As such, themodal is used descriptively, since it does not
change the deontic necessities that hold in this world; even if Veronica is ignorant of her duty, the most
that the descriptive modal accomplishes is to inform her of it. Contrast the use of the modal in (5). In this
case, Patrick has altered the facts about deontic necessities by assigning Veronica a new duty. Uses of this
sort are called performative declarative modals (performative to distinguish them from descriptive modals;
declarative to distinguish them from imperatives). One characteristic of performative declarative modals is
that in many contexts, an imperative sentence can be used instead, achieving the same eﬀect of creating a
new norm or duty. In (5), Patrick’s uĨerance could perfectly well be substituted by the imperativeTake out
the trash!. ĉis potential substitution is what leads Kaufmann (2011) to argue that imperatives should be
analyzed as modals. However, there do seem to be scenarios in which they are not interchangeable, as in
(6) below.³
(6) Context: Patrick and Veronica are housemates with several other people. ĉey have established
a rotating chore schedule and posted it in the common room. Patrick looks at the chart, which
indicates that this week it is Roger’s turn to take out the trash.
a. Patrick (to Veronica):
#You must take out the trash.
must with the more natural have to does not aﬀect the modal meaning in any way.
³In addition to the case I present here, see §3.3 of Portner (2007) for arguments as to why the claim that imperatives and
performative declarative modals are interchangeable is an oversimpliėcation.
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b. Patrick (to Veronica):
✓Take out the trash!
In the context of (6), the descriptive use of the modal is possible, although it is a false statement.
(Patrick could uĨer it felicitously if, for example, he hadmisread the chart or forgot what day of the month
it was.) On the other hand, the performative use seems unavailable. If the performative declarative modal
and imperative are identical, then the imperative should be unavailable as well, yet using an imperative
in this scenario is possible. It is clear that Patrick is creating a new norm based on criteria diﬀerent from
the previous public knowledge, but it is created just the same. ĉis fact is contrary to Kaufmann’s general
program, which as we will see, is that imperatives are identical to performative declarative modals except
that they have more restrictions on the contexts in which they can be uĨered and their range of possible
meanings.
2.2.2 ĉeGradedModal Hypothesis
Similarities between declarative modals and imperatives can be expressed in any semantics that represents
modality in natural language. Kaufmann (2011) uses the highly familiar gradedmodality theory of Kratzer
(1981). In Kratzer’s theory, necessity and possibility are treated as universal and existential quantiėcation,
respectively, as applied to a specially selected set ofworlds. ĉeprocess of selecting thoseworlds relies upon
two conversational backgrounds, functions that take a world and return a set of propositions.⁴ Kaufmann
(2011) augments the theory as presented in Kratzer (1981) by adding a temporal parameter as well. ĉe
argumentsofmodals are summarized in (7)below; of those, all except theprejacent (thepropositionwhose
necessity or possibility is being expressed by the full modal statement) are used to calculate the set of “best
worlds” to which the modal quantiėcation applies.
⁴See Kratzer (1991:641ﬀ.) for a more detailed deėnition, several basic examples of conversational backgrounds, and dis-
cussion of how they diﬀer from traditional accessibility relations.
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(7) Arguments of graded modals
Argument Semantic type
𝑓 modal base ⟨𝑖, ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩
𝑔 ordering source ⟨𝑖, ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩
𝑡 time of evaluation 𝑖
𝑃 prejacent ⟨𝑖, 𝑠𝑡⟩
𝑤 world of evaluation 𝑠
ĉe modal base 𝑓 takes the world of evaluation 𝑤 and returns a set of propositions. Taken together,
this set of propositions characterizes a set of worlds under consideration, the intersection of the returned
propositions, wriĨen ∩𝑓(𝑤). ĉis set of worlds may be more restricted, less restricted, or identical to the
set of live possibilities provided by the uĨerance context. A special case is when 𝑓 returns an empty set of
propositions, in which case∩𝑓 is𝑊 , the set of all logically possible worlds.
Like 𝑓, the ordering source 𝑔 also takes a world of evaluation and returns a set of propositions. ĉis set
is used to generate a preorder on the worlds identiėed by the modal base.⁵
(8) Preorder determined by 𝑔
∀𝑣, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ 𝑣 ≤𝑔(𝑤) 𝑧 iﬀ {𝑝 | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑔(𝑤)& 𝑧 ∈ 𝑝} ⊆ {𝑝 | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑔(𝑤)& 𝑣 ∈ 𝑝}
(Kaufmann 2011:84, ex. 28)
ĉe preorder, as deėned in (8), states that a world 𝑣 is 𝑔-beĨer than (or equal to) another world 𝑧 if every
𝑔-proposition that is true in 𝑧 is also true in 𝑣. ĉus, worlds in which the most 𝑔-propositions are true are
said to be 𝑔-best, or simply the best worlds. ĉe set of best worlds relative to a modal base, ordering source,
and world of evaluation are referred to as𝑂.
⁵Kratzer (1991), citing Lewis (1981), calls the ordering relation established by 𝑔 a partial order. According to ordering
theory, this is technically incorrect, as partial orders must be antisymmetric, i.e. not permiĨing two distinct elements to be
ranked equally. 𝑔 does allow ties in its ranking, and is thus a preorder. See Swanson (2011) for further discussion of these
distinctions, including references to the relevant linguistic literature.
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(9) Set of best worlds𝑂
𝑂(𝑓, 𝑔, 𝑤, 𝑡) ∶= {𝑣 ∈ ∩𝑓(𝑤) | ∀𝑧 ∈ ∩𝑓(𝑤) ∶ if 𝑧 ≤𝑔(𝑤,𝑡) 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤𝑔(𝑤,𝑡) 𝑧}
(aěer Kaufmann 2011:84, ex. 30)
ĉe formal deėnition of 𝑂 in (9) states: of the worlds characterized by a modal base evaluated at a
particular world (and time), the best worlds are those which are 𝑔-beĨer than (or equal to) all other worlds
characterized by the modal base.
ĉe heart of Kaufmann’s proposal is that lexical modals likemust and should determine the best worlds
and quantify over them in the same way that the unpronounced imperative operator, Op𝑖𝑚𝑝, does. ĉus
the denotations given formust (10) and Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 (11) are extremely similar.
(10) ⟦must⟧𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓𝜆𝑔𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓, 𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)]
(aěer Kaufmann 2011:96, ex. 53)
(11) ⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓𝜆𝑔𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)]
(aěer Kaufmann 2011:133, ex. 11)⁶
ĉe primary semantic diﬀerence between these two modal elements lies in the arguments of𝑂. ĉis will
necessarily result in diﬀerent truth conditions, since the universal quantiėcation is over themembers of𝑂.
For must, there is greater variability of 𝑂, since all four of its arguments are bound variables, whereas for
Op𝑖𝑚𝑝, twoof them(𝑓 and 𝑡) have been replacedwith constants (𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) and𝐶𝑇). 𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) is a constant func-
tion that “to each world…assigns the common ground of the uĨerance context” (Kaufmann 2011:132),
and 𝐶𝑇 is the uĨerance time. ĉis diﬀerence stipulates that imperatives can only be evaluated against the
current context set and time.
⁶Although this deėnition is listed by Kaufmann as “preliminary”, the portion presented here does not change at all in
the ėnal deėnition given at Kaufmann (2011:162, ex. 63); the only additions are the several “presuppositional” deėnedness
conditions imposed on imperatives. For now, I leave aside those conditions and their eﬀects, returning to them in (31) ﬀ.
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To see the eﬀects of using these constants in the computation of imperative meaning, consider the
following example, showing the applicationof⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧ to a simple imperative sentence,Get up!. Kaufmann
(2011) states the truth conditions of this sentence as in (12).⁷
(12) ⟦[[𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝 𝑓 𝑔 𝑡][IŁńńŇŃ get up]]⟧𝑐 = 1 iﬀ
(∀𝑤 ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝐶𝑊 ))[(∃𝑒)[𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤)]],
where 𝑔 = ‘what the speaker orders’
presupposes: ¬(𝑡 < 𝐶𝑇) (Kaufmann 2011:132, ex. 10)
Inprose: thedenotationofGet up! indicates that of theworldsunder consideration in theuĨerance context,
in all of them that are best according to what the speaker orders, the addressee gets up. Furthermore, it is
separately presupposed that the action of geĨing up occurs at a non-past time. ĉe following derivation
shows the proposition expressed by the same imperative sentence.
(13) ⟦[𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝 𝑓 𝑔 𝑡][IŁńńŇŃ get up]⟧𝑐 =
(14) ⟦[𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝 𝑓 𝑔 𝑡]⟧𝑐(⟦IŁńńŇŃ get up⟧𝑐) =
(15) ⟦𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐) (⟦IŁńńŇŃ get up⟧𝑐) =
(16) ⟦𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐) (⟦get up⟧𝑐(⟦IŁńńŇŃ⟧𝑐)) =
(17) ⟦𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐) (⟦get up⟧𝑐(𝐶𝐴)) =
(18) ⟦𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐) ([𝜆𝑥″𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝑥″)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]](𝐶𝐴)) =
⁷In the subsequent examples, IŁńńŇŃ is the null imperative subject pronoun. Its denotation is a function that returns the
addressee of the current context,𝐶𝐴.
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(19) ⟦𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐) (𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(20) 𝜆𝑓′ 𝜆𝑔′ 𝜆𝑡′ 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔′, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] (⟦𝑓⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐)
(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(21) 𝜆𝑔′ 𝜆𝑡′ 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔′, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] (⟦𝑔⟧𝑐) (⟦𝑡⟧𝑐)
(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(22) 𝜆𝑔′ 𝜆𝑡′ 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔′, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] (𝑐(𝑔)) (𝑐(𝑡))
(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(23) 𝜆𝑔′ 𝜆𝑡′ 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔′, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] (𝑔􏷠) (𝑡􏷠)
(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(24) 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡􏷠)(𝑤′)]
(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)]) =
(25) 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[(𝜆𝑡″𝜆𝑤″ . ∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡″& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤″)])(𝑡􏷠)(𝑤′)] =
(26) 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]]
ĉe result is a proposition of type ⟨𝑠𝑡⟩, having the same truth conditions as in (12). However, some steps
taken in the course of the derivation merit discussion, particularly those regarding the instantiation of the
four arguments of𝑂. I will return to this topic in §2.2.3 below. For now, I will use the proposition derived
in (26) to evaluate the imperative relative to sample contexts and the modal parameters they provide.
ĉe simplest model in which to evaluate ⟦Get up!⟧ is one in which it is a discourse-initial uĨerance.
ĉen we can assume that the common ground has not been linguistically restricted, and is open to all pos-
sible worlds. ĉe two salient propositions at the time of uĨerance are that the addressee gets up, and that
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the speaker orders the addressee to get up. ĉemodel thus consists of the following.
(27) Sample model for evaluating ‘Get up!’
𝐶𝐺(𝑐) =Ø
∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) =𝑊 = {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}
𝑝 =𝐶𝐴 gets up = {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠}
𝑞 =𝐶𝑆 orders 𝑝 = {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷡}⁸
One crucial aspect of the context leě unspeciėed in (27) is what world is the world of uĨerance; this world
will determine the ordering source 𝑔 used in determining the best worlds. (Recall that 𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) and 𝐶𝑇 are
constants, and therefore not contingent upon the world of evaluation.) 𝑔 has been qualitatively described
as ‘what the speaker orders’ in (12). ĉis ordering source can be formalized as in (28).
(28) ‘What the speaker orders’
𝑔􏷠 = 𝜆𝑤⟨𝑠⟩ 𝜆𝑟⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ . [𝐶𝑆 orders that 𝑟 in𝑤]
Which world from the model acts as the input to this function will determine the output of 𝑔. First let us
consider the case where𝐶𝑊 =𝑤􏷟, in which both the addressee gets up and the speaker commands it.
(29) ⟦Get up!⟧𝑐 where𝐶𝑊 = 𝑤􏷟 and 𝑔􏷠 = 𝜆𝑤⟨𝑠⟩ 𝜆𝑟⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ . [𝐶𝑆 orders that 𝑟 in𝑤]
𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] (𝐶𝑊 ) =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝐶𝑊 ))[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
⁸ĉere is room for debate on the ontology of propositions like 𝑞 and whether they have a place in deėning the common
ground of a conversation. Kaufmann explicitly doesmake room formeta-linguistic propositions in her theory, so considering
𝑞 on a par with other propositions is in accordance with her approach.
17
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) | ∀𝑧 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) : if 𝑧 ≤𝑔􏷪(𝑤􏷩) 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤𝑔􏷪(𝑤􏷩) 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-
up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) | ∀𝑧 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) : if 𝑧 ≤{𝑝} 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤{𝑝} 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-
up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢} | ∀𝑧 ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢} : if 𝑧 ≤{𝑝} 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤{𝑝} 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆
𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]]
ĉe result of (29) seems to be an ideal result: 𝑔􏷠 ranks just the 𝑝-worlds highest, and the imperative makes
a true statement, namely that all of the 𝑝-worlds are in fact 𝑝-worlds. However, this correct result comes at
the price of making a non-trivial assumption: that the action ordered by the imperative in progress counts
as a proposition that 𝐶𝑆 orders in the actual world at the time of uĨerance. Intuitively, it seems that the
order to carry out 𝑝 does not exist until aěer the imperative is uĨered (recall the scenarios in (4)–(6)).
Following this intuition, assume that 𝐶𝑊 =𝑤􏷢, the world in which the addressee does not get up and the
speaker does not command him to.
(30) ⟦Get up!⟧𝑐 where𝐶𝑊 = 𝑤􏷢 and 𝑔􏷠 = 𝜆𝑤⟨𝑠⟩ 𝜆𝑟⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ . [𝐶𝑆 orders that 𝑟 in𝑤]
𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] (𝐶𝑊 ) =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔􏷠, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝐶𝑊 ))[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) | ∀𝑧 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) : if 𝑧 ≤𝑔􏷪(𝑤􏷬) 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤𝑔􏷪(𝑤􏷬) 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-
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up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) | ∀𝑧 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺(𝑐) : if 𝑧 ≤∅ 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤∅ 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-
up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑣 ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢} |∀𝑧 ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢} : if 𝑧 ≤∅ 𝑣 then 𝑣 ≤∅ 𝑧})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠&
get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]] =
(∀𝑤′ ∈ {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢})[∃𝑒 [𝜏(𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡􏷠& get-up(𝐶𝐴)(𝑒)(𝑤′)]]
Because in𝑤􏷢 there are no propositions ordered by the speaker, 𝑔􏷠 is empty and cannot order the worlds
from the modal base in any way. ĉus all worlds in the modal base are equally good (or bad), and the
universal quantiėer scopes over the entire context set. ĉe result is a false modal statement. ĉus, we see
that in order for Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 to function properly, it must be assumed that the ordered proposition counts as
being among the speaker’s orders at the same time as the imperative uĨerance is being made.
To mitigate against problems like the one that arose in (30), several additional constraints are incor-
porated into the deėnition of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝. Kaufmann (2011) calls these, taken together, the “presuppositional
meaning component” of the imperative operator; however, they are not presuppositional in the sense of
Stalnaker (1979). For example, the constraint on the time at which the commanded action takes place,
¬(𝑡 < 𝐶𝑇), restricts the available assignments of a bound variable within ⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧. ĉere is no way to en-
code this fact as a common ground proposition. ĉus itmust not be taken as a Stalnakerian presupposition,
but either as a (pragmatic) felicity condition or a (semantic) deėnedness condition.⁹ Altogether, there are
four such conditions in the ėnal deėnition of ⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧.
⁹All of the conditions onOp𝑖𝑚𝑝 included inKaufmann(2011), aswell as someothers, are presented inSchwager (2006) as
deėnedness conditions, i.e. the entire imperative sentence is undeėned if one ormore of them fails to bemet. See (Kaufmann
2011:144, fn. 16) for discussion of this distinction and her decision to adopt the pragmatic view.
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(31) ⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓 𝜆𝑔 𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) ∪ 𝑓, 𝑔, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)]
presupposes:
Event Frame: ¬(𝑡 < 𝐶𝑇)
Authority Condition: 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐴𝑈𝑇𝐻 ′(𝐶𝑆)(𝑐)
Epistemic Uncertainty: for the precontext 𝑐′ of 𝑐,
𝐶𝑆(𝑐′) ⊆ 𝜆𝑤 . (∃𝑤′ ∈ 𝐵𝑒𝑙′𝐶𝑆(𝐶
′
𝑇)(𝑤))(∃𝑤″ ∈ 𝐵𝑒𝑙′𝐶𝑆(𝐶
′
𝑇)(𝑤))[¬𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)& 𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤″)]
Ordering Source Restriction: either in 𝑐 there is a salient decisionproblemsuch that in 𝑐 the imper-
ative provides an answer to it, 𝑔 is any prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee
consider 𝑔 the relevant criteria for resolving the decision problem;
or else, in 𝑐 there is no salient decision problem such that the imperative provides an answer
to it in 𝑐, and 𝑔 is speaker bouletic.
(Kaufmann 2011:162, ex.63)
ĉe Event Frame constraint ensures that the completion of the commanded action occurs at a non-
past time. ĉis is less strict than many other claims in the literature that commanded actions must occur
entirely in the future.¹⁰ Note that when the event time is instantiated in (23) above, it is a free variable. If
the 𝑡 argument of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 is provided in the same manner as for ordinary tensed modals, tense is speciėed
by a separate morpheme (likely T⁰). In fact, it has been claimed that several languages, including Dutch
(Mastop 2005), Syrian Arabic (Cowell 1964; Palmer 1986), and Estonian (Aikhenvald 2010), allow im-
peratives to combine with past tense morphology, usually resulting in a counterfactual interpretation.
Mastop (2011) gives a detailed account of the Dutch “pluperfect imperative” construction, which he
argues is a true counterfactual. ĉese clauses are morphosyntactically marked with a past participial form
of the verb and the inclusion of certain particles, which are glossed only as ńŇŉ, but serve an important
¹⁰In her discussion of this topic, Kaufmann (2011:96) refers to Mastop (2005) and Portner (2007) as proponents of the
future-only view. It is unclear that Mastop (2005) makes this claim, and Mastop (2011) clariėes the stance that imperatives
are a semantic primitive. On this view, imperative clauses can be marked with any tense and aspect, so long as they do not
run afoul of independent morphosyntactic restrictions.
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grammatical role. For example, the particle toch cannot co-occur with an overt subject, and this is taken
to be evidence that clauses such as (32) are indeed imperatives. (Dutch, unlike English, does not readily
allow overt pronominal or quantiėcational subjects in imperatives.)
(32) Was
was
toch
ńŇŉ
lekker
ńŇŉ
thuisgebleven.
at.home.stay-pp
“You should have just stayed at home.” (Mastop 2011:323, ex. 27)
ĉe imperative in (32) is said to be embedded (semantically, not syntactically) under “past tense which
can be given an irrealis interpretation.” (Mastop 2011:325). ĉe logical representation of (32) is taken to
be the following:
(33) Irrealis(Made it the case that you went home) (Mastop 2011:325, ex. 37)
Made it the case that you went home is the representation of the semantic imperative, indicated morphosyn-
tactically by the participial verb form. Past tense contributes Irrealis() and scopes outside of the imperative;
this interpretation is taken to be speciėc to Dutch. No past tense proposition is represented in (33), since
Mastop (2011) argues that imperatives are primitives and have no propositional content. I argue in §3.2
that imperatives do have propositional content, and that felicitous past-tense imperatives should always be
pragmatically interpreted as counterfactual.
Returning to Kaufmann’s (2011) ėnal two conditions on imperative uĨerances, the Authority Condi-
tion and the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition aim to ensure that the speaker has valid grounds for issuing
the imperative. Both of these conditions are related to the speaker’s beliefs. ĉe Authority Condition does
not enforce any notion of social authority, but rather that the speaker “counts as an authority” on the two
conversational backgrounds that are arguments of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝.
(34) 𝑥 counts as an authority on a conversational background 𝑓 in 𝑐 iﬀ
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∀𝑤 ∈ 𝐶𝑆(𝑐) (∀⟨𝑤′, 𝑡′⟩ ∈ 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑥)(𝑡)(𝑤))(∀𝑝)[𝑝 ∈ 𝑓(𝑡′)(𝑤′) ↔ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑓(𝐶𝑇)(𝑤)]
(Kaufmann 2011:149, ex. 43a)
In prose: the speaker counts as an authority on 𝑓 if for any world consistent with the speaker’s beliefs rela-
tive to any given world in the context set, the output of 𝑓 is the same in the belief world as in the uĨerance
world. ĉus the Authority Condition imposes a requirement of a certain type of consistency on the part
of the speaker, but makes no reference to his relationship with the addressee.¹¹ Similarly, Epistemic Un-
certainty solely makes reference to the speaker’s beliefs, stating that (immediately prior to the imperative
uĨerance), the speaker must believe that the commanded action may or may not be realized; this is an
acknowledgement of the fact that imperatives can be disobeyed. While I agree that “if the speaker is sure
that 𝜑 is going to happen (or will not happen), then issuing an imperative 𝜑! is infelicitous,” (Kaufmann
2011:156), I contend that an additional constraint is not necessary to enforce this notion. In §3.4.1, I show
that epistemic uncertainty can be accounted for by the general criteria for pragmatic Relevance, and need
not be encoded in the imperative operator.
Finally, the Ordering Source Restriction is a broader claim about when an imperative uĨerance is a
fruitful, cooperative contribution to a discourse. While there are certainly pragmatic principles of this sort
at play in any discourse, it’s not clear that they are brought to bear by virtue of a particular lexical item, such
asOp𝑖𝑚𝑝. In §3.3, I take a diﬀerent view onwhatmakes an imperative relevant, relying on comparing the at-
issue, propositional content of an imperative against the discourse context. ĉis approach is an extension of
Simons et al.’s (2011) theory of relevance, which is based on amodel of discourse that tracks the goals of a
discourse via a stack of Questions Under Discussion (Roberts 1996). ĉe revision that I propose both ėlls
a gap in Simons et al.’s (2011) formulation of relevance and covers the concerns addressed by theOrdering
Source Restriction.
¹¹Of course, there is the possibility that the output of 𝑓 contains propositions which involve the addressee; however, the
deėnition of authority does not guarantee this in any way.
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All of these conditions serve to reėne the formal deėnition of when imperatives are pragmatically ac-
ceptable. ĉere is certainly room to debate the way in which they are incorporated into the grammar, but
even Kaufmann (2011) has changed stance from her previous work in Schwager (2006) on this issue, and
rightly points out that the division of the theory into semantic and pragmatic components is not the most
interesting part of the debate about imperativemeaning (Kaufmann 2011:144, fn. 16). As such, I conclude
my discussion of the felicity conditions here. In the next subsection, I return to the core semantics of the
modal analysis, and address some deeper issues that it raises.
2.2.3 Criticism of theModal Analysis
ĉe modal analysis proposed by Kaufmann (2011) captures many of the basic intuitions about impera-
tives ã foremost that a concept of bestness, like in modals, plays a role in imperative meaningã but the
implementationmisses some key facts and introduces some technical diﬃculties as well, mostly due to the
denotation of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝.
First, I will address the issue that, on Kaufmann’s (2011) analysis, Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 is strictly more limited than
must in both the contexts in which it can be used and the modal meanings it can represent. ĉe deėnitions
of these two modal elements are repeated below.
(35) ⟦must⟧𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓 𝜆𝑔 𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓, 𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] =(10)
(36) ⟦Op𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓 𝜆𝑔 𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑃 𝜆𝑤 . (∀𝑤′ ∈ 𝑂(𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶), 𝑔, 𝐶𝑇 , 𝑤))[𝑃(𝑡)(𝑤′)] =(11)
A declarative modal withmust should be able to be used in place of an imperative in any circumstance, so
long as its 𝑓 and 𝑡 arguments can be instantiated as 𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) and 𝐶𝑇 . However, some imperatives do not
allow substitution with a performative declarativemodal. One class of imperatives that behave this way are
the sort of commands that appear on wriĨen signs.
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(37) Context: a sign posted on a residential lawn, which has been recently fertilized.
a. Keep oﬀ the grass!
b. #You must keep oﬀ the grass(!)
A potential counterargument to a case like (37) is that the context is defective in this scenario, since there
is not a speaker or uĨerance time per se. However, I think this counterargument is not a secure one. De-
spite the fact that 𝑓 and 𝑡 are more restricted in the imperative, they are still contextually determined; the
complete unavailability of a context-provided time shouldmake the imperative fail just as badly as the per-
formative declarativemodal. Nor can the discrepancy be due to the diﬀerence between you and IŁńńŇŃ, as
they too are equally context-dependent. Nevertheless, the imperative is the only way to express this type of
wriĨen command. ĉus, imperatives can, in at least some circumstances, perform the task of commanding
when amodal cannot, which would indicate that their range of meaning is not a subset of modal meanings.
In the other direction, the limitation imposed by hard-coding the 𝑓 and 𝑡 arguments of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 causes
both technical and practical problems. In technical terms, 𝜆𝑓′ is vacuous in (21), as there is no bound oc-
currence of 𝑓. More importantly, though, it also precludes imperatives from being evaluated against modal
bases not identical to the current context set. Yet there are constructions in which shiěing the modal base
seems perfectly normal, including in conditionals (38), and commands that invite iterative interpretations
(39).
(38) If it’s past 8:00, get up! (Otherwise, you can stay in bed.)
(39) When it’s cold outside, wear your coat!
If evaluated against a modal base consisting only of the live worlds given the uĨerance context, these im-
peratives yield anomalous interpretations. For (38), it should not be the case that the imperative predicts
that in all of the best worlds, including ones where it is 7:00, the addressee gets up. One way out of this
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problem would be to say that if the restriction imposed by the if-clause does not hold, no modal claim is
made by the imperative. However, a parallel explanation fails for (39), which can be uĨered on a warm,
summer day and still impose a norm upon the addressee.
ĉere is one situation inwhichKaufmann (2011) allows themodal base to be something other than the
CommonGround: imperativeswhich give advice. ĉeargument is that in these cases the imperativemakes
reference to knowledge the speaker has but the addressee does not, and that this non-common knowledge
cannot be represented as part of the Common Ground, but must play a role in the imperative meaning.
ĉis is accomplished by unioning the CommonGroundwith an external “set of relevant facts” (Kaufmann
2011:143), notated as 𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶) ∪ 𝑓 in the ėnal deėnition of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 (31). I fail to see how this accomplishes
anything that the ordering source does not. Certainly the ordering source in such a scenario would be
able to access the speaker’s private knowledge (as it can access their beliefs, desires, and orders in other
scenarios). ĉe process of computing 𝑓𝐶𝐺(𝐶)∪𝑓 should have no eﬀect on what worlds are selected as best,
and is therefore another vacuous contribution of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝.
Next, I address one of the modal arguments that is equally variable for Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 and must, the ordering
source 𝑔. However, the accessibility of an ordering source for anaphoric reference in a followup uĨerance
varies between modals and imperatives. With a modal sentence, it is possible for a speaker to follow up
their modal uĨerance with a statement about the nature or eﬃcacy of the ordering source (40). ĉe same
type of followup comment is not possible with an imperative (41).
(40) A: You must pay your taxes on time(!)
A: ✓However, many people disregard this law.
(41) A: Take out the trash!
A1: #However, many people disobey my orders.
A2: #However, many people don’t do what I want.
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In (40), 𝑔 is a deontic ordering source of the sort “what the law provides” (Kratzer 1991), so each of its
member propositions corresponds to an individual requirement imposed by a law. With this type of or-
dering source in eﬀect, the anaphoric phrase this law is able to exploit the fact that 𝑔 is a set of laws in order
to refer to one of its members. ĉis is not the case in (41), where an imperative does not license reference
to a proposition in an ordering source. ĉis is not because the type of ordering source being referred to is
of a type that is incompatible with an imperative; speaker-bouletic ordering sources of the form 𝑔 = ‘what
the speaker orders’ are exactly the sort licensed by the deėnition of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 (31). I take this as evidence that
imperatives do not contribute any discourse-accessible ordering source.
Another open issue regarding imperative ordering sources is whether the imperative denotation cru-
cially relies on a circular premise, namely that imperatives impose an order just in case that order is in force
at the time of uĨerance. In (29) and (30) above, it was determined that the proposition being commanded
must be part of the output of 𝑔 in order for the imperative to make a true modal statement. ĉis paradox
cannot be resolved by simply atemporalizing ‘what the speaker orders’. Allowing the ordering source access
to whatever the speaker orders at any time yields results just as anomalous as the one in which the current
command is excluded (30). Consider a simple sequence of two imperatives uĨered back to back.
(42) Get up! Get dressed!
Given that two actions are being commanded of the addressee in this scenario, there are four logically pos-
sible ordering sources for the second imperative,Get dressed!.
(43) 𝑝 = 𝐶𝐴 gets up
𝑞 = 𝐶𝐴 gets dressed
a. 𝑔􏷠 =∅
b. 𝑔􏷡 = {𝑝}
c. 𝑔􏷢 = {𝑞}
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d. 𝑔􏷣 = {𝑝, 𝑞}
𝑔􏷠 will not only yield improper results comparable to those in (30), but also ignores the fact that the
command to get up has already been given in a previous uĨerance. Nor should we exclude 𝑝 from 𝑔 due
to any paradox of circularity, since the current uĨerance is making a command regarding 𝑞. However, if
past orders are acceptable for inclusion in 𝑔, but the order in progress is not, we get 𝑔􏷡. ĉis generates
a potentially worse result than the false modal claim generated by an empty ordering source; it actually
makes Get dressed! mean that in all of the worlds where the addressee gets up, the addressee gets dressed.
It is obviously not the case that an imperative generates some new entailment based upon previous orders.
𝑔􏷢 and 𝑔􏷣 are thus our best possible candidates for the ordering source, although they both include 𝑞,
which goes against the aĨempt to avoid circularity. 𝑔􏷣 looks least oﬀensive at ėrst, since it takes into account
all past and present orders made by the speaker. However, this is actually too restrictive. To include both
𝑝 and 𝑞 in the ordering source means that the imperative only quantiėes over (𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)-worlds, i.e. ⟦Get
dressed!⟧ ≈ ‘in every world where the addressee gets up and gets dressed, the addressee gets dressed’. For
these two propositions, this interpretation seems harmless, but only because of our real-world knowledge
about the order in which these actions usually proceedã it’s very diﬃcult to get dressed while still in bed.
It ismore problematic when the two commanded actions have no causal or temporal relationshipwith each
other. Take, for example, a scenario in which a mother says the following to her son:
(44) Get dressed! Eat breakfast!
A few minutes later, she enters the kitchen and sees her son eating a bowl of cereal, wearing his pajamas.
ĉis may not be what she envisioned when giving her orders, but presuming that aěer her son ėnishes
eating, he returns to his room and gets dressed, we cannot say that hemisunderstood or failed to satisfy the
expectations imposed on him. ĉis is an unfortunate consequence for the modal analysis, as it means that
𝑔􏷢 is in fact the optimal ordering source for describing the real-world eﬀect of the imperative. If the ordering
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source for an imperative expressing an order must be the singleton set containing the ordered proposition,
the derivation of imperative meaning does not merely have a circular component, but is fully circular.
Despite the issues raised above, Kaufmann’s (2011) modal analysis of imperatives does ask the right
questions regarding the semantics of imperatives: Why are they so similar to certain modals? Why can
they accomplish a number of functions, beyond simple commanding? Why are there limitations on the
commanded action and the speaker’s aĨitude towards it? Andmost importantly, why are imperatives obli-
gatorily performative?
ĉe Ěexibility of graded modals should allow these types of complex distinctions to be encoded in
the semantics. However, the end result is that imperatives are not so semantically diﬀerent from necessity
modals aěer all. Portner (to appear), summarizing themodal analysis, points out that themajor diﬀerences
lie in the “presuppositional” pragmatic component, “which ensure[s] that [Op𝑖𝑚𝑝] has a performative, not
a descriptive, use.” While the various restrictions on imperatives constrain the contexts in which they can
be felicitously uĨered, they do not seem to directly supply a performative meaning. Furthermore, if, as
Portner (to appear) claims, the pragmatic restrictions of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 produce performativity, what does this say
about performative declarativemodals, which lack these lexically encoded restrictions? Perhaps similar re-
strictions are inferred for performative uses ofmust and should, but that would damage the notion that the
modal analysis reduces imperatives to a (more basic) declarative construction. As such, although Kauf-
mann (2011) provides many lessons about what facets of imperatives must be explained by an adequate
semantic theory, I leave it with the other reductive analyses (2). Onemajor response to reductive analyses
is an approach that has a dedicatedmechanism for trackingobligations, their creation, and their satisfaction.
I address these theories in the next section.
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2.3 Imperatives as Properties
2.3.1 DistinguishingUniversal Clause Types
In contrast to the reductive analyses described in §2.2 are approaches that treat the semantics of impera-
tive clauses as fundamentally diﬀerent from the semantics of other clause types. ĉe best-known of these
“clause-typing analyses” was introduced in Portner (2004a), and has formed the basis of a continued re-
search program by Portner and several collaborators (Portner 2007; 2012; Mauck and ZanuĨini 2005;
ZanuĨini 2008; ZanuĨini et al. 2012). ĉe core of the proposal by Portner (2004a) is that while declara-
tives encode propositions ⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ and questions encode sets of propositions ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩, imperatives encode prop-
erties ⟨𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩. ĉis segregation by semantic type allows the pragmatic component of the grammar to operate
diﬀerently on imperatives than on other clause types.
Portner (2004a) observes that the ability to encode declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives is a
universal characteristic of natural language, and that these three clause types are the only universal clause
types. He explains this as being a logical consequence of the human language faculty’smechanism for track-
ing the state of a discourse, obviating the need to encode clause types directly in the syntax (2004a:4). ĉe
discourse representation is composed by adding the denotata of matrix sentences to sets containing deno-
tata of like type. For assertions, this is a set of propositions, the Common Ground (following Stalnaker
1979). For questions, this is a set (or stack) of Questions Under Discussion (Roberts 1996). For imper-
atives, however, there is not a single set of properties. Rather, each participant in the discourse has their
own set of properties, called their To-Do List. One justiėcation for using properties to encode impera-
tives is that it solves the question of why imperativemeaning is not truth-evaluable: it is non-propositional.
However, since imperative properties do not in and of themselves specify who they are predicated of, Port-
ner (2004a; 2007) employs a pragmatic function to sort them into several To-Do Listsã indexed to each
discourse participantã so that the appropriate individual can be identiėed. ĉus imperatives are unique
among the universal clause types in that they are represented in the discourse not by a single set of semantic
29
objects, but by several participant-speciėc sets.
Under this viewof discourse, the type (and content) of a sentential denotation should uniquely identify
the component of discourse to which it will be added. For declaratives and interrogatives, semantic type
suﬃces; for imperatives, an additional domain restriction speciėes the target To-Do List. ĉe prototypical
domain restriction is that the property applies to the addressee(s) in the current context.¹² If no other type
of restriction is made, the property is added to the To-Do List(s) of the addressee(s), and is not added to
any others.
(45) ⟦Sit down!⟧ = [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = addressee𝐶 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤] (Portner 2007:358, ex. 15)
ĉe To-Do List of a given participant will contain properties roughly of the form given in (45). In
the next subsection, I will discuss the exact mechanics for adding properties to To-Do Lists in the system
of Portner (2004a; 2007); in §2.3.4 below, I discuss some issues that arise due to the fact that imperative
denotata and the elements of To-Do Lists are not identical.
2.3.2 Operating with To-Do Lists
ĉe To-Do List of a participant in a conversation is incrementally built by uĨerances of imperative sen-
tences. Like the Common Ground, at the outset of a conversation all participants’ To-Do Lists start in
some base state.¹³ All sentential denotata which are properties get delivered to the To-Do List function 𝑇 ,
which then updates the discourse context by adding the property to the appropriate To-Do List.
¹²Other restrictions are possible within Portner’s (2004a) theory; what domain restrictions can be encoded varies from
language to language. All languages allow restriction to the addressee, but some allow restrictions to the speaker or the speaker
and addressee together. Portner (2004a; 2007) notes that these other types of jussive clauses are present in Korean. See
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) for detailed discussion of the syntax and semantics of Korean jussives.
¹³ĉe base state of To-Do Lists, like the Common Ground, may be non-empty. When modeling the Common Ground,
certain basic facts may be mutually assumed between participants at the outset of a conversation. Likewise, basic deontic
norms (such as “Do not murder anyone”) may be assumed to be in a base To-Do List. Portner (2012) discusses some of
these cases and their relation to the broader linguistic and philosophical literature on permission.
30
(46) a. ĉeTo-DoList function𝑇 assigns to eachparticipant𝛼 in the conversation a set of properties
𝑇(𝛼).
b. ĉecanonical discourse functionof an imperative clause𝜑𝑖𝑚𝑝 is to add⟦𝜑𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧ to𝑇(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒).
Where𝐶 is a context of the form ⟨𝐶𝐺,𝑄, 𝑇⟩:
𝐶 + 𝜑𝑖𝑚𝑝 = ⟨𝐶𝐺,𝑄, 𝑇[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒/(𝑇(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒) ∪ ⟦𝜑𝑖𝑚𝑝⟧)]⟩
(Portner 2007:357, ex. 14)
ĉe update performed by the uĨerance of an imperative in a context does not alter the Common Ground
or Question Set, but does alter the value of a particular individual / To-Do List pair speciėed in the To-Do
List function.
Once a To-Do List is populated, its practical function is to guide the rational course of action of the
participant to whom it corresponds. Formally this is represented by calculating a partial order of worlds
based on the properties contained on the To-Do List.
(47) Partial ordering of worlds
For any𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡 ∈ ∩𝐶𝐺 and any participant 𝑖:
𝑤􏷠 <𝑖 𝑤􏷡 iﬀ for some 𝑃 ∈ 𝑇(𝑖), 𝑃(𝑤􏷡)(𝑖) = 1 and 𝑃(𝑤􏷠)(𝑖) = 0,
and for all𝑄 ∈ 𝑇(𝑖), if𝑄(𝑊􏷠)(𝑖) = 1 then𝑄(𝑊􏷡)(𝑖) = 1
(Portner 2007:358, ex. 16)
Portner (2007) compares the partial order generated by To-Do Lists to the preorder generated by the or-
dering source 𝑔 fromKratzer’s (1981) theory ofmodals, which forms the foundation for themodal analysis
of imperatives presented in Kaufmann (2011) (see §2.2 for details of the modal theory). ĉe major con-
ceptual diﬀerence between the two theories is the central focus of Portner (2007), which shows how prior
uĨerances of imperatives have eﬀects on the interpretation of later uĨerances of modal sentences.
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(48) A: Pay your taxes!
B: OK. #Should I pay my taxes? (Portner 2007:369, ex. 42)
(49) A: John, pay your taxes!
B: John should / must / has to pay his taxes.
ĉese facts are used to argue that the To-Do List is used as the ordering source for modal uĨerances, or at
least makes a material contribution to it.
ĉere are twominor discrepancies betweenTo-DoLists and ordering sources that prevents their direct
comparison or interaction. First, the values returned by ordering sources are sets of propositions, not sets
of properties. However, there is no reason that the properties on a To-Do List could not be transformed
into propositions before being combined with an ordering source. A potential method for computing such
a transformation is given in (50) below.
(50) a. 𝑇( John)= {[𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = addressee𝐶 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤]}
b. 𝑔𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 = {[𝜆𝑤 . John sits down in𝑤]}
Second, ordering sources induce preorders, rather than the partial orderings induced byTo-Do Lists.¹⁴
Portner (2007) does not specify whether the ranking derived from the ordering source should be strength-
ened to be a partial order, or whether the ranking contributed by a To-Do List should be weakened to a
preorder when used by a modal uĨerance. Either formal choice should not greatly aﬀect the qualitative
generalization that imperatives can disallow (48) or permit (49) certainmodals in the following discourse.
Finally, there is the issue of whether the structure of a To-Do List can account for the variable inter-
pretations of imperatives as commands, advice, wishes, etc. ĉe solution oﬀered by Portner (2007) is to
¹⁴ĉe ranking employed by Portner (2004a; 2007) is a true partial ordering, as it is antisymmetric (see fn. 5). Also, when
comparing the two ranking methods, be aware of a crucial diﬀerence in notation. In Kaufmann’s (2011) preorder, 𝑣 ≤𝑔(𝑤) 𝑧
is read as “𝑣 is 𝑔-beĨer than 𝑧”, whereas in Portner’s partial order,𝑤􏷠 <𝑖 𝑤􏷡 is read as “𝑤􏷡 is (𝑖-)beĨer than𝑤􏷠.”
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maintain multiple “Ěavors” of To-Do Lists for each participant, or to subdivide a single To-Do List into
sections. ĉese Ěavors correspond to the various types of modality; thus there are deontic To-Do Lists,
bouletic To-Do Lists, teleological To-Do Lists, and so on. While Portner says that he prefers subdividing
a single To-Do List over creating multiple To-Do Lists (2007:360), it seems that this would further com-
plicate the structure of the discourse. If a To-Do List has recognizable, labeled subcomponents, it can no
longer be represented as a simple set of properties. On the other hand, expanding the number of To-Do
Lists present in a discourse does not change their semantic type. Since the job of the To-Do List Function
𝑇 is already to apportion properties to To-Do Lists by individual, the only necessary modiėcation would
be to make 𝑇 also sensitive to the contextual factors that determine the Ěavor of the imperative uĨerance.
2.3.3 Encoding Properties with JussiveP
In the preceding discussion of the property analysis, it has been taken for granted that imperatives are of
type ⟨𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩. ĉe semantic composition of imperative properties and their representation in the syntax is
the major focus of ZanuĨini (2008), and is carried on in the analysis of Korean jussives in ZanuĨini et al.
(2012). In this work, the syntactic projection responsible for ensuring that imperative sentences are prop-
erties is JussiveP, which is placed in the leě periphery.¹⁵ ĉe primary purpose of the Jussive head is the
semantic eﬀect of transforming its complement proposition into a property, which can then be assigned
to a To-Do List. In other words, Jussive⁰ is an abstraction operator, which binds the subject of the imper-
ative clause; syntactically this is achieved via an Agree relationship. ĉe Jussive head is endowed with an
interpretable person feature (2nd person in the case of imperatives), which ZanuĨini et al. (2012) argue
carries a presupposition about the presence of an addressee. ĉe presupposition introduced by the person
feature is exploited both to ensure that the denotation of the clause is a property, and to explain the fact that
null subjects are universally licensed in imperatives, even in languages which do not fully permit pro-drop
¹⁵JussiveP is based on the earlier AddresseeP ofMauck and ZanuĨini (2005). ĉey are conceptually quite similar, and the
change in nomenclature wasmade to indicate that the projection is present in jussive clauses regardless of whether they apply
to the addressee (imperatives), speaker (promissives), or both (exhortatives).
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in declaratives.
In ZanuĨini et al. (2012), the JussiveP is shown to immediately dominate TP, as in (13) below. ĉe
relative position of JussiveP andTP is crucial to the analysis, which assumes that, whenpossible, features on
immediately adjacent heads bundle together and probe as a unit. When bundling does occur, the complex
is referred to as T-JussiveP.
(51)
(25) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  la)
vP
subject
[person : 2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Unlike in many other languages, in Korean the Jussive head can also enter the derivation with a first person
feature value ([person : 1]i), yielding a promissive, or with a first person inclusive value ([person : 1 2]i),
yielding an exhortative.24 We take the sentence final particle -ma to be the overt morphological realization
of the Jussive head with first person value, and -ca to be the overt realization of the Jussive head with first
person inclusive value, respectively:
(26) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ma)
vP
subject
[person : 1]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
(27) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1  2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ca)
vP
subject
[person : 1  2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Before we go on, we should mention that, while we focus on examples where the Jussive head is overt,
it can also be null. This is not surprising, if we think about interrogative clauses: though many languages,
including Korean, have an overt question morpheme, many do not, and it has long been argued that there is
a null Q morpheme in such cases (cf. Baker 1970, Cheng 1991). Even in Korean the Q morpheme can often
be covert. Similarly, the Jussive head is null in certain cases. For example, take the case of imperatives,
where a jussive particle can co-occur with a speech style particle: in (28a), we see the combination of the
speech style particle -e with the jussive particle -la:25
(28) a. Kongpuha-e-la!
study-SSP-IMP
‘Study! ’
24There are several possibilities as to how to represent the meaning of inclusive we in terms of person features. We opt to treat it
as a complex combination of first and second person, but one might also think of it as a distinct fourth person (Benincà and Poletto
2005) or as an instance of two distinct feature specifications ([person : 1], [person : 2]). Kratzer (2009) employs a 1st+2nd
feature similar to Benincà and Poletto’s fourth person, but also discusses the possibility of sum features.
25Phonologically, -ha-e becomes -hay.
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(ZanuĨini et al. 2012:1246, ex. 23)
Despite the conĚation of JussiveP andTP into a single projection in the structure given in (13), Zanut-
tini et al. (2012) do not intend T-JussiveP to be a stand-in for TP in all imperative clauses, either language-
internally or cross-linguistically. When T⁰ has a person feature that is valued diﬀerently than Jussive⁰, the
heads cannot robe as a bundle.¹⁶ A familiar example of this occurs inEnglish imperativeswith third person
quantiėcational subjects.
(52) Everyone𝑖 wash your𝑖/their𝑖 hands!
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) analyze constructions like (52) by positing a null partitive phrase within the
quantiėcational subject. However, they do not compare this construction to its counterpart with an overt
¹⁶T⁰ can either be speciėed for a person feature when it is initiallymerged, or it can have its person feature valued byAgree,
typically with the subject.
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partitive phrase, which does not license both 2nd and 3rd person anaphors.¹⁷
(53) Every one𝑖 of you wash your𝑖/*their𝑖 hands!
ĉe distinction shown in (53) rules out a partitive analysis, but ZanuĨini et al.’s (2012) general approach
can still account for the binding facts presented above. Assuming that the partitive-licensing quantiėer
every one obtains its person feature from its partitive complement, both the subject and the Jussive head in
(53) bear 2nd person features, ruling out a 3rd person anaphor. For (52), on the other hand, if everyone is
lexically speciėed as 3rd person, either the subject or the Jussive head can bind the object anaphor, since
binding is a long-distance operation and is not subject to strict intervention constraints. ĉe presence of
the Jussive head can thus account for the variety of binding eﬀects found in English imperatives.
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) use the person feature of Jussive⁰ to directly supply the domain restriction of
the property denoted by the clause. ĉe only intervening stage is to check whether the person feature has a
deėned denotation in the given context, which ZanuĨini et al. (2012) characterize as a “presuppositional”
eﬀect of the person feature. For example, a 2nd person value of the person feature is only deėned if the
current context’s assignment function picks out the current addressee as its referent.
(54) ⟦[person : 2]𝑘⟧𝑔,𝑐 is only deėned if 𝑔(𝑘) = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐);
if deėned, ⟦[person : 2]𝑘⟧𝑔,𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑘) (ZanuĨini et al. 2012:1265, ex. 47b)
¹⁷Note also the diﬀerence in the spelling of the quantiėers in (52) and (53). ĉere is also a slight prosodic diﬀerence
between the two sentences. ĉese are both cues that two lexically distinct quantiėers are being used in these constructions.
In fact, the English quantiėer everyone does not readily combine with a partitive phrase at all, andmust be substituted by every
one, which has diﬀerent syntactic properties. Everyonemay be possible with a collective interpretation, but is impossible with
the distributive interpretation intended by ZanuĨini et al. (2012).
(i) a. ?Everyone of the senators met on Tuesday.
b. *Everyone of the senators voted yea on the resolution.
(ii) a. ?Every (single) one of the senators met on Tuesday.
b. Every (single) one of the senators voted yea on the resolution.
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ZanuĨini et al. (2012) does not supply a standalone deėnition for the Jussive head, nor does it give a full
derivation of an imperative clause (see §5.2.3 for full discussion of the compositionality of the property
analysis). I have created a derivation of the English imperative Sit down! (55) based on ZanuĨini et al.
(2012:ex. 48b), which derives a simple promissive (1st person jussive) sentence. ĉe only signiėcant dif-
ference from the original derivation is the change from 1st to 2nd person.
(55) ⟦Sit down!⟧ =
⟦Jussive⁰[person : 2]𝑘 [pro𝑘[person : 2] sit down]⟧𝑔,𝑐 =
[𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = ⟦[person : 2]𝑘⟧𝑔,𝑐 . ⟦pro𝑘[person : 2] sit down⟧𝑔[𝑘⟶𝑥],𝑐] =
[𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) . [𝜆𝑤 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤]]
ĉismethod derives the property denotation and licenses the pro subject in English. ZanuĨini (2008) and
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) both aĨribute the successful licensing of pro to the Agree relationship between it
and Jussive⁰, but do not elaborate on the eﬀects that this syntactic relationship has on the semantics or
pragmatics. ĉe derivation in (55) sheds some light on this issue. Without the abstraction provided by
the Jussive head, pro would denote a free variable 𝑥. In a non-pro-drop language like English, this free
variable cannot be assigned a referent pragmatically, i.e. solely appealing to the uĨerance context. ĉus the
presenceof Jussive⁰ really does semantically “rescue”pro fromcausing thederivation to crash (inminimalist
terms, at LF).ĉe only open question then is whether the Agree relation between the two is crucial to the
interpretation. It seems that the Agree relationship does in fact mandate that the free variable denoted
by pro corresponds to the lambda-operator introduced by Jussive⁰. For example, the presence of Jussive⁰
cannot licenseobjectpro-drop inEnglish, even if the subject position is ėlledwith aDP thatdoesnot require
semantic identiėcation.
(56) ĉere’s a man at the door. *You open!
(Intended reading: You open the door!)
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ĉe exact mechanics of how Agree corresponds to semantic variable binding are not spelled out in the
property analysis, and I will not pursue a further analysis of it here.
To summarize the basic template for deriving properties from imperative clauses, recall the syntactic
template for imperatives within the property analysis.
(57) =(13)
(25) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  la)
vP
subject
[person : 2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Unlike in many other languages, in Korean the Jussive head can also enter the derivation with a first person
feature value ([person : 1]i), yielding a promissive, or with a first person inclusive value ([person : 1 2]i),
yielding an exhortative.24 We take the sentence final particle -ma to be the overt morphological realization
of the Jussive head with first person value, and -ca to be the overt realization of the Jussive head with first
person inclusive value, respectively:
(26) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ma)
vP
subject
[person : 1]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
(27) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1  2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ca)
vP
subject
[person : 1  2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Before we go on, we should mention that, while we focus on examples where the Jussive head is overt,
it can also be null. This is not surprising, if we think about interrogative clauses: though many languages,
including Korean, have an overt question morpheme, many do not, and it has long been argued that there is
a null Q morpheme in such cases (cf. Baker 1970, Cheng 1991). Even in Korean the Q morpheme can often
be covert. Similarly, the Jussive head is null in certain cases. For example, take the case of imperatives,
where a jussive particle can co-occur with a speech style particle: in (28a), we see the combination of the
speech style particle -e with the jussive particle -la:25
(28) a. Kongpuha-e-la!
study-SSP-IMP
‘Study! ’
24There are several possibilities as to how to represent the meaning of inclusive we in terms of person features. We opt to treat it
as a complex combination of first and second person, but one might also think of it as a distinct fourth person (Benincà and Poletto
2005) or as an instance of two distinct feature specifications ([person : 1], [person : 2]). Kratzer (2009) employs a 1st+2nd
feature similar to Benincà and Poletto’s fourth person, but also discusses the possibility of sum features.
25Phonologically, -ha-e becomes -hay.
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A structure of this sort also provides the basic semantic template for imperatives. Properties, in this form,
are ready to be picked up by the pragmatic component and assigned to the appropriate To-Do List, as
deėned by Portner (2004a; 2007).
(58) [𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) . [𝜆𝑤 . vP(𝑥)(𝑤)]]
(ZanuĨini et al. 2012:1264, x. 43b)
ĉe syntactic/semantic interface between (57) and (58), plus the pragmatic function for assigning deno-
tata to discourse components, forms the core of the property analysis. In the next subsection, I raise some
issues not fully explained by the analysis and propose some potential reėnements.
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2.3.4 Possible Revisions for the Property Analysis
One of the major explanatory goals of Portner’s (2004a) proposal is to show why declaratives, interroga-
tives, and imperatives are the three universal clause types. ĉe theory centers around the fact that these
clause types represent the (only) three types of semantic objects that can be represented by matrix sen-
tences, and that this interface restriction is a property of Universal Grammar. ĉe discourse components
that track each clause type are then represented as sets of matrix sentence denotata, and a single pragmatic
update function is responsible for adding these denotata to the appropriate set. While in principle this
should allow for a directly parallel treatment of the three major clause types, imperatives are still the odd
man out in Portner’s (2004a) system. Unlike theCommonGround for tracking declaratives and theQues-
tion Set or QUD Stack for tracking interrogatives, which are shared among all discourse participants, To-
Do Lists tracking imperatives are speciėc to individuals.¹⁸ ĉe simplest pragmatic update functionã one
which is sensitive only to semantic type ã cannot handle multiple To-Do Lists. Portner’s (2004a) more
complex representation of discourse sacriėces full parallelism in the pragmatic component. Below I discuss
whether full parallelism can be implemented without sacriėcing any of the theory’s explanatory power.¹⁹
ĉe ėrst question to address is whether maintaining separate To-Do Lists for each participant in the
discourse is strictly necessary. Would tracking imperatives in a single, shared To-Do List not accurately
represent the communicative eﬀects of imperatives? In broadly descriptive terms, the reason for maintain-
ing separate To-Do Lists for each participant is to ensure that the norms, duties, or permissions created by
imperatives apply only to the individuals being addressed by the speaker of the imperative. For example,
if two individuals are standing and one says to the other, Sit down!, it should not have the eﬀect that both
of them should sit down. Maintaining two separate To-Do Lists is a brute force way of accomplishing this,
but given theway that Portner (2007) deėnes imperatives semantically, the issue should never arise. Recall
¹⁸ĉis discrepancy is carried throughout the literature based on the property analysis. See the beginning of this section for
a full list of papers that use Portner (2004a) as a foundation.
¹⁹What I propose in this subsection deals with the distinction between shared vs. individual To-Do Lists. Independently,
multiplying or modifying the structure of To-Do Lists may be necessary to represent the diﬀerent illocutionary forces that
can be communicated with imperatives. I am not addressing that issue here, but see §2.3.2 above for further discussion.
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that every property denoted by an imperative carries a domain restriction, governed by the person features
on Jussive⁰.
(59) ⟦Sit down!⟧ = [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = addressee𝐶 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤] =(45)
ĉe pragmatics speciėed by Portner (2004a; 2007) takes denotations of exactly the form given in (59)
and adds them individual To-Do Lists. For example, if John has no previous duties and the command Sit
down! is addressed to him, then John’s To-Do List should be of the following form:
(60) 𝑇( John)= {[𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = addressee𝐶 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤]}
ĉis cannot be an accurate representation of the property assigned to John’s To-Do List, since the domain
restriction 𝑥 = addressee𝐶 no longer provides any useful information. ĉe referent of the current addressee
is constantly changing, and it is usually not possible to recover contextual information of this sort aěer-the-
fact. ĉis is evident in direct quotation of declaratives containing context-sensitive pronouns.
(61) a. Patrick said, “You seem happy.”
b. Patrick was talking to Veronica this morning. He said, “You seem happy.”
With no knowledge of the conversation being reported, it is impossible to arrive at the propositionalmean-
ing of Patrick’s uĨerance in (61a). However, information about the context can be overtly supplied, as in
(61b). ĉus the domain restriction in (60) provides no useful information once its property is placed onto
a To-Do List, unless a full contextual history of the conversation is maintained. ĉe domain restriction
must be resolved in some way so that the properties on the To-Do List are fully informative.
One way to avoid this problem would be to say that the only purpose of the domain restriction is to
provide information to the pragmatic update function, and that it should be discarded once it has been
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determined that the property is destined for John’s To-Do List. If this were done, John’s To-Do List would
instead contain an unrestricted property.
(62) 𝑇( John)= {[𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤]}
ĉis is not a desirable result, as it does not capture the intendedmeaning of the imperative. ĉeTo-Do List
given in (62) would have the eﬀect that it is now among John’s duties to ensure that everyone sits down.
ĉerefore the domain restriction cannot be discarded outright.
Instead, the domain restriction can be preserved but resolved. ĉis would match the way in which
declaratives with context-sensitive pronouns are added to theCommonGround. Consider a conversation-
initial declarative uĨerance such as the following:
(63) Context: Patrick encounters Veronica on the street and sees her smiling.
Patrick: You seem happy.
→ 𝐶𝐺 = {Veronica seems happy}
↛ 𝐶𝐺 = {𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝐶 seems happy}
If the context-sensitive expression 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝐶 is replaced in the samemanner in imperatives, then address-
ing the command Sit down! to John will have the following eﬀect:
(64) 𝑇( John)= {[𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = John . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤]}
ĉis produces the proper eﬀect ã John is now responsible for bringing it about that he sits, and not that
anyone else sits ã but is redundant. Why separate properties with the domain restriction 𝑥 = John into
their own list? If all properties denoted by imperatives are similarly speciėed, they can all coexist in a single,
shared To-Do List without losing track of what duties belong to what individual.
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A potential reason not to resolve domain restrictions in this way and combine all properties into a sin-
gle To-Do List would be the fact that properties with resolved domain restrictions no longer appear very
semantically distinct from propositions. Given the resolved property assigned to John in (64), a simple
step of lambda-conversion produces a saturated proposition.
(65) [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = John . 𝑥 sits down in𝑤] = [𝜆𝑤 . John sits down in𝑤]
If this step is taken, the imperative can no longer ėt into the pragmatic system proposed by Portner (2004a;
2007). If lambda-conversion is done aěer addition to a To-Do List, then the To-Do List is no longer a list
of properties. If lambda-conversion is done before addition to a To-Do List, the pragmatic update function
will add it to the Common Ground as if it were an assertion. ĉeory-internally, resolution of the domain
restriction on imperatives is impossible. But if it is such a simple step to recover a proposition from an
imperative uĨerance, why should the theory bar it? Yes, a distinctionmust bemaintained between asserted
and commanded propositions. ĉis is exactly the sort of distinction which is created in a theory that treats
imperatives as preferring propositions, rather than asserting them. I turn to such a proposal in the next
section, and will adopt a preference-based view in the remainder of the dissertation.
2.4 Imperatives as Preferences
2.4.1 Discourse States and Illocutionary Updates
Preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012) is a dynamic semantic system that uniėes, rather than separates,
the meanings of diﬀerent types of clauses. It builds on the framework of Inquisitive Semantics (Groe-
nendijk and Roelofsen 2009), which uses a combined information state containing content which is both
informational (assertive) and inquisitive (questioning). Preference semantics extends the representation
of an information state by incorporating preferential content. With this addition, preference semantics can
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operate on three major types of semantic objects: propositions, alternatives, and preferences. Proposi-
tions are conceived in the traditional way, as sets of worlds, spelled out as {𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, …} or abbreviated
with a leĨer 𝑝. A bare proposition cannot exist in an information state, but is instead represented as an
alternative, an ordered pair of propositions containing a non-empty proposition and an empty proposition
⟨𝑝, ∅⟩. Preferences are also ordered pairs of propositions, but unlike alternatives, neither proposition is
empty ⟨𝑝, 𝑞⟩.²⁰ ĉe generation of a new preference of the form ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩ is the canonical contribution of an
imperative clause. A pair of propositions of the form ⟨∅, 𝑝⟩ is said to be absurd, as such a structure would
indicate that ruling out all possible worlds is preferable to 𝑝 being true.
A set of preferences can be used to model informational, inquisitive, and preferential content simulta-
neously within a single semantic object, called a preference state𝑅.
(66) Deėnition of preference state (Starr 2012:20)
A preference state𝑅 is a binary relation on a set of alternative propositions. It represents the pref-
erences that are being taken for granted for the purposes of the interaction. 𝑅(𝑎, 𝑎′) means that
𝑎 is preferred to 𝑎′. 𝐶𝑅 (issues at stake in 𝑅) is the set of (non-empty) alternatives related by 𝑅.
𝑐𝑅 (information at stake in𝑅) is the union of those non-empty alternatives. It is assumed that the
agents always prefer their information to absurdity, so ∀𝑅 ∶ 𝑅(𝑐𝑅, ∅).
Because preference states can contain three types of information, they are richer than a Stalnakerian Com-
mon Ground, which only contains propositions. However, just like in the Common Ground model, if
the information contained in 𝑅 corresponds to the mutually assumed information, alternatives, and pref-
erences held by interlocutors, it represents the current state of the discourse. Furthermore, 𝑅 can be se-
quentially updated with uĨerance contents to track the progress of the discourse. Again, these updates are
richer than their analog in the Common Ground model, which is just set union. In preference semantics,
each clause type speciėes an update rule which adds preferences to𝑅 and/or modiėes the existing prefer-
²⁰ When a preference orders two unrelated propositions ⟨𝑝, 𝑞⟩, I will refer to it in prose as a “preference for 𝑝 over 𝑞”, and
when a preference orders a proposition over its complement ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩, I will refer to it as a “preference for p”.
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ences in 𝑅. (See (68) and (70) below for the complete form of declarative and imperative updates within
preference semantics.)
ĉe semantic richness of 𝑅 and the update functions that modify 𝑅 allow the entire discourse to be
tracked with a single semantic object. Since all members of a preference state are ordered pairs of propo-
sitions, no additional information outside of 𝑅 is required to capture the fact that “declaratives provide
information by eliminating worlds ... interrogatives introduce alternatives by grouping those worlds into
sets, imperatives order alternatives.” (Starr 2012:2, emphasis original). ĉe discourse representations that
are segregated in the property analysisãCommon Ground, Question Set, and To-Do Listã are all uni-
ėed in a single representation 𝑅. However, no information is lost, and the collections of information that
correspond to these representations can be read directly from 𝑅. ĉe equivalent of the Common Ground
is the set of all propositions contained in 𝑅’s preferences. ĉe Question Set is modeled by the set of all al-
ternatives in the discourse representation: ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩ ∈ 𝑅. ĉe collected preferences in𝑅 of the form ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩
replace To-Do Lists.
ĉere are several axiomatized restrictions onpreference states, including that theymust have some con-
tent (*𝑅 = ∅) and that they cannot contain absurd preferences (*⟨∅, 𝑎⟩ ∈ 𝑅). When being used to track
the state of a discourse, each new uĨerance updates the preference state by modifying its existing prefer-
ences and potentially adding new ones; the semantic eﬀect of applying an update by uĨering a sentence𝜑
in a context𝑅 is notated𝑅[𝜑] = 𝑅′.
Sentences in preference semantics are divided into two components: a propositional radical and the
force of the sentence.²¹ Starr (2010) deėnes force operators for each of the three major sentence types,
declarative ▷, interrogative ?, and imperative !. ĉe semantics of each force operator speciėes a series of
update rules, which either modify existing preferences within 𝑅 (e.g. ⟨𝑎, ∅⟩ ⟶ ⟨𝑎 ∩ 𝑝,∅⟩) or add
new preferences to 𝑅. Assertions and questions add preferences of the form ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩. ĉese objects group
²¹Starr refers to this as the “moodmarking” of the sentence (2012:24). I refer to it here as “force” for greater compatibility
with my syntactic analysis of imperatives, which argues that the non-propositional contribution of the sentence is associated
with the ForceP projection in the clausal leě periphery; see §4.2.1 and §5.2 for further discussion. I also want to avoid any
confusion with other syntactic positions responsible for morphological mood marking on verbs.
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worlds together but prefer them to no worlds; the result is that they are interpreted as alternatives. On the
other hand, imperatives introduce preferences of the form ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩, indicating that one group of worlds is
preferable to its complement. None of the force operators introduce preferences of the form ⟨𝑝, 𝑞⟩, where
𝑝 and 𝑞 are not complements. Such preferences are permissible within preference structures, but must be
introduced by the semantics of special lexical items, such as prefer or rather in English, or be generated by
applying general pragmatic reasoning processes to the contents of𝑅.
ĉe table in (67) lists the types of preferences introducedby the threemajor forceoperators. For ease of
presentation, these preferences are slightly simpliėed from their formal deėnition. Technically, each pref-
erence introduced to a discourse state 𝑅 only relates propositions whose extensions are contained within
𝑐𝑅. For example, what is notated as ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩ in (67) corresponds to ⟨𝑐𝑅[𝑝], ∅⟩ in the deėnitions from Starr
(2012) given below.
(67) Contributions of force operators
Sentence type Preference added
▷ declarative ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩
? interrogative
polar question ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩, ⟨¬𝑝, ∅⟩
Wh-question ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑞, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑟, ∅⟩, …
! imperative ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩
Besides contributing newpreferences, each force operator alsomodiėes the existing preferenceswithin
𝑅. Because force operators have this additional eﬀect on 𝑅, they match Murray’s (2010) deėnition of il-
locutionary relation, a function that takes the discourse context and a proposition, and returns an updated,
structured context. For example, simply adding a new preference of the form ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩ does not capture the
eﬀect of assertion. Like assertion in a Common Ground model (e.g. Stalnaker 1979), assertion in prefer-
ence semantics serves to remove worlds from consideration. ĉis cannot be done by performing a single
intersection with 𝑐𝑅, the live worlds, since 𝑐𝑅 is not directly represented in𝑅 but is computed from its con-
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stituent preferences. Eliminating worlds from consideration must be done by individually intersecting the
asserted proposition with each proposition contained in the preferences in 𝑅. ĉus Starr (2012) deėnes
the declarative update as follows:
(68) Deėnition of Declarative Update (Starr 2012:27)
𝑅[▷𝑝] = {⟨𝑎[𝑝], 𝑎′[𝑝]⟩ ∣ ⟨𝑎, 𝑎′⟩ ∈ 𝑅 ∶ 𝑎[𝑝] = ∅} ∪ {⟨𝑐𝑅[𝑝], ∅⟩}
ĉis performs two distinct transformations on𝑅.
(69) 1. Take every preference in𝑅 and intersect both of its members with 𝑝.
2. “Highlight” the asserted proposition by adding the preference ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩.
ĉe imperative update is slightly more complex, as it performs three transformations. It does not elim-
inate any worlds from𝑅, but alters and augments its preferences.
(70) Deėnition of Imperative Update (Starr 2012:26)
𝑅[! 𝑝] = 𝑅 ∪ {⟨𝑐𝑅[𝑝], 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑐𝑅[𝑝]⟩} ∪ {⟨𝑎[𝑝], 𝑎 − 𝑎[𝑝]⟩ ∣ 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶𝑅 & 𝑎[𝑝] = ∅}
1. Admit all of the preferences in𝑅.
2. Introduce a global preference for all of the 𝑝-worlds in 𝑐𝑅 over the non-𝑝-worlds.
3. For each alternative 𝑎 in𝐶𝑅, if there are 𝑝-worlds in 𝑎 then introduce a local preference for
the 𝑝-worlds in 𝑎 over the non-𝑝-worlds in 𝑎.
Aěer the update is complete, additional pragmatic reasoning may eliminate worlds from 𝑅, but this is not
part of the deėnition of the imperative operator per se (see §3.4.1 for an instance of when this type of rea-
soning applies).
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ĉe combination of these three transformations ensures that the propositional content of the imper-
ative becomes mutually preferred for the purposes of the discourse. To demonstrate the workings of the
update rule, consider a very simple initial discourse state𝑅 = {⟨{𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, ∅⟩}. ĉe only informa-
tion contained in𝑅 is that there are four worlds under consideration and that none of them are grouped or
rankedwith respect to one another. 𝑅 can then be updatedwith an imperative uĨerance such asBill, jump!,
whose meaning is ! 𝐽 . For the purpose of this example, assume that the extension of 𝐽 = {𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢, 𝑤􏷣}.
ĉe application of the imperative update rule then applies as in (71). Note that the intermediate stages
𝑅′, 𝑅″, 𝑅‴ do not correspond to stages of the discourse, but are shown to illustrate the eﬀects of the im-
perative update, which is applied all at once.
(71) 𝑅: {⟨{𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, ∅⟩} initial preference state
𝑅′: {⟨{𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, ∅⟩} admit all preferences in𝑅􏷟
𝑅″: {⟨{𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, ∅⟩, ⟨{𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, {𝑤􏷟}⟩} introduce global preference
𝑅‴ = 𝑅″ no local preferences to introduce
𝑅[! 𝐽]: {⟨{𝑤􏷟, 𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, ∅⟩, ⟨{𝑤􏷠, 𝑤􏷡, 𝑤􏷢}, {𝑤􏷟}⟩} updated preference state
2.4.2 Semantic and Syntactic Consequences of Preferences
Applying preference semantics to imperatives captures the best aspects of previous analyses of imperatives,
and avoids several of the problems that they face. Because they contain diﬀerent illocutionary relations,
imperatives and declaratives have signiėcantly diﬀerent eﬀects when applied to a given context, unlikewhat
is predicted by the modal analysis. However, since all clause types denote update functions that apply to
preference states, thepragmatic applicationof clausalmeaning canbeuniėed, unlike themechanismused in
the property analysis. I explain the details of how preference semantics provides these beneėts throughout
the rest of the dissertation; in the remainder of this section, I show how a preference analysis obviates some
smaller problems.
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Although the deėnition of imperative update (70) is complex, all of its parts pertain directly to the up-
date and structuring of𝑅. ĉere is no need to place additional constraints on imperative meaning, such as
the “presuppositional” restrictions needed in Kaufmann’s (2011) deėnition of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 (11). It is perfectly
possible to apply ! to any proposition, including past tense propositions; restrictions on such constructions
are leě to the morphosyntactic component of the grammar. Other constraints, such as the Epistemic Un-
certainty Constraint, can be avoided with a suitably robust deėnition of discourse relevance, which applies
to all uĨerances. Preference semantics provides a framework that allows for a simple, direct computation
of relevance for all clausal uĨerances (§3.4).
Additionally, a preference analysis eliminates the need to provide an ordering source and the resulting
problem of circularity. One disadvantage of preference semantics is that a full account of modals within
its dynamic system is still under development; fortunately, it can account for the full range of imperative
meaning without one. Where the modal analysis had diﬃculty with the meaning of two consecutive im-
perative uĨerances, preference semantics is developed with this sort of case in mind (Starr 2012:25 ﬀ.).
Take the same two imperatives that were considered in §2.2.3 above: Get up! and Get dressed!, which will
be represented as ! 𝑈 and ! 𝐷 respectively. Applying ! 𝑈 and ! 𝐷 in sequence gives the following results:
(72) 𝑅􏷟 = {⟨𝑊,∅⟩}
𝑅􏷠 = {⟨𝑊,∅⟩, ⟨𝑈, ¬𝑈⟩}
𝑅􏷡 = {⟨𝑊,∅⟩, ⟨𝑈, ¬𝑈⟩, ⟨𝑈 ∩ 𝐷,𝑈 ∩ ¬𝐷⟩, ⟨¬𝑈 ∩ 𝐷,¬𝑈 ∩ ¬𝐷⟩, ⟨𝐷, ¬𝐷⟩}
ĉe local preferences in𝑅􏷡, ⟨𝑈 ∩ 𝐷,𝑈 ∩ ¬𝐷⟩ and ⟨¬𝑈 ∩ 𝐷,¬𝑈 ∩ ¬𝐷⟩, are what allow satisfaction of
the commands to occur in either order. For example, if it becomes common knowledge that𝐷 is true, the
remaining𝐷 ∧ 𝑈 worlds will still be preferable to the remaining𝐷 ∧ ¬𝑈 worlds. ĉe same holds even
if ¬𝐷 becomes common knowledge; if there is no entailment relationship between the two propositions,
¬𝐷 ∧𝑈 worlds will still outrank¬𝐷 ∧ ¬𝑈 worlds.
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2.5 Summary
ĉis chapter has provided background on threemajor approaches to imperativemeaning: themodal analy-
sis (Kaufmann 2011), the property analysis (Portner 2004a; 2007), and preference semantics (Starr 2010;
2012). Both themodal analysis and property analysis have Ěaws, especially with respect to howdeclarative,
interrogative, and imperative meaning interact.
Preference semantics uniėes all three types of meaning, and I continue the theme of uniėcation in the
preference analysis presented in the remaining chapters. Another beneėt of preference semantics is that
it manipulates discourse representations, which are always taken to indicate information that is mutually
accepted for thepurposesof the conversation. In thenext chapter, I showhowamodel of discourse that uses
preference states can be used to directly determine the relevance and felicity of any uĨerance, regardless of
clause type. Also, since it is not necessary to maintain multiple discourse components of diﬀerent types,
there is no reason to assume that any one clause type has a syntactic projection that another does not. ĉis
will play a major role in my syntactic analysis of imperatives within an articulated leě periphery (Chapter
4) and will facilitate a direct mapping between the syntax and semantics (Chapter 5).
48
CHAPTER 3
MEANINGANDBEHAVIOROF IMPEĆTIVES INDISCOURSE
3.1 Introduction
ĉis chapter deals with imperativemeaning beyond the level of a single sentence. In particular, it asks what
can be learned about imperative meaning through examining the felicity of follow-ups to imperatives and
imperative uĨerances themselves. ĉe eﬀectiveness of follow-up uĨerances, particularly aﬃrmations and
challenges, serves as a diagnostic for what meaning was contributed by the imperative. Similarly, an imper-
ative uĨerance must be compatible with the current informational state of the discourse to be felicitous.
ĉe chapter is organized as follows. §3.2 introduces the concepts of at-issue and not-at-issue meaning
(characterstics of propositions used in a particular context) and shows which types of meaning impera-
tives contribute. I argue that imperatives contribute at-issue propositional content as well as illocutionary
content, which is neither at-issue nor not-at-issue. §3.3 looks at the felicity of imperative uĨerances within
the framework of Relevance (Roberts 1996; 2004; Simons et al. 2011). Earlier work on Relevance does
not have amethod for directly computing the relevance of imperatives with respect to theQuestionUnder
Discussion, so in §3.4 I propose a method for doing so within preference semantics. Since preference se-
mantics uniėes all types of clausal meaning into a single discourse representation, I am able to formulate a
single deėnition of Relevance for all clause types.
3.2 Eﬀects of Imperative UĨerances
3.2.1 Introduction to Challenge Tests
ĉis section explores what eﬀect imperative uĨerances have in discourse, paying special aĨention to re-
strictions on what can be felicitously uĨered in the immediately following context. ĉe extent of these
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restrictions goes far beyond the traditional observation that imperatives can’t be challenged in terms of
truth or falsity.
(1) A: Take out the trash!
B: #ĉat’s true. / #ĉat’s false. (aěer Iatridou 2008: ex. 43–44)
In §3.2.1 I introduce two classes of challenge tests (direct and indirect), which are diagnostic of at-issue
status, a characteristic of a proposition in a given discourse context. In principle, any expressed propo-
sition can be diagnosed as either at-issue or not-at-issue (Simons et al. 2011). ĉe term at-issue was ėrst
introduced by PoĨs (2003; 2005), which deėned at-issue entailments as “‘what is said’, in Grice’s terms” and
contrasted them with conventional implicatures. Since the concept of at-issueness follows from Gricean
pragmatics and deals in entailments and implicatures, it follows that being at-issue or not-at-issue is a char-
acteristic of propositions. I refer to this characteristic as a proposition’s at-issue status, and I maintain that
non-propositional semantic objects have no at-issue status; as a result non-propositional units of meaning
cannot be targeted by either type of challenge test.
In§3.2.2 and§3.2.3 the challenge tests are applied toboth imperativeuĨerances anddeclarativemodals.
While imperatives show invariant behavior with respect to these tests, modals can vary depending on
whether they are used descriptively or performatively (see §2.2.1). For example, without further context,
challenging a declarative modal in the same manner as in (1) is perfectly felicitous, as its default interpre-
tation is descriptive.
(2) A: You must take out the trash.
B: ✓ĉat’s true. / ✓ĉat’s false.
ĉe results of the challenge tests show that imperatives and declarative modals do not have identical
content, nor do they vary solely in the at-issue status of their expressed propositions; a crucial piece of
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imperative meaning is neither at-issue nor not-at-issue and is so demonstrated to be non-propositional. I
categorize this additional meaning as the illocutionary relation of the imperative clause, a concept which I
associate with the establishment of preferences (§3.3). An example of the diﬀerent types of meaning that
will play a role in evaluating imperatives in discourse, as contained in the simple imperative sentence Jump!,
are listed in (3).
(3) Jump!
𝑝 = the addressee jumps
! 𝑝 = imperative update, preferring that the addressee jumps
𝑅􏷠 =𝑅􏷟[! 𝑝]=thediscourse context, updatedand structured such thatworlds inwhich the addressee
jumps are preferred
I now turn to tests that diagnose characteristics of propositions. In general, these discourse-based tests
can be divided into two groups, direct and indirect challenges (Roberts et al. 2009; Beaver et al. 2009), which
each target a diﬀerent class of propositional content. I argue that all overtly expressed propositions can be
classiėed as either at-issue or not-at-issue. At-issue content is the main point of an uĨerance, and furthers
resolution of the discourse topic. Direct challengeability is a positive indicator of at-issueness. Not-at-issue
content is additional content within an uĨerance, including but not limited to presuppositions, evidentials,
and implicatures. Indirect challengeability is ahallmarkofnot-at-issue content. Not all content is challenge-
able; content with no at-issue status resists challenges of either type. Since at-issue status is a characteristic
of propositions, any non-propositional content should fail both types of challenges. In §3.2.2 and §3.2.3
we will see that imperatives contain unchallengeable material, which corresponds to the illocutionary rela-
tion of the clause. In the remainder of this subsection, I introduce the various challenge tests and provide
examples of how they can be applied to non-modal declarative uĨerances.
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Direct challenges are uĨerances that aﬃrm or deny the truth or falsity of the previous uĨerance.¹ ĉey
are almost always anaphoric, whether they contain an overt propositional anaphor (e.g. English that), or
indicate anaphoricity indirectlywith a discourse particle such as yes,OK, or no. In fact, simply uĨering “yes”
or “no” can constitute a full direct challenge, albeit a highly elliptical one. “ĉat’s true” and “that’s false”
are oěen used as direct challenge diagnostics, as they are unambiguous; however, in certain contexts they
may seem stilted. I try to use the most natural phrasing as possible, and to disambiguate when necessary
by providing further followup. ĉis can be accomplished by repeating aﬃrmed content or explaining the
reason for rejecting content.
(4) A: John took out the trash.
B1: Yes. He did take out the trash.
B2: ĉat’s false. He only took out the recycling.
Whatever content is anaphorically targeted by a direct challenge is “susceptible of direct aﬃrmation or
denial,” and therefore is at-issue (Beaver et al. 2009). In (4), we can conclude that the proposition John
took out the trash, as asserted in the initial uĨerance, is at-issue. ĉis is expected, since the uĨerance is
monoclausal and only encodes a single proposition. In more complex constructions, the test distinguishes
the at-issue proposition(s) from other content.
(5) A: Jill, who lost something on the Ěight, likes to travel by train.
𝑝 = Jill likes to travel by train, 𝑞 = Jill lost something on the Ěight
(aěer Roberts et al. 2009: ex. 3)
¹I refer to these as “challenges” throughout, despite the fact that they do not necessarily seek to reject content from a
previous uĨerance. While the eﬀects of aﬃrmation and denial are opposite, the conditions for performing either of these
actions are identical, and rooted in the at-issue status of the targeted proposition. Since the purpose of these tests is diagnosing
the conditions in which they can be felicitously uĨered, direct aﬃrmations and denials are a single class of challenges.
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B1: No, that’s false. Jill hates traveling by train.
eﬀect: 𝑝 is rejected, 𝑞 is accepted
B2: No, that’s false. #Jill didn’t lose anything on the Ěight.
eﬀect: 𝑞 cannot be directly rejected
conclusion: 𝑝 is an at-issue proposition in A, 𝑞 is not
ĉeapplicationofdirect challenge tests to (5) shows that theproposition regarding Jill’s travel preferences is
at-issue,while thenon-restrictive relative clause about theobject she lost is not. If theproposition expressed
by the relative clause is not true, the interlocutor is not without recourse, but must use a diﬀerent strategy
ã an indirect challengeã in order to issue a successful challenge.
Indirect challengesmay be used on content that direct challenges fail to target. If the indirect challenge
succeeds, it indicates that the targeted proposition is not-at-issue. One of the best-known indirect chal-
lenges is the “Hey, wait a minute” test, ėrst proposed in Shanon (1976).² ĉis type of indirect challenge
can be used to deny the content of the relative clause from (5) above.
²Unfortunately, the contribution of the phrase “Hey, wait a minute” is much more ambiguous than the propositional
anaphors or discourse markers used in direct challenges. When used to signal an indirect challenge, its function is to turn the
topic of the discourse to a proposition that otherwise would not be up for discussion. A clear example of this is using ”Hey,
wait a minute” to make lexically triggered presuppositions available for denial.
(i) A: Have you stopped beating your wife?
B: Hey, wait a minute, I’ve never beaten my wife.
However, in other contexts, it can be used to simply express surprise or confusion.
(ii) A:ĉemeeting this aěernoon is at 4:00.
B: Hey, wait a minute, that doesn’t seem right. Our meetings are always at 3:00.
ĉe use of “Hey, wait a minute” in (ii) does not constitute an indirect challenge, and therefore indicates nothing about the
at-issue status of any proposition. (In fact, the antecedent of that in B’s uĨerance is an at-issue proposition.)
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(6) A: Jill, who lost something on the Ěight, likes to travel by train.
𝑝 = Jill likes to travel by train, 𝑞 = Jill lost something on the Ěight
B1: Hey, wait a minute, Jill didn’t lose anything on the Ěight.
eﬀect: 𝑝 is suspended, 𝑞 is rejected
B2: #Hey, wait a minute, Jill doesn’t like to travel by train.
eﬀect: 𝑝 and 𝑞 are neither accepted nor rejected
ĉe responseB1 in (6) has the intended eﬀect of rejecting the content of the relative clause, the proposition
𝑞. However, it makes no claim about the truth or falsity of 𝑝, the at-issue proposition in the A uĨerance.
Evaluation of 𝑝 becomes suspended, and must be taken up later in the discourse. ĉis eﬀect of suspension
is what the phrase “Hey, wait a minute” achieves.
Note also that trying to apply an indirect challenge to an at-issue proposition is infelicitous. ĉe reason
for this is that the aim of the suspension maneuver is to suspend the current discourse topic in order to
replace it with the target of the challenge. Using an indirect challenge on an at-issue proposition either
inaccurately assumes what the current discourse topic is, or tries to replace the current discourse topic
with itself. Neither is a productive conversational maneuver, accounting for the infelicity of the challenge.
Removing the phrase “Hey, wait a minute” from such a challenge, such as B2 in (6) above, leaves a direct
challenge to an at-issue proposition, which we saw was felicitous in (5).
3.2.2 ApplyingDirect Challenge Tests
Recall that imperatives cannot be challenged in terms of truth or falsity. ĉe unsuccessful challenges given
in (1) are examples of direct challenges. ĉey contain propositional anaphora, which contributes to their
failure for one of two reasons: either there is no suitable antecedent for the propositional anaphor that, or
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there is an antecedent, but its truth or falsity cannot be determinedon the basis of the prior discourse. Since
imperatives encode preferences, which are composed out of propositions, there is propositional content
within imperatives, and thus a potential antecedent. Enriching the challenges by spelling out this propo-
sition does not improve them in any way; 𝑝 cannot be said to be true or false immediately following an
imperative that commands 𝑝.
(7) Context: Speaker A is assigning chore duties to his housemates, who include speaker B.
A: Take out the trash!
𝑝 = the addressee takes out the trash
B1: #ĉat’s true. I (will) take out the trash.
B2: #ĉat’s false. I won’t / don’t take out the trash.
ĉere are also felicitous, yet seemingly direct, responses to imperatives. Such statements of compliance
or refusal to carry out an imperative command can also be diagnosed by providing further followup.
(8) B3: OK, I will (take out the trash).
B4: No, I won’t (take out the trash).
B3–B4 are felicitous because they avoid claiming whether 𝑝 is true or false within the current context. ĉe
followups in (7) show that doing so is not possible, which is a sign that there are both 𝑝- and ¬𝑝-worlds in
the Context Set. ĉe followups in (8) allow for this possibility, and only claim whether speaker B plans to
make 𝑝 true or false in a future context. ĉese plain statements of compliance or refusal are just some of
the simplest cases of a broader class of felicitous, qualitative comments about the proposition 𝑝 (9).
(9) B5: No, that’s not what I’m going to do.
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B6: No, that’s a bad idea.
Note that the claims regarding 𝑝 in (8), not just their means of introduction, make these followups
felicitous. AppendingOK or no to anaphoric challenges does not improve them.³
(10) B7: #OK, that’s true. / #OK, that’s right.
B8: #No, that’s false. / #No, that’s wrong.
ĉe eﬀectiveness of these various direct challenge strategies leads to the following conclusions. Propo-
sitional anaphors in direct challenges cannot target ! 𝑝, because it is not propositional; they must target 𝑝.
However, it is indeterminate whether 𝑝 is true or false. ĉus the only statements that can be made about 𝑝
are qualitative ones, or predictions about its truth or falsity in a future context.⁴
³ĉe secondchallenge inB8 is lexically ambiguous, and couldbe interpreted as being a felicitous comment about𝑝 ifwrong
is taken to mean ‘morally wrong’ rather than ‘false’. Also note that the inclusion of true or false in these examples enforces a
propositional anaphora reading. VP anaphora is possible, and indeed felicitous:
(i) B1′: OK, I will do that.
B2′: No, I won’t do that.
⁴ĉere is no general prohibition about asserting 𝑝 or ¬𝑝 immediately aěer an imperative (or at any stage of a discourse),
but the inclusion of yes,OK, or no has an anaphoric eﬀect similar to that, and thereby presupposes a prior assertion of 𝑝. ĉis
subtle diﬀerence in phrasing has quite robust eﬀects on felicity.
(i) A: Do your homework!
B1: ✓I am doing my homework.
B2: #Yes, I am doing my homework.
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Now let us consider the felicitous direct challenges toperformative declarativemodal commands (11).⁵
What is the target of such challenges when they are successful? ĉe A uĨerance in (11) appears to only
encode a single proposition: it is necessary that the addressee takes out the trash. ĉemore basic proposition,
the addressee takes out the trash, cannot be targeted even if we make the unlikely assumption that the modal
indicates logical necessity, rather than epistemic or deontic necessity.⁶ As with the imperatives above, we
can conėrm this by enriching the B responses with additional followup material.
(11) A: You must take out the trash(!)
𝑝 = it is necessary that the addressee takes out the trash
𝑞 = the addressee takes out the trash
Context: A is reminding B of his existing, publicly acknowledged chore dut.
B1: ĉat’s true. I saw it on the chore chart.
B2: ĉat’s false. I don’t have to until next week.
Context: A is assigning a new chore duty to B.
B3: ĉat’s true. #I (will) take out the trash.
B4: ĉat’s false. #I won’t / don’t take out the trash.
Note that the followup in B2 is felicitous because it remains modally subordinated to the A uĨerance.
Rephrasing it as “I won’t until next week” makes the response just as infelicitous as B4. ĉe followups in
⁵It should be noted that Schwager (2006) contends that the challenges in (11) are not felicitous if the modal sentence is
being used performatively, i.e. as a command rather than an assertion of existing obligation. ĉere is no question that “Stating
a norm is not the same as creating a norm,” (Platzack 2007), but it also seems clear that performative declarativemodals cando
either, while imperatives can only do the laĨer. Resolving this ambiguity in performative declarative modals is an extremely
subtle judgment; it is not apparent that the two uses can be diﬀerentiated by prosody, and Schwager provides no other tests
for performativity.
⁶ĉis is a fact about natural language (or at least English), not a fact about modal logic. In a simple modal logic, we can
write 𝑝 = □𝑞, and by doing so imply that 𝑝 and 𝑞 are the same sort of objectãpropositionsãdespite the fact that it appears
that 𝑝 can be decomposed.
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B3–4 demonstrate that the challenge is unsuccessful if it aĨempts to target the non-modal proposition 𝑞.
ĉeir infelicity is not dependent on a performative interpretation of A.
ĉe same inability to target the non-modal proposition occurs in unambiguously descriptive modals.
(12) A: It might be raining.
B:ĉat’s true. ?It’s raining.
ĉe only potential interpretation of the elaboration B in (12) is that it defeats the implicature introduced
by A that it might not be raining. ĉis is notable, since a modal such as A conveys two propositions: the
modalizedproposition and its prejacent (vonFintel andGillies 2007:45). B aĨempts to target the laĨer, but
is not fully successful in doing so.⁷ von Fintel and Gillies (2007:ex. 20 ﬀ.) claim that both propositions are
accessible later in the discourse; note the equal felicity ofĉat’s right, it might be andĉat’s right, it is raining.
However, these responses do not properly fall under the category of either direct or indirect challenges.
Given the distinction between these felicitous followups and the B uĨerance in (12), I conclude that only
the modal proposition is properly at-issue in these cases.
Furthermore, following a modal, propositional anaphora can only target the modal proposition even
when providing a qualitative followup, rather than aﬃrming or denying the proposition.
(13) A: You must take out the trash(!)
B1: I understand that.
B2: I don’t like that.
Response B1 in (13) is only sensical on the reading “I understand that I must take out the trash”, as com-
pared to #“I understand that I take out the trash.” On the other hand, B2 is ambiguous between “I don’t
⁷As phrased above, B seems slightly awkward; it would be much more natural with contrastive focus (It Ľň raining) or a
separate marker of contrast such as in fact.
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like the fact that I have to take out the trash” and “I don’t like taking out the trash”, although the laĨer is
likely a case of VP anaphora rather than propositional anaphora.
ĉe felicity of these same followup uĨerances is diﬀerent when uĨered in response to an imperative.
(14) A: Take out the trash!
B1: #I understand that.
B2: I don’t like that.
Since there is nomodal proposition expressed in the imperative, the only interpretation of B1 in (14) is #“I
understand that I take out the trash”, so the uĨerance is infelicitous. ĉe ambiguity is similarly removed for
B2, which can only mean “I don’t like taking out the trash.” ĉis reaﬃrms that the non-modal proposition
is at-issue in imperatives, while the modal proposition is at-issue in performative declarative modals.
All of the data above, in light of the fact that direct challengeability indicates at-issueness, give a solid
picture of what propositions are at-issue in both imperatives and performative declarative modals. ĉe
infelicity of the direct challenges to imperatives in (7) demonstrates that it is impossible to challenge the
overall contribution of the imperative, ! 𝑝. ĉe felicity of followups that target the proposition 𝑝 is depen-
dent uponwhether they aĨempt to evaluate the truth or falsity of 𝑝 based on the prior discourse; followups
which do succeed indicate that 𝑝 itself is at-issue in imperatives. Additionally, the modal proposition en-
coded in performative declarative modals is the only at-issue proposition in the clause, as it alone can be
targeted by anaphoric direct challenges. §3.2.3 will examine whether indirect challenges yield converse
results, and whether they can target ! 𝑝.
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3.2.3 Applying Indirect Challenge Tests
Recall from §3.2.1 that the success of an indirect challenge indicates that its target is not-at-issue. Applying
the “Hey, wait a minute” indirect challenge test to an imperative appears to yield the exact opposite results
as direct challenge tests.
(15) Context: Speaker A is assigning chore duties to his housemates, who include speaker B.
A: Take out the trash!
𝑝 = the addressee takes out the trash
B1: #Hey, wait a minute, I won’t take out the trash.
B2: Hey, wait a minute, I don’t have to take out the trash.
B3: Hey, wait a minute, you don’t want me to take out the trash.
However, on closer examination, B2–3 of (15) target neither 𝑝 nor ! 𝑝, but novel propositions related to 𝑝.
ĉe result of B1 in (15) is not spurious, but is as expected; an indirect challenge of 𝑝 itself fails because 𝑝 is
an at-issue proposition.
Constructing indirect challenges to target ! 𝑝 is somewhat more diﬃcult. ĉe resulting followups are
considerablymore awkward, if not downright infelicitous. As indirect challenges, like direct challenges, are
supposed to be diagnostic of a subclass of propositions, this result is unsurprising.
(16) Take out the trash!
! 𝑝 = imperative update, preferring that the addressee takes out the trash
B1: #Hey, wait a minute, it is not preferred that I take out the trash.
B2: #Hey, wait a minute, it’s not best for me to take out the trash.
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B3: #Hey, wait a minute, you didn’t impose a preference for me to take out the trash.
When applied to performative declarativemodal commands, indirect challenges yield no new insights.
(17) Context: A is assigning a new chore duty to B.
A: You must take out the trash(!)
𝑝 = it is necessary that the addressee takes out the trash
B1: #Hey, wait a minute, I won’t take out the trash.
B2: #Hey, wait a minute, it’s not best for me to take out the trash.
Nevertheless, they do conėrm the conclusion drawn from the direct challenge data, namely that there is
a single, at-issue proposition encoded in the clause. With no not-at-issue content in the clause, indirect
challenges uniformly fail against performative declarative modals.
3.3 Imperatives andDiscourse Relevance
In contrast to challenge tests, which examine the felicity of uĨerances following imperatives, Relevance
(Roberts 1996; 2004; Simons et al. 2011) is a felicity condition imposed on all uĨerances requiring that
they contribute to the resolution of the Question Under Discussion (QUD), which encodes the current
discourse topic as a set of potential answers. Applying Relevance to imperatives will make predictions about
when imperative uĨerances themselves are felicitous. However, most accounts of Relevance provide a
method of assessing declaratives and interrogatives, but not imperatives.
Since “Relevance can be characterized in terms of logical relations between the [question under discus-
sion] and the semantic content of a new uĨerance” (Roberts 2012), it ought to apply broadly and a class
of uĨerances as large as imperatives should not be overlooked. Roberts (2012) continues to say that in
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order to apply Relevance consistently to all uĨerances, “we need a dynamic formal semantic theory,” a re-
quirement which preference semantics satisėes. A simple Common Ground model proves insuﬃcient for
several reasons. First, the only semantic objects that can be compared to determine Relevance are proposi-
tions. Under the property analysis, no such proposition exists within an imperative (or it has to be created
ad hoc; see §2.3.4 for further discussion), while under the modal analysis, the proposition contributed by
an imperative is modal, perhaps rendering it incompatible with theQuestion Under Discussion. However,
under a preference analysis, the actual eﬀect of the update contributed by an uĨerance can be compared
against the QUD.⁸ĉis accommodates imperative uĨerances and additional outcomes of basic pragmatic
reasoning (§3.4.2). ĉus I show that combining prior views of Relevance with preference semantics pro-
vides a simple, uniėed, accurate model of Relevance for any uĨerance.
3.3.1 Relevance and theQUD
Much recent work on the semantics of imperatives (e.g. Portner 2004a; 2007; Kaufmann 2011) seeks an
explanation of when imperatives can be felicitously uĨered. ĉe sorts of restrictions that have been pro-
posed include restrictions on the addressee (Portner 2004a), restrictions imposed by the speaker’s knowl-
edge (Portner 2007:364), and a variety of “presuppositional” constraints including the timeframe of the
commanded action and the speaker’s authority (Kaufmann 2011).⁹
On the other hand, work on the structure and mechanisms of discourse (e.g. Roberts 2004; Roberts
et al. 2009; Simons et al. 2011) has formalized relevance in terms of an uĨerance’s relationship to the cur-
rentQuestionUnderDiscussion (QUD), “a semantic question (i.e. a set of alternative propositions) which
corresponds to the current discourse topic” (Simons et al. 2011:7). At every stage of a discourse, the inter-
locutors keep track of the alternatives currently under consideration so they can try to choose among them,
resolve the QUD, and increase the amount of shared informational content. Various models for tracking
⁸See §2.4.1 for an introduction to the mechanics of updates within preference semantics.
⁹See §2.3.1 for more on the restrictions imposed in Portner (2004a; 2007) and §2.2.2 for the restrictions imposed in
Kaufmann (2011)
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theQUD (ormultipleQUDs) exist. ĉemost commonly adoptedmodel is the push-down stack ofQUDs
originally proposed by Roberts (1996). In preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012), all alternatives are
contained within a single preference state, which eﬀectively “ĚaĨens” the stack of QUDs.
When evaluating relevance, only the topmost QUD in a stack model or the ėnest-grained alternatives
in a preference state are used. Simons et al. (2011) deėnes relevance for assertions andquestions as follows:
(18) Relevance for assertions and questions
a. An assertion is relevant if it contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant if it has an answer which contextually entails a partial or complete an-
swer to the QUD.
(aěer Simons et al. 2011: ex. 13)
However, Simons et al. (2011) does not address the issue of what makes a command relevant. Roberts
(2004) provides a preliminary deėnition of imperative relevance, but it is not as precise as those in (18).
(19) Preliminary deėnition of imperative relevance
A move𝑚 is Relevant…if𝑚 is…an imperative whose realization would plausibly help to answer
[the QUD]. (Roberts 2004:216)
ĉe issue I seek to address in this section is what form amore robust deėnition of imperative relevance
must take and what beneėts it provides to the overall theory of relevance. Cormany (to appear) extends
Simons et al.’s (2011) paradigm of relevance (18) with a corresponding deėnition for commands (20).
(20) A command is relevant if what it prefers contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the
QUD.
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Formulating thedeėnition in thiswaydoeshave several advantages. It allows for the relevanceof commands
to be determined directly and in the samemanner as other uĨerance types: by comparing a portion of the
uĨerance to the potential answers of theQUD.One implication of the three deėnitions of relevance in (18)
and (20), taken as a paradigm, is that all uĨerance types have a propositional component.¹⁰ I maintain that
this is indeed the case, and that any sentence can be divided into two portions: propositional content, and
an illocutionary relation. Following Murray (2010), I deėne an illocutionary relation as a function that
takes the discourse context and a proposition, and returns an updated, structured context. Following the
dynamic update rules of Starr (2010), we can characterize the illocutionary relations of the major clause
types as follows. ĉe illocutionary relation of declaratives performs set intersection within each alternative
in the discourse state. Interrogatives introduce new alternatives, with the eﬀect of partitioning the context.
ĉe illocutionary relation of imperatives imposes preferences for propositions over their complements.
3.3.2 Generalizing relevance
Since relevance is determined by comparing a potential answer with a set of alternatives, imperatives can
address QUDs, as long as they have the appropriate propositional content. ĉe proposed deėnition of
imperative relevance, repeated in (23), targets this proposition directly; it is the proposition preferred in a
command. When structured this way, command relevance ėts into the larger paradigm of relevance with
Simons et al.’s (2011) deėnitions of relevance for assertions (21) and questions (22).
(21) An assertion is relevant if it contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
(22) A question is relevant if it has an answer which contextually entails a partial or complete answer to
the QUD.
¹⁰Note that this is contra Portner (2004a; 2007), which claim that all imperative sentences have the semantic type of
properties, ⟨𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩.
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(23) A command is relevant if what it prefers contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the
QUD.
All three deėnitions are of the same form: a propositional component of the uĨerance is compared to
the propositional potential answers of the QUD. ĉe ways in which the uĨerance types vary is in their
illocutionary relation, which speciėes how the propositional content updates and structures the current
context.¹¹ Since the deėnitions of relevance vary solely in terms of illocutionary relation, we can say that
the paradigm does not represent three distinct concepts, but three variations of a single, uniėed concept of
relevance.
(24) Uniėed Deėnition of Relevance
An uĨerance is relevant if the propositional argument of its illocutionary relation contextually en-
tails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
Inmore intuitive terms, anuĨerance’s relevance is determinedby its propositional content. Its illocutionary
relationmayhave independent eﬀects on the felicity of the uĨeranceãthis is especially true of imperatives
ã but does not directly aﬀect relevance.
Adopting the uniėed deėnition in (24) has several beneėts. Foremost, it completes and simpliėes the
concept of relevance. Minor clause types (such as exclamatives, promissives, and the like) can now be
tested for relevance with the same diagnostic as major clause types. Additionally, any further reėnements
to the criteria for relevance (such as allowing gradeable rather than discrete answers to the QUD) will au-
tomatically apply to the relevance of all uĨerances.
¹¹Note that Simons et al.’s (2011) deėnition of relevance for assertions treats the entire assertion as a bare proposition. I
would reword this deėnition to indicate that assertions are not bare propositions, but propositions dominated by an assertoric
illocutionary relation imposing intersection relations within the discourse state. Positing an illocutionary level above the
propositional level for assertions is supported by any language that has distinct morphology or syntax in the leě periphery of
matrix declarative clauses. See ZanuĨini et al. (2012) for a summary of Korean clause typing, which is just one example of
this phenomenon.
65
Another advantage is that the relevance of commands can be determined by comparing only the im-
perative uĨerance and theQUD.ĉe only type of semantic object that can be directly compared to aQUD
is a proposition (or perhaps another question). ĉe proposed account does this by dividing imperatives
into a proposition and a preferential illocutionary relation. ĉe division is semantic, and there is no need
to pragmatically reconstruct a proposition for purposes of comparison to the QUD. ĉis is in contrast to
the property theory of Portner (2004a; 2007), in which the denotation of the imperative ėrst must be
added to a To-Do List ã a set of properties assigned to a given participant in the conversation ã and
then a proposition must be recovered from that list by an independent process. Conversely, a theory that
treats imperatives and modal declaratives as semantically identical (e.g. Kaufmann 2011) supposes that
they have fundamentally identical illocutionary components. ĉe contrasts in relevance and felicity be-
tween imperatives and declaratives must be aĨributed to outside factors under such an approach. None of
these problems arise in a system where illocutionary relation is the sole mediator between propositional
content and discourse.
3.3.3 Responding to and with imperatives
Illocutionary and propositional components of imperatives
It has long been observed that certain uĨerances are infelicitouswhen immediately following an imperative
(Iatridou2008). Forone, they arenot truth-evaluable, and resist direct challenges in termsof truthor falsity
(Cormany to appear).
(25) A: Take out the trash!
B1: #ĉat’s true! I (will) take out the trash.
B2: #ĉat’s false! I won’t / don’t take out the trash.
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ĉe failure of propositional anaphora in these cases has led some to argue that imperatives are non-
propositional. Cormany (to appear) argues that all clause types do in fact have a propositional component.
Furthermore, all clauses must have an illocutionary component to be well-formed. ĉis follows from the
general claim in speech act theory, “Propositional acts cannot occur alone; that is, one cannot just refer and
predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act.”
(Searle 1969:25).
Illocutionary relations lie at the syntax/semantics interface, and are necessary for a clause to be com-
plete both in form and meaning. Any approach which seeks to explain imperatives (or any other clause
type) by paraphrasing them in terms of another clause type, adds or substitutes an illocutionary com-
ponent when one is already present. ĉe You will, You should, and I order you to reductions discussed in
Hamblin (1987), and their formal equivalent in Kaufmann (2011) are transformations of this type (§2.2).
Furthermore, in the process of paraphrasing, theymodify the propositional content of the sentence, so the
paraphrases will not be suitable stand-ins when assessing relevance.
It is not enough to simply segregate themeaning of an imperative uĨerance into two categories labeled
“propositional” and “illocutionary”; when combined, the twomust have the eﬀect of an imperative, which
is canonically a command. However, as Kaufmann (2011) and many others have pointed out, not all im-
peratives issue commands. It is for this reason that I represent the illocutionary relation of imperatives as
establishing a preference. Imposing a preference relation has the eﬀect of taking the common ground of
the current discourse and ranking some of its worlds higher than others without eliminating any. For exam-
ple, the imperativeTake out the trash! ranks all world in which its addressee takes out the trash above those
where he does not, but in no way precludes the possibility that he does not. ĉe preferential illocutionary
relation serves as a function that connects the propositional semantics and the discourse semantics. ĉis
connecting behavior is a consequence of the types of arguments taken by illocutionary relations; they are
used in a context and scope over a propositional constituent.
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Examples of imperative responses
Imperatives are natural responses to certain questions. When diagnosing relevance, it is important to bear
in mind that imperatives have a signiėcantly diﬀerent relationship with the surrounding discourse material
than declaratives do. Adopting the preferential approach for imperative relevance allows for a straightfor-
ward explanation of these cases.
Although QUDs may be introduced in a variety of ways, I will focus on cases where they are directly
introduced by the uĨerance of an interrogative clause. Even when limited to these cases, there is a wide
variety of QUDs that can be introduced, and many of them have felicitous imperative responses that are
accounted for by relevance. Take, for example, the following dialogue:
(26) A: Are you going out for lunch today?
B: Yes, but I don’t know where to go.
A: Go to the taco place! ĉey have a special today.
In this brief exchange, twoQUDs are raised and both are answered, one with a declarative and one with an
imperative. ĉe ėrst QUD is a polar question and has the answers {A is going out for lunch today, A is not
going out for lunch today}. B then answers this question in the aﬃrmative with the elliptical response “Yes.”
ĉe remainder of B’s uĨerance introduces aWh-question as the newQUD,which has several answers of the
sort {B goes to the cafeteria for lunch, B goes to the hot dog stand for lunch, B goes to the taco place for lunch,…}.
ĉis question is answered by A’s imperative, which prefers the answer B goes to the taco place ( for lunch). A
also explains his reasoning for introducing this new preference.
However, there are many questions that imperatives cannot directly respond to. By their very nature,
imperatives prefer propositions that the addressee can make true. A question about a third party only has
answers pertaining to that third party, and thus an imperative response is ruled out.
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(27) A:Where’s Bob? I need to talk to him about our project.
ĉe answers to this question are of the form {Bob is at his desk, Bob is in the lounge, Bob is at the coﬀee shop,
…}. No imperative can prefer any of these options.¹² However, either a question or an assertion canmake
a relevant contribution. For example, the question Is he at his desk? has the answers {Bob is at his desk,
Bob is not at his desk}. ĉe former is a complete answer to the QUD, while the laĨer is a partial answer
to the QUD. Having a single answer that is also an answer to the QUD suﬃces to make the question is
relevant; it is a felicitous response. Likewise, asserting either of those propositions outright is also a relevant
contribution.¹³
Additionally, there is a third type of relevant response, which may or may not be fully subsumed under
the deėnition of relevance for assertions. A fruitful strategy for responding to the QUD in (27) is to use a
modal declarative. ĉe type of modality expressed by such a response can even vary, and can be clariėed
with additional explanation.
(28) A:Where’s Bob? I need to talk to him about our project.
B1: He should be at his desk. ĉe boss says he has to be there from 9 to 5.
B2: He should be at his desk. He sets his own schedule, but I know he’s almost always there at this
time of day.
ĉe connections between imperatives and declarative modals have not gone unnoticed in the litera-
ture. Portner (2012) claims that the norms introduced by imperatives can later be used by modals as (a
¹² ĉis is certainly the case if Bob is not a participant in the discourse; imperatives are always addressee-directed. Addi-
tionally, given the nature of this QUD, if Bob were present, the QUD itself would be a very odd thing to ask. Even if A asked
his question out of an extreme lack of perception ã Bob is right there in front of him! ã an imperative of the sort Bob, be
right here! would also be infelicitous because it commands something that is already true in the current context.
¹³An alternative way to respond to this question with an imperative is to not provide an answer, but to suggest an alternate
strategy for ėnding the answer. For example, B could respondAskMary! ĉe implication of this response is thatMary knows
where Bob is. (A declarative uĨerance, such as I don’t know, but Mary does, can have the same eﬀect.) ĉis sort of response
involves manipulation of the QUD stack that falls outside the purview of relevance, so I will not address it further here.
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portion of) their ordering source, while Kaufmann (2011) goes as far as equating imperatives and modals
entirely. I do not draw such a strong tie between imperatives andmodals since, as I show in §3.3.1, treating
imperatives as preferences is crucial to a deėnition of relevance that applies equally to all clause types. As
I examine various types of QUDs in §3.3.4, I will be primarily concerned with the relevance or irrelevance
of imperatives; §3.3.5 will return to the relationship between imperatives and modality, and the variable
behavior of imperative responses to modal questions.
3.3.4 Answering diﬀerent types of QUDs
ĉe deėnition given in (23) covers cases when imperatives are relevant. However, there are many cases in
which an imperative cannot provide a relevant response to a QUD, beyond non-addressee-oriented ques-
tions (25). ĉere are factors other than the propositional content of theQUD, including information struc-
tural requirements, that aﬀect whether an imperative can felicitously respond to the QUD. In this section,
I break questions into syntactic classes to examine how theQUDs that they introduce interact with imper-
ative responses.
Polar questions
ĉe simplest QUD is a polar question. Since polar questions only have two potential answers, a relevant
response can only give a complete answer to the question, never a partial one.¹⁴
In the appropriate context, an imperative can felicitously respond to a polar question, in either the
aﬃrmative or negative.
¹⁴I am abstracting away from responses that indicate the possibility or likelihood of a potential answer to the QUD.ĉese
do not constitute partial answers, since a partial answer must eliminate one or more potential answers. Simons et al. (2011)
acknowledges that this is an outstanding issue for the current theory of relevance, which “is overly restrictive and should be
weakened at least to allow for discourse moves whichmerely raise or lower the probability of some answer to the QUD being
correct” (2011:8, fn. 3). Presumably whatever the necessary modiėcations to the theory of relevance are, they apply equally
to imperatives.
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(29) Context: A is planning her activities for the day.
A: Am I going to the store?
B1: Go to the store! We’re out of eggs.
B2: Don’t go to the store! We have everything we need.
ĉe QUD in (29) has the potential answers {A goes to the store, A does not go to the store}. Response B1
prefers the former proposition, and response B2 prefers the laĨer. Both prefer complete answers to the
QUD, and both are relevant.
However, many polar questions have no felicitous imperative responses, even if their potential answers
are addressee-oriented and non-past.
(30) A:Will I win the race?
B1: You’ll win the race. (Everyone else is slower than you.)
B2: #Win the race! (Everyone else is slower than you.)
ĉe QUD in (29) has the potential answers {A will win the race, A will not win the race}. ĉe imperative
response in B2 prefers the proposition A wins the race, which is not among the potential answers. It is not
possible to construct an imperative that prefers either potential answer due to the fact that future tense is
marked with a modal construction in English, and imperativizing a modal verb is not possible; *Will win
the race! is ungrammatical. However, other modals such as should and must can be used in questions that
have imperative responses; I address these cases separately in §3.3.5.
ObjectWh-questions
Wh-questions are more open-ended than polar questions, and may have an unbounded number of poten-
tial answers. ĉis allows imperatives to supply either a complete or partial answer to a question. As shown
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in §3.3.3, imperatives can straightforwardly answer object Wh-questions. ĉe example given in (26), re-
peated in (31) below, provides a complete answer to the QUD.
(31) A: I don’t know where to go for lunch.
B: Go to the taco place! ĉey have a special today.
In (31), the QUD is introduced by the subordinate clause “where to go for lunch,” and has the potential
answers {A goes to the cafeteria for lunch,A goes to the hot dog stand for lunch,A goes to the taco place for lunch,
…}. B’s response “Go to the taco place!” prefers A goes to the taco place for lunch. Since it prefers one and
only one of the potential answers, it is a complete answer to the QUD, and is therefore relevant. It is also
possible to have a relevant imperative response that provides a partial answer. ĉe simplest way to do so is
with a disjunctive command.
(32) A: I don’t know where to go for lunch.
B: Go to the taco place or the hot dog stand! ĉey’re both close and cheap.
ĉe response in (32) directly prefers two potential answers over the others, and does not establish any
further preference among these two options.¹⁵
A less direct method of providing a partial answer is with a negative imperative.
(33) A: I don’t know where to go for lunch.
B: Don’t go to the taco place! I got food poisoning last time I ate there.
¹⁵ĉe disjunctive proposition A goes to the taco place or A goes to the hot dog stand could be a potential answer to the QUD,
although it was deliberately not listed in the representation above, which only included atomic propositional answers. If dis-
junctive potential answers were included in the QUD, partial answers of the sort given in (32) would be reduced to complete
answers. Since it does not aﬀect the determination of relevance (which only requires either a partial or complete answer) and
makes a list-based representation of QUDs simpler, I will continue to omit disjunctive answers.
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B’s response in (33) prefersAdoes not go to the taco place for lunch, and has the eﬀect of removing the propo-
sition A goes to the taco place for lunch from the pool of potential answers while leaving all other options;
hence it provides a partial answer. Note that in the denotation of the QUD given above, A does not go to
the taco place for lunch is not among the listed potential answers. ĉis is desirable, since if it were, then B’s
prohibition in (33) would prefer a complete answer, even though the issue raised by A is not fully resolved.
SubjectWh-questions
ĉe above examples showed that imperatives can easily provide several types of answers, both complete
and partial, to object Wh-question QUDs. However, subject Wh-questions resist imperative responses.
(34) Context: Several housemates have met to discuss chores. B is in charge of assigning responsibilities.
A:Who takes out the trash (this week)?
B: #Take out the trash!
ĉeQUD introduced by “Who takes out the trash?” has the potential answers {A takes out the trash,B takes
out the trash,C takes out the trash,…}. B’s response, addressingA, prefersA takes out the trash, which is oneof
the potential answers to theQUD.ĉusB’s imperative uĨerance in (34) is relevant, but is still infelicitous. I
argue that this is not due to a shortcoming in the deėnitionof relevance, but canbe aĨributed to the fact that
imperatives can (and frequently do) have null subjects, which has information-structural consequences.
Information structure plays an important role in determining the potential answers of a given question.
Marking a certain constituent in a question with prosodic focus indicates that it is what varies among the
potential answers.
(35) Who didMary see?
(As opposed to who she didn’t see.)
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(36) Who didMary ňĹĹ?
(As opposed to who she emailed, talked to on the phone, etc.)
(37) Who didMĵŇŏ see?
(As opposed to who John saw, who Bill saw, etc.)
Any response must foreground the same element as the question it seeks to address. For example, “MĵŇŏ
saw Bill” is an acceptable response to (37), but not (35) or (36), at least in most contexts.¹⁶ ĉis type of
focal compatibility is known as congruence to the QUD (Roberts 1996), and can be formalized as follows.
(38) Move 𝛽 is congruent to a question ?𝛼 iﬀ its focal alternatives ||𝛽|| are theQ-alternatives determined
by ?𝛼, i.e. iﬀ ||𝛽|| = 𝑄 − 𝑎𝑙𝑡(𝛼). (Roberts 1996:24, ex. 25)
In what sense, then, is the imperative response in (34) incongruent to theQUD?ĉeQUD is a subject
Wh-question, and bears no additional focus, so the focal alternatives of the question center around the sub-
ject nominal. However, the imperative response has a null subject. As discussed heavily in the literature on
pro-drop, null elements represent backgrounded information (e.g. BuĨ and King 1997). Since the subject
is backgrounded in this manner, there is a focal clash with the QUD, causing infelicity.
ĉere is a strategy available for foregrounding imperative subjects: the inclusion of a vocative. Port-
ner (2004b) likens the information structural status of vocatives to sentence topics, which are a type of
foregrounded information. However, adding a vocative to the response in (34) does not make it fully fe-
licitous.¹⁷
¹⁶Shiěing focus within a response can be a deliberate conversational maneuver, for example to introduce a conversational
implicature. Since I am largely concerned with relevance, which depends on contextual entailment, I will not address issues
of implicature further.
¹⁷ĉe judgments expressed in (39) are intended to represent the acceptability of the imperatives when they are used to
establish a new norm. If the maĨer of who has the duty to take out the trash had been decided prior to A’s question, neither
imperative response would be felicitous. ĉis is due to the general restriction that imperatives cannot be used to describe
previously established norms; see Cormany (to appear) for further discussion.
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(39) A:Who takes out the trash (this week)?
B1: #?You, take out the trash!
B2: ?John, take out the trash! ( John ≠ the addressee)
ĉis is not a shortcoming of congruence to the QUD. In the next subsection, which deals with imperative
responses tomultipleWh-questions, I will show that a vocative’s failure to “rescue” an imperative response
to a subject Wh-question is in fact a desirable and direct consequence of congruence.
MultipleWh-questions
Multiple Wh-questions resist bare imperative responses in a manner similar to subject Wh-questions.
(40) John: So, Bob, you’re in charge. Who has what job?
Bob (to John): #?Take out the trash!
In English, multipleWh-questions require pair-list answers, so the potential responses to theQUD in (40)
are of the form {John takes out the trash, John does the dishes, Bob takes out the trash, Bob does the dishes, …}.
Bob’s response prefers one of these propositions, John takes out the trash, yet remains infelicitous. However,
unlike in the subjectWh-question case in (34) and (39), adding a vocative signiėcantly improves responses
to multiple Wh-questions (41), even when only providing a partial answer (42).
(41) John: So, Bob, you’re in charge. Who has what job?
Bob: John, take out the trash! Mary, sweep the Ěoor! I’ll do the dishes.
(42) John: So, Bob, you’re in charge. Who has what job?
Bob: John, take out the trash! I haven’t decided what the rest of us should do.
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ĉis is due to the fact that multiple Wh-questions not only require a diﬀerent type of response in terms of
content, but also in terms of information structure. In a pair-list answer, both elements of the pair must
be foregrounded. ĉe imperative responses with vocatives successfully foreground both elements (subject
and VP), and are both relevant and felicitous. ĉe fact that such responses foreground two elements also
accounts for why they are not suited to addressing subject Wh-questions, which seek responses with only
a single focus.
AdjunctWh-questions
ĉe ėnal class of QUDs to be examined is adjunct Wh-questions. Although adjunct Wh-questions may
have syntactic diﬀerences as compared to argument Wh-questions in a given language, they introduce
similar sets of potential answers and have similar congruence conditions. However, some adjunct Wh-
questions appear to accept declarative responses asserting a propositional answer, but disallow imperative
responses preferring the same answer.
(43) A:Why does everyone assume that I smell bad?
B1: (It’s because) you take out the trash.
B2: #Take out the trash!
Adjunct Wh-questions formed with why in English are deceptive in this regard. Since why takes the place
of a clausal adjunct, it is tempting to say that the answers to the questions in (43) are of the form {A takes
out the trash, someone started a rumor that A smells bad,…}. However, this is not the case, as questions with
non-clausal adjuncts show. ĉe potential answers to the questionWhen did Bob eat dinner? are not {6:00,
7:00, as soon as he got home, …} ã clearly not, since these are not propositions. Rather, they are of the
form {Bob ate dinner at 6:00, Bob ate dinner at 7:00, Bob ate dinner as soon as he got home, …}.
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By the same token, the answers to the QUD introduced in (43) are properly represented as {everyone
assumes A smells bad because A takes out the trash, everyone assumes A smells bad because someone started a
rumor that A smells bad, …}. Despite the potential for ellipsis indicated in B1, a relevant response must
contain propositional content that is a full answer to the QUD, at least underlyingly. ĉe supporting mate-
rial necessary to meet this requirement cannot be overtly represented in an imperative response, as shown
by the ungrammaticality of *It’s because take out the trash!. Trying to move the imperative marking to the
matrix clause of the expanded response has an equally nonsensical result: *Be because you take out the trash!
ĉis imperative sentence is ungrammatical because it is not addressee-oriented.
3.3.5 Open issue: Modal QUDs
ĉeprevious section discussed the ability of imperatives to provide felicitous and relevant responses to cer-
tain syntactic classes of questions. Now I turn to amajor semantic area not discussed in detail above, which
cuts across the various syntactic classes: modal questions. ĉe typeofmodality expressed in a question also
has eﬀects on the felicity of imperative responses. In general, imperatives aremost compatiblewith bouletic
modals (those which pertain to wishes or desires). Certain modals in English, including should and must,
are ambiguous betweenmultiple types ofmodality, including bouletic and teleological (pertaining to goals
and the steps taken to achieve them).¹⁸ ĉese semantic distinctions may be linked to relevance via contex-
tual entailment. I will point out one way in which this could be accomplished, but will leave to future work
the development of the modal logic that would formally connect the two.
First, it should be established that the acceptability of imperative responses to modal questions can
diverge from that of responses to non-modal questions. In (44), imperative responses to a modal polar
question are infelicitous or marginal at best, in contrast to felicitous responses to a non-modal question
(see (29) above). ĉe imperative responses in (44) also fare far worse than declarative responses.
¹⁸For further introduction to these and other types of modality, with examples, see chapter 2 of Portner (2009) and von
Fintel and Gillies (2007).
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(44) A: Do I have to take out the trash?
B1: You do (have to take out the trash).
B2: #?Take out the trash! / #?Do it!¹⁹
B3: You don’t (have to take out the trash).
B4: #Don’t take out the trash! / #Don’t do it!
One possible analysis of the infelicitous B2 and B4 responses in (44) is that they do not prefer potential
answers to the QUD.ĉeQUD introduced by “Do I have to take out the trash?” has the potential answers
{A has to take out the trash, A does not have to take out the trash}. B2 prefers A takes out the trash, which is
not among the potential answers, nor is it incompatible with either answer. Recall that it is syntactically
impossible to construct an imperative that prefers a modal proposition (see §3.3.4).
However, there are many cases in which imperatives can be felicitous responses to modal questions,
such as the modal Wh-question in (45) below.
(45) A:Who should I see at the conference?
B1: SeeMary! She always gives fantastic talks.
B2: Don’t see Mike! He does good research, but he mumbles.
If the logic used to rule out the imperative responses in (44) were applied to these cases, it would falsely
predict that the responses should be infelicitous. ĉe imperative in B1 prefers a non-modal proposition,
A sees Mary at the conference, but it is felicitous, despite the fact that the QUD has no non-modal potential
answers.
It is at this point that an appeal must be made to diﬀerent types of modality. ĉe responses in (45)
¹⁹B2 is signiėcantly improved when preėxed by yes. ĉis is due to the fact that yes is elliptical and stands in for a declarative
response. Being a complete answer, it discharges theQUD.ĉe imperativeuĨerance thenbecomes supplemental information,
which does not have a direct relationship to the QUD and is therefore not ruled out on grounds of relevance.
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are compatible with a bouletic interpretation of should in A’s question. ĉe responses pertain to B’s wishes,
desires, or opinions as to what course of action A should take. It is diﬃcult to interpret should as expressing
a diﬀerent type of modality in this circumstance.
On the other hand, if A asks a similar question usingmust, multiple interpretations are available.
(46) A:Whomust I see at the conference?
Interpretation: Following your wishes/desires/opinions, who will I necessarily see?
B1: You must see Mary. She always gives fantastic talks.
B2: SeeMary! She always gives fantastic talks.
(47) A:Whomust I see at the conference?
Interpretation: By virtue of my presence at the conference, who will I necessarily see?
B3: You must see Jane. I know you don’t like her, but she’s running the registration desk.
B4: #See Jane! I know you don’t like her, but she’s running the registration desk.
Must is ambiguous between bouletic and teleological interpretations. ĉe acceptability of the imperative
response depends upon which interpretation is chosen. ĉe followup material in B’s responses represent
propositions in the ordering source of the modal, and are indicative of the type of modality expressed.
Similarly, in the appropriate context, should canalsohave a teleological interpretation. Imperative responses
to teleological should are just as bad as those to teleologicalmust.
(48) Context: Mary is sick and consulting a doctor, who has just prescribed some medicine for her.
Mary: So I have to take these pills for two weeks, right?
Doctor: Yes, that’s right.
Mary: Should I start feeling beĨer before the two weeks are up?
Doctor: Yes, you should start feeling beĨer in about three days.
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(49) Mary: Should I start feeling beĨer before the two weeks are up?
Doctor: #Yes, start feeling beĨer in about three days!
ĉedeėnition of relevancemakes no reference tomodality, let alone diﬀerent types ofmodality, so how
can it be used to explain these diﬀerences? One solution would be to employ the concept of contextual
entailment already present in the deėnition of command relevance.
(50) An uĨerance is relevant if the propositional argument of its illocutionary relation
contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD. = (23), emphasis added
ĉe felicity of imperative responses to bouleticmodal questions would then depend on a contextual entail-
ment link between the preferred, non-modal proposition and a modal potential answer to the QUD. For
example, the imperative SeeMary! only prefers the proposition [the addressee] seesMary, butmay contextu-
ally introduce other propositions, such as [the speaker] wants [the addressee] to see Mary. ĉe propositional
expression of this desire can then entail the bouletic modal proposition [the addressee] should see Mary,
according to [the speaker’s] wishes.
Collectively, the data presented in this section indicates a link between the type ofmodality represented
in a QUD and the relevance of imperative responses. ĉe open question is how to establish an entail-
ment relationship between the non-modal propositions preferred by the imperative and modal potential
answers. Doing so would allow for the deėnition of relevance for commands to go unchanged. I hope that
cross-linguistic data will shed additional light on this question. For instance, a language with modals that
unambiguously indicate a single type of modality could provide even clearer evidence that bouletic and
teleological modals behave diﬀerently with respect to imperatives.
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3.4 Relevance and Preference Semantics
3.4.1 Preferences andQUDs
In §3.3.4 I showed how imperatives are sensitive to the current QUD, and what eﬀect this has on their Rel-
evance and felicity. Now I will explain those eﬀects as a direct consequence of the representations used in
preference semantics (§2.4.1). Comparing the contents of the discourse state𝑅 and the scope proposition
of an imperative ! 𝑝makes predictions that match the pragmatic data.
ĉe contribution of an imperative is to eﬀect a change on the preference state𝑅, which is representative
of the information currently assumed for the purpose of the discourse. 𝑅 also contains information about
the possible directions of future discourse, since it typically contains several alternatives. ĉe alternatives of
the form ⟨𝑎, ∅⟩, taken together, can represent theQuestions Under Discussion.²⁰ All uĨerances, including
commands, are sensitive to the QUD (Cormany 2012). ĉe alternatives under consideration determine
the uĨerance’s Relevance and, at least in part, its felicity. In the examples below, I show how the preference
semantics for commands permits or rules out imperative uĨerances relative to a speciėed𝑅. ĉis will lead
to a formal, dynamic deėnition of Relevance for commands, which will be generalized to all clause types in
§3.4.2.
Successfully Addressing the QUD
Consider the alternatives (obliquely) introduced by the following uĨerance:
(51) A: I don’t know where to go for lunch today.
²⁰Since 𝑅may contain alternatives of coarser or ėner grain, the entire set of QUDs is represented in a single object. All of
these alternatives should, in theory, be directly accessible. Contrast the push-down QUD stack of Roberts (1996; 2004).
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ĉe alternatives correspond to all of the possible propositions describing where A will go to lunch. For
the sake of this example, assume that A and his interlocutor know that there are only three possible places
that A could get lunchã the cafeteria, the hot dog stand, or the taco placeã and that A will get lunch at
exactly one place. ĉat is to say, A’s uĨerance introduces the alternatives {A goes to the cafeteria for lunch, A
goes to the hot dog stand for lunch,A goes to the taco place for lunch}, and these alternatives are exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. We can represent the preference state aěer (51) is uĨered as follows:
(52) 𝑅􏷟 = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}
𝑐 = A goes to the cafeteria for lunch
ℎ = A goes to the hot dog stand for lunch
𝑡 = A goes to the taco place for lunch
A’s interlocutor can then introduce a preference for one of these alternatives, say 𝑡, by uĨering an im-
perative. (B can optionally provide a rationale for this preference.)
(53) B: Go to the taco place! (ĉey have a special today.)
ĉis imperative performs all three steps of dynamic update described in §2.4.1 above, producing a new
preference state𝑅􏷠.
(54) a. Admit𝑅􏷟 preferences: {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}
b. Add a global preference: {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ¬𝑡⟩}
c. Add local preferences:
{⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ¬𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑐 ∩ 𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ ∩ 𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡 ∩ 𝑡, ∅⟩} intersect each 𝑎with 𝑡
d. Perform pragmatic reasoning:
82
{⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ¬𝑡⟩, ⟨∅,∅⟩, ⟨∅,∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩} alternatives are mutually exclusive
{⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, 𝑐 ∪ ℎ⟩, ⟨∅,∅⟩, ⟨∅,∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩} alternatives are exhaustive
{⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, 𝑐 ∪ ℎ⟩} remove null and redundant preferences
Because of the additional information about the relationship between the three alternatives,𝑅􏷠 diﬀers
from𝑅􏷟 only in the global preference ⟨𝑡, 𝑐 ∪ ℎ⟩. ĉis preference contributes new information about one of
the alternatives present in𝑅􏷟, namely ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩; we can therefore say that B’s imperative uĨerance successfully
addressed the QUD.
Failing to Address the QUD
Since an imperative that contributes new information about an alternative under consideration is Relevant,
one that fails to do so should be considered not Relevant, and therefore not felicitous. Consider the same
situation as in (52), with 𝑅􏷟 = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}. Suppose that, instead of an imperative preferring
⟨𝑡, ¬𝑡⟩, B uĨers a diﬀerent imperative:
(55) B: Bring me a sandwich!
ĉis imperative establishes a preference for the proposition 𝑏over its complement: ⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩. ĉe imperative
update rules proceed in the same manner; they are not sensitive to the fact that 𝑅􏷟 does not contain an
alternative ⟨𝑏, ∅⟩.
(56) a. Admit𝑅􏷟 preferences: {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}
b. Add a global preference: {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩}
c. Add local preferences: {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩, ⟨𝑐 ∩ 𝑏,∅⟩, ⟨ℎ ∩ 𝑏, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡 ∩ 𝑏, ∅⟩}
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Since there is no contextually speciėed relationship between 𝑏 and any of 𝑐, ℎ, 𝑡, no further pragmatic rea-
soning takes place, and𝑅􏷠 = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩, ⟨𝑐 ∩ 𝑏, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ ∩ 𝑏, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡 ∩ 𝑏, ∅⟩}. ĉus this
update contributesmore information to𝑅 than the successful update in (54) aboveãfournewpreferences
as compared to oneã but none of these new preferences provide new information about the alternatives
present in𝑅􏷟. Put diﬀerently, the new information does not contain any preference that would help A de-
cide where he should go to lunch. ĉus we can say that B’s uĨerance in (55) is not Relevant, and therefore
not felicitous.
3.4.2 Unifying Relevance Under Preferences
In the above examples, Relevancewas determined bywhether an imperative update contributed new infor-
mation about an alternative under consideration. Since the dynamic preference semantics permits direct
comparison of imperative, interrogative, and declarative content, this method for determining relevance
can be extended to all clause types. To do so, the criteria for relevance can be stated in terms of the content
of 𝑅 prior to and aěer update with a given uĨerance. Since preference states are sets, the eﬀected contri-
bution of an uĨerance to a given state can be computed by set subtraction: 𝑅[𝑈] − 𝑅. Examining context
changes of this sort will form the basis for a uniėed deėnition of Relevance in a dynamic semantic system.
Preference semantics has representations for all uĨerance types, and freely mixes them within prefer-
ence states. To have an eﬀect on a context, alternatives and preferences must be contributed by update
rules, which represent illocutionary relations. ĉe three major clause types and their characteristic eﬀects
in dynamic preference semantics can be summarized as follows (see also §2.4.1).
(57) a. Assertions use a singleton alternative to ėlter possible worlds: ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩
b. Questions introduce multiple alternatives: {⟨𝑝, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑞, ∅⟩, …}
c. Imperatives prefer a proposition over its complement: ⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩
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ĉe formal similarity between all three clause types is that their contribution is based on a preference
which is of the form ⟨𝑝, 𝑥⟩. Since all of the representations in (57) are generated by illocutionary operators
that scope over a propositional constituent, we can say that it is characteristic of these operators that they
place their scope proposition as the ėrst element of a preference. ĉis formal similarity can be exploited to
create a deėnition of Relevance not just for imperative uĨerances, but for all matrix clause uĨerances.
A uniėed deėnition of relevance should apply to the common character of diﬀerent types of uĨerances:
the ėrst member of the preferences that they introduce. ĉus I propose that to be Relevant, an uĨerance
must satisfy two criteria:
(58) a. ĉe uĨerance must introduce a preference whose ėrst element entails an element of one of
the alternatives under consideration.
b. ĉe uĨerance must alter the preference state𝑅.
(58a) is the core of what it means to be relevant. (58b) ensures that Relevant uĨerances must not only
be compatible with 𝑅, but provide new information; i.e. re-assertion, re-statement of the QUD, and re-
iteration of commands are not Relevant contributions.
Both of these criteria can be captured by examining the change between the preference state prior to
and following the uĨerance. In the deėnition below, the notation 𝑅[𝑈] is to be read “the preference state
𝑅 updated with uĨerance𝑈”.
(59) Relevance in Preference Semantics
An uĨerance𝑈 is Relevant iﬀ
∃⟨𝑝, 𝑥⟩ ∈ 𝑅[𝑈] − 𝑅 ∶ 𝑝 ⊆ 𝑎& (⟨𝑎, 𝑎′⟩ ∈ 𝑅 ∨ ⟨𝑎′, 𝑎⟩ ∈ 𝑅)
Note that this is the actual context change brought about by𝑈 , not an abstract context change potential.
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Existentially quantifying over𝑅[𝑈]−𝑅 also enforces (58b), since if the uĨerance eﬀects no change on the
context,𝑅[𝑈]−𝑅 = ∅ and the quantiėcational restriction will necessarily be false, deeming the uĨerance
not Relevant.
ĉe deėnition in (59) can be used to predict the Relevance facts for (53) and (55); these results are
summarized below.
(60) A: I don’t know where to go for lunch today.
B1: Go to the taco place!
B2: #Bring me a sandwich!
(61) Computation of Relevance forGo to the taco place!
𝑅 = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}
𝑅[𝑈] = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, 𝑐 ∪ ℎ⟩}
𝑅[𝑈] − 𝑅 = {⟨𝑡, 𝑐 ∪ ℎ⟩}
𝑡 ⊆ 𝑡& ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩ ∈ 𝑅, therefore Relevant.
(62) Computation of Relevance for Bring me a sandwich!
𝑅 = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩}
𝑅[𝑈] = {⟨𝑐, ∅⟩, ⟨ℎ, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑡, ∅⟩, ⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩}
𝑅[𝑈] − 𝑅 = {⟨𝑏, ¬𝑏⟩}
𝑏 ⊈ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊈ ℎ, 𝑏 ⊈ 𝑡, therefore not Relevant.
An interesting property of Relevance as deėned in (59) is that it can be combinedwith theCooperative
Principle (Grice 1989). ĉis can lead to an acceptable interpretation of (62), even if it is strictly speaking
not Relevant. If A assumes that B’s uĨerance must be a cooperative aĨempt at communication, A will try
to infer a reason why 𝑏 does in fact entail one of 𝑐, ℎ, 𝑡. One such scenario would be that A and B both
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know that the cafeteria is the only place that sells sandwiches. ĉrough this additional pragmatic reasoning,
A could conclude that B was indirectly establishing a preference for 𝑐. ĉe mechanics of this reasoning
lie outside of dynamic semantics, illocutionary update rules, and the computation of Relevance, but are
nevertheless important factors in the rational behavior of discourse participants. ĉere are also uĨerances
which have no place in the discourse, even when taking additional reasoning into account. For example, if
B uĨered Stand on your head!, its contribution would likely have no inferable tie to any of the alternatives
under consideration, and it would be ruled both not Relevant and not felicitous.
3.5 Summary
ĉis chapter has demonstrated twomajor points about implementing preference semantics for imperatives
in discourse. First, the challenge tests presented in §3.2 show that imperatives contribute the type ofmean-
ing predicted by preference semantics, since they have an accessible, at-issue propositional component and
additional illocutionary meaning. Moreover, their contributions are divergent from those of performative
declarative modals. Second, it is possible to account for the felicity of imperative uĨerances using standard
pragmatic tools, including Relevance. ĉe felicity of an imperative uĨerance depends on its propositional
content, its information structure, and the Question Under Discussion. Finally, I formulated a formal deė-
nition of Relevancewithin preference semantics. Because preference semantics uniėes all types ofmeaning
within a single discourse representation, I uniėed the deėnition ofRelevance so it applies to all clause types,
without sacriėcing its explanatory coverage.
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CHAPTER 4
ENCODINGTHE IMPEĆTIVE ILLOCUTIONARYRELATION
4.1 Introduction
ĉis chapter explores the ways in which the imperative illocutionary relation can be represented syntacti-
cally. As explained inChapter 3, illocutionary relations require access to both a propositional argument and
the discourse context. As such, the natural place for them to reside is in the leě periphery, above the con-
stituent that denotes a saturated proposition (likelyTPorFinP).However, there are several other functions
that must be performed in the leě periphery of any clause, and they have signiėcant interactions with the
marking of imperativity. Furthermore, the inventory of functional heads in any given language has serious
implications for the syntax of imperatives. I aim to show that the range of variation found in imperatives can
be accounted for with a single framework of an articulated leě periphery. Within this framework, individ-
ual languages may encode features on a greater or smaller number of functional heads. I argue in §4.2 that
English collapses three clausal features onto a single complementizer head and realizes two other features
independently.
ĉe chapter is organized as follows. §4.2 covers previous proposals for the structure of the leě periph-
ery, including general proposals and those speciėcally tailored to imperatives. I adopt an extended version
of Rizzi’s (1997) structure as a universal template; I then derive a more restricted structure from it, which
applies to English. §4.3 looks at the possibilities for information-structural movement in imperatives. I
present novel English data that shows a diﬀerence between contrastive and non-contrastive topicalization
in imperatives, and I use several word order tests to determine the positions of dislocated elements, overt
subjects, and do-support in negative imperatives. §4.4 applies the same structural account to embedded im-
peratives, which are present in English and other languages. I show that embedded imperatives are neither
weak nor strong islands, but do restrict extraction in ways predicted by their clausal structure.
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4.2 ĉe Illocutionary Function of ForceP
4.2.1 Illocutionary Relation in the CP Field
Most accounts of the syntax of imperatives use a leě-peripheral projection to explain some or all of their
characteristic properties, including verb position, clitic position, and subject agreement. ĉe element re-
sponsible for these eﬀects can be treated either as an operator (e.g. Han 2000) or a head (e.g. ZanuĨini
2008; ZanuĨini et al. 2012). However, past accounts typically rely on either a unitary CP (1) or ad hoc
projections (2) that are peculiar to imperatives. Such structures leave liĨle room for complex interactions
in the clausal periphery.
(1) Unitary CP
CP > TP… (e.g. Han 2000)
(2) Clause-speciėc phrase
JussiveP ≥ TP… (ZanuĨini 2008; ZanuĨini et al. 2012)
ĉe framework I adopt is an extension of the articulated leě periphery as originally proposed in Rizzi
(1997). ĉe concepts that Rizzi explained by proposing an articulated CP ėeld are universal properties of
clauses, but do not form an exhaustive list. Rather than adopting a fully cartographic approach, I only pro-
pose the addition of onemore leě-peripheral layer. All of the clausal functions are represented by syntactic
features, which, depending on the language, may have a dedicated single-purpose head or may reside on
a more complex complementizer. ĉe combinations of features present in the lexical inventory of a given
language aﬀects the structure and dynamics of its leě periphery, in imperatives as well as other clause types.
Han (2000) uses the paucity of positions in the unitary CP model to explain interactions with nega-
tion, claiming that scope eﬀects arise due to the order of adjunction in Neg-to-C head raising. I argue
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that this analysis is too simple, even when just accounting for negation and no other leě-peripheral func-
tions (§4.3.3). Also, labeling the imperative-marking projection as CP delimits the clause, precluding ad-
ditional peripheral positions. While a clause-speciėc projection allows higher projections, placing them
above the clause-marking position generates anomalous results, both syntactically (§4.2.2) and semanti-
cally (§5.2.3).
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) posit an imperative-speciėc projection, JussiveP,¹ to account for the binding
of 2nd person anaphors and reĚexives in imperatives, even in the presence of a grammatically 3rd person
subject.
(3) a. Everyone wash yourself!
b. *Everyone washed yourself. (aěer ZanuĨini et al. 2012: ex. 12–13)
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) argues that the person features of the reĚexive yourself are not logophorically deter-
minedbutmust bepropagated fromJussive⁰ viaAgree. ĉeseperson features are also responsible for licens-
ing pro subjects in imperatives, even in languages that typically disallow pro-drop in other clause types. In
order to establish an adjacency interaction with the presence or absence of a person feature in T⁰, JussiveP
is placed directly above TP. ZanuĨini et al. (2012) claim that if the person features of T⁰ are compatible
with those of Jussive⁰, the two heads will fuse and act as a single probe; otherwise they remain distinct.
ĉus the projection responsible for imperative properties either immediately precedes or is identical to the
projection that bears tense.
Neither Han (2000) nor ZanuĨini et al. (2012) places the imperative-marking content within an ar-
ticulated CP ėeld, although ZanuĨini et al. (2012) claim that an additional C layer (equivalent to SubP,
which I adopt in (6) below)may exist above JussiveP in embedded contexts (see §4.4.1). ĉis makes both
approaches incompatible with a model that adopts an articulated CP.
¹See §2.3.3 for additional discussion of this structure.
90
(4) Articulated CP
ForceP > TopP > FocusP > TopP > FinP > TP… (Rizzi 1997)
ĉe structure in (4) is by no means universal, and has been revised many times in the literature on the
cartography of the leě periphery, including in Rizzi (2004). Extensions of the sort that posit extremely
ėne-grained or language-speciėc positions (e.g. Cinque’s (1999) account of adverb order) do not pertain
to the clausal positions that I examine in this chapter. I focus on universal clausal characteristics, includ-
ing clause type (in ForceP), information structure (in TopP and FocusP), and subject licensing (in FinP).
While clause typemust be represented quite high in the clause, I do not argue that it must be at the extreme
leě edge. ĉat position is reserved for an important syntactic (and semantic) characteristic: whether the
clause is amatrix or subordinate clause. A dedicated phrase for this function has been proposed forModern
Greek (Roussou 2000) and Korean (ZanuĨini et al. 2012), where overt particles occupy a position above
the traditional C or Force head. I refer to this projection as Subordination Phrase (SubP) and the feature
it encodes as [±Sub], although it ought to be present in both matrix and subordinate clauses. ĉe addition
of SubP yields the overall clausal architecture (5) that I adopt for the remainder of the dissertation.
(5) Extended articulated CP
SubP > ForceP > TopP > FocusP > TopP > FinP > TP…
However, from a typological standpoint, languages that have an overt functional head that marks only
the [±Sub] feature are rare. ĉis is likely due to interaction with its immediate neighbor, ForceP, which
encodes illocutionary relation / clause type as a non-binary feature [Force{ĸĹķ, Ľłŉ, ĽŁń, …}]. In most
languages, there are two possibilities for the value of [Sub] and three for [Force]. If encoded separately,
ėve functional heads can produce all of the possible combinations of the two features. However, if the
two positions are conĚated, such that both features must be encoded on a single head, the complexity is
not much greater, requiring six heads: [+Sub, ĸĹķ], [+Sub, Ľłŉ], [+Sub, ĽŁń], [−Sub, ĸĹķ], [−Sub, Ľłŉ],
[−Sub, ĽŁń].
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Furthermore, arriving at this combined system seems highly likely from the point of view of frequency.
While having an overt Sub⁰ in subordinate clauses is extremely useful for marking the clause boundary, it
will appear with the same form and position in every matrix clause. Highly predictable information tends
to be phonologically reduced. One can imagine that matrix clauses are frequent enough that the [–Sub]
particle will be phonologically reduced to zero in quick order. Syntactic conĚation of the null-headed SubP
and ForceP will then produce a combined Sub/Force⁰. Drastic reduction of these systems lead to the sim-
pliėed leě peripheries of languages such as English, which does not overtly mark either Sub or Force in
matrix clauses, and combines them in subordinating complementizers. For example, matrix declaratives in
English are always headed by Ø, while subordinate declaratives can be headed by that or Ø. See §4.2.2 for
discussion of the full English complementizer inventory.
In English, not all of the positions in (5) are realized. Haegeman (2004) presents arguments that there
is only a single TopP in English, contra both Rizzi (1997) andRizzi (2004), which expands the structure in
(4) to allow arbitrarilymanyTopic projections. Building onHaegeman’s arguments, I propose that English
conĚates the adjacent positions of SubP, ForceP, and TopP. ĉe resulting projection is headed by a port-
manteau complementizer that carries three features: [±Sub, Force{ĸĹķ/Ľłŉ/ĽŁń}, ±Top]. ĉe English
leě periphery therefore has three layers: complementizer, Focus, and Finiteness.
(6) Extended articulated CP for English
Sub / Force / TopP > FocusP > FinP > TP… (following Haegeman 2004)
ĉe greatest eﬀect of the structure in (6) is that Focus has an independent position, while Top is covari-
ant with Sub and Force. ĉis directly predicts interactions between clause type and information-structural
movementwhich are not easily captured in the other theories of imperative syntax. Before addressing these
interactions in §4.3, I will address a more basic issue: the syntactic requirements of Force⁰ taken in isola-
tion.
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4.2.2 Clause typingmethods
ĉetypeof contribution that a clausemakes is oneof itsmost important characteristics, and theCPdomain
is responsible inwhole or in part for encoding this information. ĉeoriginalmotivation for positing aForce
projection was to specify clause type.
Complementizers express the fact that a sentence is a question, a declarative, an exclamative,
a relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind, etc., and can be selected as such by a
higher selector. ĉis information is sometimes called the clausal Type (Cheng 1991), or the
speciėcation of Force (Chomsky 1995). (Rizzi 1997:283)
Specifying ForceP as the locus of clause typing makes a speciėc syntactic claim about the broader Clause
Typing Hypothesis, as introduced by Cheng (1991).
(7) Clause Typing Hypothesis
All clauses contain an element that scopes over a propositional constituent (TP) and speciėes its
discourse function. (Cheng 1991)
I have made the further claim that the semantic eﬀects of “specify[ing] a discourse function” are best
represented by illocutionary relations, functions which take a proposition and a context, and return an up-
dated, structured context (§3.3). In order to have access to both of these arguments, the element encoding
illocutionary relationmust scope overTP andmust be high enough to be “outward-facing”; ForceP satisėes
these positional requirements.
ĉe next question is whether illocutionary relation is marked on Force⁰ or on an operator residing in
Spec ForceP. For a variety of reasons, I argue for the former. For one, ForceP is responsible for enforcing
declarative, interrogative, or imperative inĚection of the verb. It cannot be the reverseã that an inĚected
verb determines clause type ã as that would require a strictly local relation between the verb and Force,
93
but in many languages the verb does not raise to C, even in interrogatives and imperatives. Furthermore,
information structural positions intervene between Force and the propositional domain. ĉus the estab-
lishment of a long-distance relationship between Force and the verb is necessary. I take this relationship
to be Agree, and following traditional assumptions about the syntactic status of probes and goals (Chom-
sky 1995), Force must be encoded in the head of its projection. I represent this as a non-binary feature:
[Force{ĸĹķ, Ľłŉ, ĽŁń,…}].
Taking the primary syntactic requirement of clause typing to be the establishment of an agreement rela-
tionship, instigated by a Force probe, there are still three possible syntacticmethods of clause typing. Agree
between Force and a lower category can either drive phrasalmovement, headmovement, or nomovement.
Previous accounts have argued that Agree without movement is not suﬃcient to type a clause, and either
phrasal movement (Koopman 2007) or head movement (Han 2000) is required. Below I show that man-
dating either type of movement generates ungrammatical word orders in English imperatives with fronted
elements. As a result, I argue for the theoretically simplest conclusion: only Agree is universally required
for clause typing, and additional movement eﬀects may be possible in certain languages.²
Phrasal movement to Spec ForceP (Koopman 2007)
In analyzing Dutch imperative constructions, Koopman (2007) argues for a method of clause typing that
involves phrasal movement. In thismodel, the imperative Force⁰ probes for amaximal category containing
the imperative verb; this phrase, which is typically a remnant constituent, is then overtly moved to Spec
ForceP. ĉe general schema for this method of clause typing (8) is said to be “part of the native speakers’
‘knowledge’ of Dutch imperatives” (Koopman 2007:172).
²ĉis claim carries over to other clause types as well. Phrasal movement to Spec ForceP generates V2 orders in declara-
tives and Wh-movement in interrogatives. Head movement to Force⁰ generates V-T inversion in interrogatives. ĉere is no
question that these phenomena are directly linked to clause type, and are frequently linked to matrix vs. subordinate status.
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(8) General clause-typing conėguration (aěer Koopman 2007:ex. 57)
ForceP
XP
ForceIMP
VIMP XP
Because of the possibility of an independentTopP inDutch imperatives (contrast the structure given in
(6) for English imperatives), there are two distinct instantiations of the general mechanism given in (8). In
the absence of topicalization, TopP is not projected, and FinP headed by the imperative verb is the target of
clause-typing movement (9). If topicalization does occur, TopP is projected, the verb must adjoin to Top⁰
to “identify” TopP as imperative, and then TopPmoves to type the clause (10).
(9) Phrasal clause-typing with V-to-Fin (aěer Koopman 2007:ex. 58)
ForceP
FinP
ForceIMP FinP
VIMP TP
… VIMP …
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(10) Phrasal clause-typing with V-to-Fin-to-Top (aěer Koopman 2007:ex. 59)
ForceP
TopP
ForceIMP TopP
VIMP
TP
… VIMP …
FinP
VIMP
However, both of these conėgurations generate ungrammatical orders in English. In an English imper-
ative with a fronted constituent,³ targeting FinP results in Subject-Verb-Adverb-Topic order.
(11) *Everyone buy immediately ŉļĹňĹ ňŉŃķĿň!
CP
CIMP FocusP
FinP
TP
these stocks
Focus0
everyone buy these stocks immediately
Fin0
everyone
FinP
everyone buy 
immediately
X
³(11) uses a contrastive topic fronted to FocusP; see §4.3.1 for discussion of the positions involved in this type of move-
ment.
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Even following the additional stipulation of Koopman (2007) that the imperative verb must raise by head
movement to the highest head below Force⁰, phrasal movement generates an ungrammatical order: *Ev-
eryone immediately these stocks buy!
Given these results, the phrasalmovementmethodof clause typing is inadequate forEnglish, and there-
fore inadequate as a universalmodel. ĉe incorrect predictions of Koopman’s (2007) approach are not due
only to remnant movement or phrasal movement, but also the prerequisite headmovement of the impera-
tive verb.
Headmovement of V to C (Han 2000)
I nowwill show that a clause-typingmethod that exclusively uses overt headmovement also fails to generate
the proper word orders for English imperatives. ĉe argument for imperative verbs raising into the CP
ėeld presented by Han (2000) is dependent upon the assumption that there is a unitary CP, headed by an
operator C⁰. Furthermore, this analysis takes adjunction, driven by head movement, to be the mechanism
for transferring features between heads: “…when the imperative verb adjoins to C⁰, it inherits all of the
features of the imperative operator in C⁰.” (2000:47). As a result, V always raises to C in imperatives. ĉe
positionof clitics relative to the imperative verbmakes a strong case for overtV toCmovement in languages
such as Spanish and Italian. However, there cannot be overt V to Cmovement in English imperatives, as it
would generate ungrammatical word orders such as the imperative verb preceding the subject.
(12) a. Everyone buy these stocks!
b. *Buy everyone these stocks!
In order to enforce the grammatical order in (12a), either the imperative verb must remain low, or
imperative C⁰must also aĨract the subject to its Spec. While the laĨer option is plausible in a unitary CP, it
becomes untenable in an articulated CP, such as the one posited for English in (6) above. In an articulated
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CP, subject licensing is performed below the imperative head; thus the imperative verb must remain low.
(13) *Buy these stocks everyone immediately!
CP
CIMP + buy FocusP
FinP
TP
these stocks
Focus0
everyone buy these stocks immediately
Fin0
everyone
X
X
Just because the imperative verb does not raise intoCdoes notmean that it cannot have features valued
byC⁰, which are thenmanifest in the verbal morphology. Below I argue that this relationship is established
via Agree, rather than by covert movement as in Han (2000).
Clause typing in situ
Rather than enforcing a movement relationship between a head or maximal projection and Force⁰, I at-
tribute clause-typing eﬀects exclusively to the featural content of Force⁰. In many cases, the [Force] fea-
ture will probe and Agree with the verb; alone this will triggermorphological marking on the verb, and any
movement should be aĨributed to independent syntactic processes. In fact, even this Agree relationship
may be optional, leading to “underinĚected” or “uninĚected” main verbs in negative imperatives in certain
languages (see §4.3.3 for further discussion).
Consequently, clause typing in English is entirely tied to the lexical inventory of complementizers. For
98
matrix clauses, C⁰ is always null, whereas for embedded clauses it may be overt or null depending on clause
type (14).
(14) English complementizer inventory
[–Sub] [+Sub]
declarative Ø that, Ø
interrogative Ø if, whether
imperative Ø Ø
Since there is an eﬀect of clause type on verbal inĚection in English imperatives, requiring the “bare” form
of the verb, Imaintain that there is at least anAgree relationship betweenC⁰ andV⁰ inEnglish clause typing.
ĉis holds in both positive imperatives (15) and negative imperatives (16).
(15) a. You are happy.
b. Be happy!
c. *Are happy!
(16) a. You are not sad.
b. Don’t be sad!
c. *Are not sad!
Additionally, English clause typing is tied to the information-structural properties of the clause, since
the [±Topic] feature must also be encoded on C⁰. ĉe next section explores this interaction and the inde-
pendent variation of [±Focus]; these two features correspond to non-contrastive and contrastive topical-
ization, respectively.
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4.3 Information Structure in Imperatives
English imperatives have diﬀerent information-structural restrictions than declaratives and questions. In
this section, I show that these restrictions are largely syntactic. ĉere is no semantic restriction on cer-
tain information-structural features being present within a single clause, but they must be represented in
the available syntactic positions. In English, these positions are determined by the three-layer extended
articulated CP (6). ĉe positions in the leě periphery account for semantic, pragmatic, and information-
structural functions, but are not completely in free variation because, in most languages, they are not iso-
lated in individual syntactic projections.
4.3.1 Contrastive andNon-Contrastive Topics
ĉere are three information-structural processes in English that increase the prominence of a constituent:
focalization, contrastive topicalization, andnon-contrastive topicalization. Of these, only the topicalization
processes always involve overt movement; focalization is typically performed in situ and marked only by
prosodic stress.
In the absence of aword order diagnostic between contrastive and non-contrastive topics (as is the case
in English), the status of a fronted constituent must be determined by semantic and pragmatic criteria. A
non-contrastive topic draws aĨention to its content but does not invoke a comparison to alternatives that
might ėll that element’s role. ĉere is no consensus term for the eﬀect that non-contrastive topicalization
has ã focus-presupposition, theme-rheme, background-foreground, topic-comment, and given-new are
examples (Ward 1988:61) ã but they all refer to an intrasentential division between the topicalized el-
ement and the remainder of the clause. For example, in (17), the patienthood of the book is given more
prominence than the fact that buyingwas the action that tookplace or that Johnwas the agent of that action.
(17) ĉe book, John bought .
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Non-contrastive topicalization does not make extrasentential comparisons by introducing a class of
alternative elements that couldėll the topic’s role in the clause. Contrastive topics do introduce suchclasses,
which can be represented either as an open proposition, i.e. a proposition with an unbound variable in place
of the topicalized element (Ward 1988), or as focal alternatives, a set of propositionswith instantiated values
for the variable element (e.g. Rooth 1985; Roberts 1996). ĉe existence of alternatives can be represented
lexically, as with these in (18), or can be pragmatically introduced by the context.
(18) ĉese stocks, the broker bought immediately.
ĉis additional semantic contributionof contrastive topics ismirrored in the syntax; I argue that contrastive
topics move to Spec FocusP in English. Doing so uniėes the semantic contribution of Focus⁰ for both
information-structural and Wh-movement: it is the element that transforms a proposition into an open
proposition.
Furthermore, FocusP is an independent position in English. Recall the extended articulated CP for
English, which contains three distinct layers.
(19) Sub / Force / TopP > FocusP > FinP > TP… =(6)
ĉe locus of non-contrastive topics is combined with subordination and clause typing in C⁰. As a result,
the value of the [Top] feature covaries with the [Sub] and [Force] features, while the value of [Focus] can
vary freely. A major consequence of the bundling of features in C⁰ is the unavailability of non-contrastive
topics in imperative clauses.
(20) *ĉe book, buy !
(21) ĉese stocks, buy immediately! (ĉose avoid at all costs!)
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I contend that the ungrammaticality of (20) is due to the unavailability of the proper combination of
features onC⁰, as determined the lexical inventory of complementizers in English. ĉere is no independent
semantic reason for ruling out topicalization within an imperative, and non-contrastive topics do freely
appear in other languages, such as Korean.
(22) Chayk
book
un
ŉŃń
ilke-ra!
read-ĽŁń
“Books, read!”
ĉe availability of non-contrastive topicalization in Korean is in part due to its more ėnely articulated CP.
Examples of embedding in Korean indicate that it has a morphologically distinct SubP.
(23) Emma-ka
mother-NOM
Inho-eykey
Inho-DAT
kongpuha-la-ko
study-IMP-COMP
hasiess-ta.
said-DEC
“Mother told Inho to study.” (ZanuĨini et al. 2012:ex. 50a)
In (22), un is the overt head of TopP. ĉus the [Sub], [Force], and [Top] features are syntactically inde-
pendent, so their values are not covariant. Any combination of values is possible, including [Force{ĽŁń}]
and [+Top]: an imperative clause with a non-contrastive topic.
4.3.2 Interactions with TypedC⁰
ĉeposition and order of features in the leě periphery have additional eﬀects on the word order of impera-
tive clauses. ĉese eﬀects go beyond the topic-licensing eﬀects particular to English, which are conditioned
on its leě-peripheral structure and inventory of complementizers. Most importantly, they show that the
clause-typing feature [Force{ĸĹķ,Ľłŉ,ĽŁń}] cannot be as low as the subject licensing position, contra the
syntactic analysis proposed in ZanuĨini et al. (2012).
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Looking at English again, we ėnd that the position of contrastive topics in imperatives is ėxed with
respect to all other constituents in the clause edge; the order is Focus > Subject > Verb.
(24) a. ĉese stocks everyone buy immediately! ✓Focus > Subject > Verb
b. *ĉese stocks buy everyone immediately! ✗Focus > Verb > Subject
c. *Everyone these stocks buy immediately! ✗Subject > Focus > Verb
d. **Buy these stocks everyone immediately! ✗Verb > Focus > Subject
Taken in isolation, these word order facts are only informative enough to show that the imperative subject
and verb are inseparable (presumably in a Spec/Head conėguration), and that contrastive topicalization
takes place above both. I have made the more speciėc claim that focalized elements occupy Spec FocusP,
subjects occupy Spec FinP, and the inĚected verb occupies Fin⁰. Making just one assumptionãthat clause
typing is encoded as a syntactic feature on a head in the leě peripheryã is enough to draw this conclusion.
To show that a sparer structure for imperatives does not accurately predict the Englishword order facts,
I will aĨempt to explain them using the structure proposed in ZanuĨini et al. (2012). Recall the proposal
that a clause-speciėc JussiveP, immediately dominating TP and perhaps merged with it, accounts for im-
perative subject licensing and word order eﬀects.
(25) JussiveP ≥ TP > vP…
(25) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  la)
vP
subject
[person : 2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Unlike in many other languages, in Korean the Jussive head can also enter the derivation with a first person
feature value ([person : 1]i), yielding a promissive, or with a first person inclusive value ([person : 1 2]i),
yielding an exhortative.24 We take the sentence final particle -ma to be the overt morphological realization
of the Jussive head with first person value, and -ca to be the overt realization of the Jussive head with first
person inclusive value, respectively:
(26) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ma)
vP
subject
[person : 1]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
(27) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1  2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ca)
vP
subject
[person : 1  2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Before we go on, we should mention that, while we focus on examples where the Jussive head is overt,
it can also be null. This is not surprising, if we think about interrogative clauses: though many languages,
including Korean, have an overt question morpheme, many do not, and it has long been argued that there is
a null Q morpheme in such cases (cf. Baker 1970, Cheng 1991). Even in Korean the Q morpheme can often
be covert. Similarly, the Jussive head is null in certain cases. For example, take the case of imperatives,
where a jussive particle can co-occur with a speech style particle: in (28a), we see the combination of the
speech style particle -e with the jussive particle -la:25
(28) a. Kongpuha-e-la!
study-SSP-IMP
‘Study! ’
24There are several possibilities as to how to represent the meaning of inclusive we in terms of person features. We opt to treat it
as a complex combination of first and second person, but one might also think of it as a distinct fourth person (Benincà and Poletto
2005) or as an instance of two distinct feature specifications ([person : 1], [person : 2]). Kratzer (2009) employs a 1st+2nd
feature similar to Benincà and Poletto’s fourth person, but also discusses the possibility of sum features.
25Phonologically, -ha-e becomes -hay.
15
Presuming that the imperative verb stays low (in v⁰), this structure generates the grammatical order of a
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simple imperative with an overt subject: Everyone buy these stocks!. If contrastive topics are licensed above
JussiveP, it also generates the grammatical order in (24a),ĉese stocks everyone buy immediately!, and does
not overgenerate the ungrammatical orders (24b–d).
However, since there is no high representation of the [Force{ĽŁń}] feature, this model cannot predict
the diﬀerence in grammaticality between contrastive and non-contrastive topics. ĉere is no logical way
to both generate contrastive topics above JussiveP and forbid non-contrastive topics either in or above
JussiveP. On the other hand, a model with a high encoding of Force, such as the extended articulated CP,
does make the correct predictions about topic availability.
Consider licensing contrastive topics in an imperative clause with JussiveP. ĉere are two logical pos-
sibilities: either the topic is hosted in JussiveP itself or in a higher phrase. If the former is the case, then
Jussive⁰ is speciėed for a [±Focus] feature, and when it is valued [+Focus], it aĨracts a contrastive topic
element to its Spec. If the laĨer is the case, then FocusP selects JussiveP and independently aĨracts the
contrastive topic. So far, this poses no problem for the JussiveP model. However, this breaks down when
trying to rule out non-contrastive topics in imperatives.
Regardless ofwhere contrastive topics are hosted, non-contrastive topicsmust behosted in aprojection
above JussiveP.ĉe only option that would allow both contrastive and non-contrastive topics to be hosted
in JussiveP would be one where Jussive⁰ bears both [±Top] and[±Focus] features, while also allowing for
the possibility of multiple speciėers. (I assume a single-speciėer model throughout this chapter.) If they
are hosted in TopP > JussiveP, we could rule out non-contrastive topicalization by stipulating that Top⁰
cannot select a JussiveP complement. If FocusP intervenes, appealing to selection becomes more diﬃcult.
Non-contrastive topics can precede contrastive topics in declarative sentences in English.
(26) A:Who bought what?
B: [TopP ĉe book, [FocusP JŃļł bought .]]
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To not rule out sentences like B’s response in (26), FocusPwould have to inherit the imperative feature
of JussiveP, and Top⁰ would have to discriminate between FocusP complements based on their featural
content.
Positing a high realization of the imperative feature, namely [Force{ĽŁń}] on C⁰, provides a simpler
mechanism for ruling out non-contrastive topics in imperatives and allowing them in other clause types.
ĉismodel is furthermotivated by the independent evidence for encoding subordination, clause type, and
non-contrastive topic features in a single layer in English (Haegeman 2004), which is bolstered by facts
about subordinating complementizers (§4.4). ĉus the extended articulated CP is the best solution for
deriving subject order and topicalization facts.
4.3.3 Negation and do-support
One eﬀect of clause typing that operates at a distance is the interaction between imperativity and negation.
It has been widely observed that many languages (English being an exception) do not permit the direct
negation of imperatives (e.g. Aikhenvald 2010; Han 2000; ZanuĨini 1997). In particular, the analysis of
Han (2000) focuses on ruling out negative imperatives in languages that lack them by appealing to the
hierarchy of adjoined heads and the semantic scope of negation over clause typing. Since I argue for an
in situ method of clause typing (§4.2.2), problems of this sort do not arise. Placing Neg suitably high in
the clausal architecture accounts for word order facts in English and positively determines the position of
do-support in negative imperatives to be Focus.⁴ No similar prediction can bemade in an analysis with less
articulated structures.
English allows direct negation of imperatives, but requires do-support in such clauses.
⁴ĉeanalysis that I present heredoesnotmake any claims about thepositionofdo-support in other clause types inEnglish,
nor about similar phenomena in imperatives in other languages. Each casemust be analyzed as the interaction of the available
positions and features in the leě periphery, as I do for English imperatives here.
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(27) Don’t buy these stocks!
Don’t can be pronounced doNOT for emphasis, but cannot be separated, either by a fronted element (28b)
or by a subject (28c). ĉis indicates that do and Neg are adjoined and occupy a single head position.
(28) a. Do NOT buy these stocks!
b. *Do these stocks not buy !
c. *Do you not buy these stocks!
Subjects cannot appear to the leě of don’t in English imperatives (29a). If subjects are hosted in Fin,
the lowest position thatNeg can be realized in is Focus. ZanuĨini (1997) associatesNegwith Focus, which
would accurately predict the possible Neg/subject word orders.
(29) a. *Everyone don’t do that! ✗ high subject
b. Everyone, don’t do that! ✓ vocative
c. Don’t anyone do that! ✓ low subject
ĉe fact that don’t occupies a single position is beneėcial for syntactic analyses that have a unitary CP, since
it allows negative imperatives to ėt into their minimal structure. However, these analyses don’t take into
account the fact that contrastive topics can occur in negative imperatives, and when they do they must
occur to the leě of don’t.
(30) a. ĉese stocks, don’t anyone/everyone buy !
b. *Don’t these stocks anyone/everyone buy !
ĉus don’t must occupy a position between the host of contrastive topics and the subject position. ĉese
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are adjacent Spec positions, namely Spec Focus and Spec Fin, so don’tmust reside in Focus⁰.
4.4 Embedding Imperatives
4.4.1 Imperative Complements and Illocutionary Verbs
English embeds all types of clauses, including imperatives. Similar to how a very restricted class of verbs
embed interrogative clauses, only a handful of verbs embed imperatives. ĉe most common embedding
verb for imperatives is say (31a). ĉe ability to bind into these clauses (31b) shows that they are not in-
stances of direct discourse or quotation (Crnič and Trinh 2009).
(31) a. John𝑖 said call his𝑖/𝑗 mother.
b. *John𝑖 said, “Call his𝑖 mother!”
ĉe embedding verb say serves an exceptional role in this example. It is not performing the ordinary
functionof an illocutionary verb (Searle 1975). In fact, early analysesof imperative semantics (e.g.Hamblin
1987) claimed that they were equivalent to paraphrases where a declarative clause was embedded under an
illocutionary verb such as order. Note that verbs of this sort cannot take imperative complements inEnglish.
(32) ?John𝑖 ordered [call his𝑖 mother].
Based on the contrast between (31a) and (32), I take the embedding verb say to have the semantic eﬀect
of shiěing a discourse updateã i.e., the denotation of a full clause including Forceã into another context
(see §5.3.2 for a full semantic analysis of embedding say). As a result, some speakers accept embeddings
with other verbs that specify the manner in which the embedded clause took eﬀect in its original context.
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(33) a. %John demanded [call his mother].
b. %John insisted [call his mother].
c. %John indicated [call his mother].
For speakerswho reject someor all of the sentences in (33), those embeddingverbsdonothave the context-
shiě eﬀect of say, but only have an illocutionary reading. All three of the verbs used in (33) can embed a
declarative modal clause, with the eﬀect of reporting a command: John demanded/insisted/indicated that
you should call his mother.
Another eﬀect of the context-shiěing meaning of say is that it can embed both declarative and imper-
ative clauses. However, neither type of subordinate clause is headed by a [+Top] complementizer. ĉis is
true for both that-headed (34) and null-headed declaratives (35).
(34) *John said [a book that he bought .]
(35) *John said [a book Ø𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷.𝐷𝐸𝐶 he bought .]
(36) *John said [a book Ø𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷.𝐼𝑀𝑃 buy .]
ĉese facts, in conjunction with the unavailability of non-contrastive topics inmatrix imperatives (§4.3.1),
lets us complete the paradigm of complementizers in English, accounting for all three of their features:
[±Sub], [Force{ĸĹķ,Ľłŉ,ĽŁń}], and [±Top]. (ĉe symbol Ø indicates the presence of a null complemen-
tizer, while ✗ indicates that there is no complementizer ã overt or null ã with that combination of fea-
tures.)
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(37) English complementizer inventory
[–Sub] [+Sub]
[–Top] [+Top] [–Top] [+Top]
declarative Ø Ø that, Ø ✗
interrogative Ø ✗ if, whether ✗
imperative Ø ✗ Ø ✗
Matrix imperatives are not exceptional in disallowing non-contrastive topics in English. If any clause type
can be seen as exceptional with respect to topicalization, it is matrix declarative clauses, the only clauses
that permit non-contrastive topics.
Despite being valued [−Top], embedded clauses do still contain a FocusP layer, which can host con-
trastive topics. ĉis holds for both declaratives and imperatives embedded under say.
(38) John said [CP that [FocusP these stocks he bought .]] (…not those.)
(39) John said [CP Ø𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷.𝐼𝑀𝑃 [FocusP these stocks buy .]] (…those avoid.)
ĉis is further evidence for the three-layer system in English. ĉe most complex of those layers, CP =
Sub/Force/TopP, cannot realize all twelve of its logical feature combinations. To simplify the system, it is
largely the [+Top] variations that have been leě out of the lexicon.
4.4.2 Extraction fromEmbedded Imperatives
Given that imperative clauses can be embedded, what kind of extraction properties do they have? Since
imperative clause typing is performed in the samemanner and in the same location as other clause typing,
they should behave similarly to other embedded clauses. ĉere are three traditional types of extraction do-
mains: strong islands, weak islands, andnon-islands. ĉe typesof extractionor long-distancedependencies
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that a clause can participate in are determined by its island status (van de Koot andMathieu 2003).
(40)
Strong Island Weak Island
Wh-argument extraction ✗ ✓
Wh-adjunct extraction ✗ ✗
NPI licensing ✓ ✗
Anaphoric binding ✓ ✓
I show that, at least in English, none of these three categories fully describes the extraction and depen-
dency behavior of imperatives. ĉey are not strong islands, because various tests show no evidence for an
Operator in the highest Spec position of the embedded imperative, which would block the clausal “escape
hatch” and all types of extraction. Certain types of extraction from imperatives fail because the syntax of the
imperative clause prevents the targeted item from moving to its leě edge. Additionally imperatives show
one of the properties of weak islands, blocking of NPI licensing from the matrix clause. No single island
type shares all three of these properties. Like all types of islands, they do allow anaphoric binding from the
higher clause, as shown above in (31).
I now demonstrate these several properties of embedded imperative in English. All of these properties
are consistent with the clausal architecture proposed in the preceding sections, in combination with an
in-situmethod of clause typing.
Wh-extraction vs. relativization
One type of extraction that is generally prohibited is Wh-movement out of an imperative. ĉis holds for
both argument and adjunct Wh-questions.
(41) a. *Who did John say [ send to the store]?
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b. *Where did John𝑖 say [ send his𝑖 mother ]?
For Wh-extraction to proceed, the Wh-element must initially move to the Spec CP position within the
embedded clause. If this movement is prohibited, extraction will fail. One way to prevent such movement
is if there is an Operator occupying the Spec CP position, thereby blocking the “escape hatch” out of the
embedded clause.
However, if a ėlled Spec CP is the reason for blocking extraction, then all types of extraction should be
blocked, but this is not the case. For example, relative clauses headed by an element that originated in an
embedded imperative are fully grammatical.
(42) a. ĉe book that John said [ read by tomorrow] wasn’t at the library.
b. ĉe place where John said [ meet him ] was hard to ėnd.
If extraction out of relatives is possible, then there cannot be an Operator ėlling Spec CP, and Wh-
extraction must be blocked for a diﬀerent reason. I argue that movement of a Wh-phrase to Spec CP in an
embedded imperative is impossible, but that this is due to the content of C⁰, not Spec CP. In every typed
clause, C⁰ must bear a Force[] feature. Only a head that bears a Force[Ľłŉ] feature can also bear a [+Wh]
feature and aĨract a Wh-phrase. Accordingly, when C⁰ bears Force[ĽŁń], the Wh-phrase cannot move to
the escape hatch position and cannot be extracted. ĉis is a purely syntactic fact, as a matrix interrogative
can license a Wh-element in an embedded imperative as long as it remains in situ, for example in an echo
question.
(43) John said [send ŌļŃ to the store?]
Matrix imperatives can also host echo question elements. It seems trivial that a matrix clause cannot be
simultaneously interrogative and imperative ã something along the lines of *Who send to the store! ã
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but Wh-extraction from an imperative would require exactly that sort of representation for extraction to
succeed. Relativization, on the other hand, takes advantage of topicalization, a process already available in
matrix imperatives, to move an element to the embedded clause edge and make it eligible for extraction.
Topic extraction vs. cleěing
Extraction of a topic from an imperative is possible, but only if the topic is eligible for movement within
the imperative clause. As shown in §4.3, only contrastive topics can move to the leě periphery in English
imperatives. Exactly parallel to the case of Wh-extraction vs. topicalization above, it follows that only con-
trastive topics can move to the clause edge and be extracted into a higher clause.
(44) a. *A book, read ! matrix topic
b. *John said [a book, read ]. embedded topic
c. *A book, John said [read ]. extracted topic
(45) a. ĉese stocks buy ! matrix topic
b. John said [these stocks buy ] embedded topic
c. ĉese stocks, John said [buy ]. extracted topic
Contrastive topics containing anaphors can even allow reconstruction.
(46) HĽň𝑖 ňŉŃķĿň John𝑖 said [sell right away]; BŃĶ’ň he said [hold for now].
Cleěing out of an imperative ought to paĨern similarly, but it poses an apparent puzzle: it is possible to
cleě an element from an embedded imperative, moving it into the matrix clause (47), but it is impossible
to have a cleě in a matrix imperative clause (48).
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(47) a. It’s this book (that) John said [read ].
b. ?It’s at the library, John𝑖 said [meet him𝑖 ].
(48) a. *It’s this book, read !
b. *It’s at the library, meet me !
ĉis seems paradoxical, but is resolved by the fact that a “matrix” cleě is inherently biclausal, so the cleě
extraction in (47) is actually a triclausal construction. ĉe additional clausal layer hosts the cleěed element
and selects a declarative clause as its complement. In (48), only an imperative clause is available, and the
sentences are ungrammatical. However, in the case of embedding, cleěing can target thematrix declarative
clause; the type of the embedded clause is not of consequence for the local selection relation. Extraction
can then proceed in a long-distance fashion, directly from the edge of the embedded imperative to the cleě
position.
NPI licensing
ĉe clause edge also has eﬀects on non-movement phenomena that have to traverse it. Licensing of a neg-
ative polarity item from a matrix clause into an embedded imperative (49) is degraded. Contrast (50),
which allows theNPI anything to be licensed bymatrix negation, yielding the interpretation “John said buy
nothing.”
(49) ?John didn’t say [buy anything].
(50) John didn’t say [to buy anything].
Note that (50) also has a second interpretation, in which the act of saying is negated and anything assumes
a free-choice interpretation. ĉis is the less salient reading, but may be coerced with proper contextual or
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prosodic support. ĉe fact that aĨempting to license anything as an NPI seems to be the default parsing
strategy could explain why (49) sounds odd, but not outright ungrammatical.
Synopsis
ĉe possibilities for extraction from imperative clauses are summarized in the following table.
(51)
Strong Island Weak Island Imperative
Wh-argument extraction ✗ ✓ ✗
Wh-adjunct extraction ✗ ✗ ✗
NPI licensing ✓ ✗ ✗
Anaphoric binding ✓ ✓ ✓
Imperatives do not behave quite like any other clause or island class when it comes to extraction. ĉis is
due to a combination of several factors: the absence of an Operator in Spec CP, featural restrictions on C⁰
that bears Force[ĽŁń], and the permissibility of diﬀerent types of information-structural movement below
CP. ĉus English imperatives are not representative of a new class of extraction barriers, but derive their
extraction restrictions from independent motivations.
4.5 Summary
ĉis chapter has examined previous syntactic approaches to imperative clauses and the more general issue
of clause typing. I have argued that an articulated leě-peripheral structure is necessary to accommodate
imperative clause typing and the various fronting phenomena found in English imperatives. Furthermore,
English word order demonstrates that clause typing is performed in situ in English, so neither head move-
ment nor remnant movement can be required for clause typing crosslinguistically. Several phenomena in
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English imperatives exploit the extended articulated leě peripheral structure for English, which has three
layers: CP > FocusP > FinP. ĉe independence of the FocusP position and its ability to host contrastive
topics explains the diﬀerence in acceptability between contrastive and non-contrastive topic fronting in
English imperatives. Word order facts also determine the locus of imperative subjects in Spec FinP and
do-support in Focus⁰. Finally, the possibilities for extraction from embedded imperatives conėrm that the
same leě-peripheral structure is present in matrix and embedded clauses in English. In the next chapter, I
mappreference semantics onto these positions and show that clause typing is performed in a compositional
manner.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPEĆTIVES ATTHE SYNTAX/SEMANTICS INTERFACE
5.1 Introduction
ĉis chapter seeks to combine the insights of Chapters 3 and 4 bymapping semantic concepts onto syntac-
tic positions. Amajor feature of the preference semantics adopted in §3.4 is the separation of propositional
and illocutionary content. I now undertake to map those pieces of content to the syntactic structure: con-
stituents below Force⁰ in the leě periphery encode propositions; Force⁰ encodes illocutionary relation by
taking its complement (FocusP) and outpuĨing an update (ForceP). ĉese divisions follow the analysis
of fronting in English imperatives in §4.3, which identiėed clause-typing and information-structural posi-
tions.
ĉe chapter is organized into two parts. §5.2 spells out the mapping between imperative content and
structure in greater detail and shows how propositional and illocutionary content are composed. I also
argue that the syntax/semantics interface for imperatives proposed in ZanuĨini et al. (2012) is not com-
positional in the same manner. §5.3 takes the compositional approach developed for matrix clauses in the
preceding section and applies it to embedded imperatives. Preference semantics oﬀers a way of deėning
embedding verbs in terms of shiěed preference states, i.e. ones that do not correspond to the current dis-
course state. I adapt Starr’s (2010) deėnition of the question-embedding verb wonder to the multi-type
embedding verb say.
5.2 Mapping Preferences to Projections
ĉe preference semantics of Starr (2012) builds clausal meaning starting at the propositional level. Given
a proposition 𝑝, a force operator can be applied to it to form a declarative ▷𝑝, polar interrogative ?𝑝, or
imperative ! 𝑝. ĉe surface indication of the force operators is taken by Starr (2012) to be the holistic
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notion of declarative, interrogative, or imperative syntax, comprising word order, verbal morphology, and
other surface eﬀects. However, the operators themselves correspond to illocutionary relations (Murray
2011), which by deėnition take a proposition and the discourse context as their arguments. ĉis recalls
the Clause Typing Hypothesis of Cheng (1991): ¹
(1) Clause Typing Hypothesis
All clauses contain an element that scopes over a propositional constituent (TP) and speciėes its
discourse function. (Cheng 1991)
Cheng (1991), working prior to the articulated CP as introduced by Rizzi (1997), assumed that TP was
the highest propositional constituent and that it was dominated by a unitary CP projection. Neverthe-
less, the basic framework of the Clause TypingHypothesis can be adapted to the articulated CP argued for
in Chapter 4 by specifying the position of the clause-typing element, Force⁰, and the propositional con-
stituent, FinP.
(2) Revised Clause Typing Hypothesis
All clauses contain a Force⁰ head that scopes over a propositional constituent (FinP) and applies a
force operator to it.
ĉe remainder of this section is devoted to motivating the changes made in (2), including giving a seman-
tics for Force⁰ heads valued for [Force{ĸĹķ,Ľłŉ,ĽŁń}] and showing that FinP is the minimal propositional
constituent on which it can operate.
¹See §4.2.2 for full discussion of the syntax of clause typing, particularly in English imperatives.
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5.2.1 Illocutionary Content and Illocutionary Positions
ĉe illocutionary content of a clause is that portion of its meaning that constrains its discourse function. In
the framework of preference semantics, this means determining which type of update rule (§2.4.1) will be
applied to the propositional content of the clause. All typed clauses denote updates of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩ (functions
from one preference state, abbreviated type 𝑟, to another preference state); these updates are then applied
to the discourse context (at least in the case of matrix clauses; see §5.3 below for discussion of syntactically
embedded constituents that denote updates).
Recall from §2.4.1 that a single discourse update will perform several transformations on 𝑅, the pref-
erence state that represents the discourse context at the time of uĨerance. An imperative update performs
three distinct operations on𝑅:
(3) Imperative update (Starr 2010; 2012)
𝑅[! 𝑝] = 𝑅 ∪ {⟨𝑐𝑅[𝑝], 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑐𝑅[𝑝]⟩} ∪ {⟨𝑎[𝑝], 𝑎 − 𝑎[𝑝]⟩ ∣ 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶𝑅 & 𝑎[𝑝] = ∅}
a. Admits all of the preferences in𝑅.
b. Introduces a global preference for all 𝑝-worlds over all ¬𝑝-worlds ⟨𝑝,¬𝑝⟩
c. Introduces local preferences within already-present alternatives ⟨𝑎 ∩ 𝑝, 𝑎 − 𝑝⟩
ĉeseupdate eﬀects are not separable, but are all contained in the forceoperator !, which is a primitive of the
semantic system. ĉerefore, when mapping the illocutionary content of a clause to its syntactic structure,
there will not be any syntactic element responsible for only a portion of the transformations it performs on
𝑅. For example, in imperatives, there is noelement that speciėes the introductionof anewglobal preference
⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩without also specifying the other components of a complete imperative update. ĉis is in contrast
with the individual “arguments” of Op𝑖𝑚𝑝 in the modal analysis, the modal base 𝑓, the ordering source 𝑔,
and the time of evaluation 𝑡. Kaufmann (2011) gives each of these elements distinct syntactic positions,
but they do not appear to be individually targeted by either the syntax or the semantics (e.g. they cannot
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be referred to anaphorically, see §3.2.2).
Given that force operators are not decomposable, they must occupy a single syntactic position. In
§4.2.2 I argued for in situ clause typing, aĨributable to the featural content of Force⁰. ĉe syntactic features
[Force{ĸĹķ}], [Force{Ľłŉ}], and [Force{ĽŁń}] are present on the Force heads that contribute▷, ?, and !,
respectively. Each force operator, representing an illocutionary relation, requires two arguments: a propo-
sition and a discourse context. ĉe proposition is the semantic argument of the illocutionary relation, and
the context is its pragmatic argument. Assuming that pragmatic information cannot be directly mapped
onto the syntax, only the propositional argument will be contributed syntactically. ĉus the discourse
context argument lies outside the clausal structure.²
Accounting for all of these considerations, the interface-visible semantics of Force⁰ will behave like a
one-place predicate, which takes a proposition as its single argument. ĉe complement of Force⁰ can be
any leě-peripheral constituent that denotes a proposition: minimally FinP, but also FocusP or TopP if they
are present in the derivation. Each force operator denotes a function that takes a proposition and outputs
a function from preference states to preference states. Adopting 𝑟 as a shorthand for the semantic type
of preference states, the semantic type of Force⁰ can be wriĨen as ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑟⟩. ĉe entire clause ã a well-
formed update functionã is thus of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩. ĉe semantics of Force⁰ for the three major clause types is
summarized below.
(4) Force operators of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑟⟩
Sentence type Semantics of Force⁰
declarative 𝜆𝑝 . ▷𝑝
interrogative 𝜆𝑝 . ?𝑝
imperative 𝜆𝑝 . ! 𝑝
²I take this to be true for both matrix and embedded clauses. In matrix clauses, the clause’s content is passed to the
pragmatic component, which supplies the current 𝑅. In embedded clauses, the material of the higher clause ã speciėcally
the embedding verb ã indicates a contextual shiě. See §5.3 for further discussion of the mechanics of contextual shiě in
embedded imperatives.
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Any of the Force heads can combine with a propositional constituent to form the complete meaning
of the sentence, in the terms of Starr (2012). Preference semantics is a propositional logic, so propositions
are primitives, notated with capital leĨers such as 𝐽 = Patrick jumps. A propositional radical of this sort “is
not awell-formed sentence, but it still has a semantics like any sub-sentential constituent.” (Starr 2012:24).
I return to the composition of propositional radicals in §5.2.2 below.
Taking a propositional radical, for example 𝐽 , applying the semantics of an imperative Force⁰ to it will
give the well-formed semantic representation ! 𝐽 .³
(5) Patrick, jump!
ForceP
!J
Force0
!p . !p
FinP
J
Applying the illocutionary relation in this manner gives a simple, compositional approach to building
sentence meaning out of propositional meaning. Note that there is no part of the structure in (5) below
Force⁰ thatmakes reference to preference states. ĉerefore, there is no problemof the sentence-level deno-
tationbeing ambiguouswith the denotationof a constituent in the verbal domain, as there is in the property
analysis (§2.3). In the preference analysis, there are only two levels in a clausal representation that can be
of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩, ForceP and SubP. If the schematic subtree in (5) is representative of an English sentence,
only one level can be of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩, since Sub, Force, and Topic are combined on a single C head (§4.2.1).
In languages with a distinct SubP, its head does not introduce any new argument structure, but acts as an
identity function. It makes the syntactic contribution of indicating whether there is superordinatematerial
governing the typed clause denoted by ForceP. If there is no superordinatematerial, the update is passed to
³! 𝐽 is not a completely saturated representation, when taking into account the pragmatic argument of the illocutionary
relation, but it is all that can be contributed at the level of a clausal constituent, SubP or ForceP.
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the pragmatic component of the grammar (6), where it operates on the current discourse state𝑅. If there
is superordinate material, the update is passed to the embedding verb (7), which speciėes the context in
which it should be interpreted (for more discussion, see §5.3.2 below).
(6)
ForceP
!J
Force0
!p . !p
FinP
J
[–Sub]
!U . U
SubP
!J
spellout
interpreted in current discourse state
(7)
ForceP
!J
Force0
!p . !p
FinP
J
[+Sub]
!U . U
SubP
!J
VP
V
As represented in (6) and (7) above, the semantics of Sub⁰ is the identity function, evaluated with
respect to a certain context. An alternate expression of its semantics would be to supply the discourse or
shiěed context as the result of pragmatic reasoning based on the syntactic marking of the clause as matrix
[−Sub] or subordinate [+Sub]. I return to the concept of context-shiěing and its relation to the semantics
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of embedding verbs in §5.3.2 below.
5.2.2 Propositional Content and Propositional Positions
I now turn to restrictions on the propositional material that can be passed to the imperative force operator,
and also look at the manner in which it is composed. In the examples in the preceding subsection, the
scope proposition of ! has been represented as 𝐽 = Patrick jumps, the extension of which is the set of worlds
in which Patrick jumps. However, this is merely a semantic representation; this sentence cannot have a DP
Patrick as its syntactic subject, since the sentences *Patrick jumps! and *Patrick jump! are not well-formed
English imperatives. Presumably themeaning ! 𝐽 is best mapped onto a sentence with a null or pronominal
subject (Jump! or possibly You jump!), spoken in a context where Patrick is the sole addressee.⁴ Optionally,
Patrick can be singled out as the target of the command by using a vocative, such as thewell-formedPatrick,
jump!.
How then should null imperative subjects be represented at the interface with preference semantics?
Intuitively, it’s clear what a null imperative subject should refer to: the set of addressees. When addressing
Patrick with an imperative, preferences are established regarding Patrick’s actions; when addressing a class-
room full of students, preferences are established about the students’ collective or coordinated actions.⁵
However, it appears incorrect to assume that null imperative subjects perform quantiėcation or maximiza-
tion over the set of addressees. Universal quantiėer subjects, such as everyone, allow for restriction of their
⁴Although see arguments in ZanuĨini (2008) that plain DP subjects are more freely permissible in English imperatives
than commonly thought. Even so, DP subjects are widely rejected as incongruent with contexts that do not introduce focal
alternatives regarding the subject (cf. discussion in §3.3.4).
⁵Whether an imperative is taken to prefer collective or coordinated action is dependent upon the action itself. When issu-
ing the imperative Sit down! to several addressees (without deictically indicating a single individual), it requires collaborative
action: each individual addressee must perform the action of siĨing down to bring about the preferred proposition. On the
other hand, Open the window! addressed to the same group only requires that the addressees coordinate in such a way that
the window is opened; they don’t all have to physically liě the window handle. Other actions, such as the one preferred in
Read the passage aloud! lie in a grey area. If half of the audience comply, there is a sense in which the preferred proposition is
“truer” than in the case where the audience is ordered to stand up and half of them remain siĨing. ĉese are subtle judgments
about the truth of quantiėcational propositions, and are not imperative-speciėc phenomena. Since preference semantics is a
non-quantiėcational logic, I cannot pursue the issue further here, but present the data for further inquiry.
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domain via modiėers (8), and these modiėers can be extraposed either leěward (8a) or rightward (8b) in
English imperatives. ĉe same cannot be done with a null subject (9).
(8) a. Everyone except John stand up!
b. Except John, everyone stand up!
c. Everyone stand up, except John!
(9) a. **pro except John stand up!
b. *Except John, pro stand up!
c. *pro stand up, except John!
One possible explanation for these facts is that the null subject simply cannot license an adjoinedmodiėer
in the conėguration [pro except NP]. But even in cases where the restriction is performed by a clausal
modiėer that is in no direct syntactic relationship with the subject, overt quantiėer subjects are restrictable
while null subjects are not.
(10) a. Although John doesn’t have to, everyone stand up!
b. #Although John doesn’t have to, stand up!
With these facts in mind, it is possible to return to the question of how the imperative subject should
be represented in preference semantics. ĉe logic of preference semantics does not provide quantiėers,
but only predicates and names (Starr 2010:172). ĉerefore the null imperative subject must also denote
something of type 𝑒, as names do. Following Murray (2011), I use a special constant 𝑢, whose denotation
⟦𝑢⟧𝑅 is determined relative to a context, such that 𝑢 is the individual corresponding to the addressee(s) in
every world in the context set 𝑐𝑅.⁶
⁶Cf. the special null element IŁńńŇŃ and its meaning as given in Schwager (2006); Kaufmann (2011).
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(11) Deėnition of 𝑢
⟦𝑢⟧𝑅 ∶= 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷 | ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝑐𝑅 ∶ 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑤)
Imperatives restrict their subjects to ⟦𝑢⟧𝑅. ĉis same type of restriction is imposed in the property analysis
of imperatives, where Jussive⁰ adds the subject restriction via abstraction. However, in so doing, the con-
tent of JussiveP becomes a property rather than a proposition. ĉus, in a preference semantics model, the
subject restriction cannot be imposed via abstraction, as properties are incompatible with force operators,
and the semantic derivation would crash. ĉus two projections are required to accomplish both subject
licensing and clause typing. I maintain that the role of ForceP, when distinct, is solely the contribution of
illocutionary relation, which takes a proposition and returns a function frompreference states to preference
states. ĉe role of FinP is a function from propositions to propositions ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩, which returns its scope so
long as the subject meets the criterion of being an addressee. Given the deėnition of 𝑢, this criterion is
always met when an imperative has a pro subject; put diﬀerently, pro subjects of imperatives can only refer
to the addressee(s).
ĉus the overall composition of a simple imperative, such as Jump!, is as in (12). ĉe dashed line be-
tween TP and vP indicates that other projections within the aspectual/inĚectional domain may intervene.
Similar to information-structural positions (§4.2), the heads of these projections contribute additional in-
formation but output elements of the same semantic type as their input. Another similarity between this
domain and the leě periphery is that the number of positions between TP and vP may vary according to
economy of structure and language-speciėc factors.
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(12) Jump!
ForceP
!Jump(u)
Force0
!p . !p
vP
Jump(u)
VP
!x . Jump(x)
pro
u
FinP
Jump(u)
TP
Jump(u)
Fin0
subject restriction
ĉetree in (12) omits the information structure positionsTopPandFocusP,whose syntactic eﬀects are
discussed in§4.3. Here I assume that, whenpresent, information structurepositions are also functions from
propositions to propositions ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩. ĉe additional information they contribute (beyond the semantic
type of their output) does not bear directly on the issues of compositionality considered here.⁷
5.2.3 Comparison to Property-denoting Positions
ĉepreference analysis of imperatives, in addition to its improved empirical coverage, avoids composition-
ality problems that arise for the property analysis (Portner 2004a; 2007; ZanuĨini et al. 2012). Firstly, as
sketched out in (12) above, in the preference analysis there is no position above VP that corresponds to
a property; every maximal projection corresponds to either a proposition ⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ or an update ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩, and this
holds across all clause types, not just imperatives. In the property analysis, on the other hand, imperatives
⁷Although information-structural factorsmay bear on the computation of relevance, even in preference semantics, insofar
as they may introduce alternatives; see §3.3.4.
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are the only clause type that have a “high” property projection. ZanuĨini et al. rejects ForceP as the clause-
typing position, saying, “Clearly jussive particles are not in [ForceP]” (2012:1258). Since the property
denoted by the clause must then be picked up by a pragmatic function that assigns it to a To-Do List in the
discourse representation,⁸ this more or less requires that T/JussiveP is the highest clausal projection.
Constructing imperative meaning as properties in JussiveP causes two problems for compositionality.
First, in cases where JussiveP cannot be the highest projection in the clause, how are other elements per-
miĨed to combine with it? Second, can the semantic contribution of Jussive⁰ be isolated, and if so, what
is it? ĉe allegedly compositional analysis given in §4 of ZanuĨini et al. (2012) does not seem to provide
answers to either of these questions.
Can imperative properties be semantic arguments?
ĉe primary reason for generating properties as the semantic representation of imperative clauses is for
them to serve as the objects of the pragmatic To-Do List assignment function. For any semantic element
to be picked up by the pragmatic component of the grammar, it must correspond to the highest level of the
clausal structure. However, JussiveP immediately dominates TP or, in certain cases, even fuses with TP.
ĉis leaves no room for higher leě-peripheral positions, including information structure positions, but I
have shown that it is possible for constituents to be fronted to higher positions, such as TopP and FocusP
(§4.3).
ĉe presence of information-structural positions above JussiveP is not ruled out by ZanuĨini et al.
(2012), but positing them comes at a price when considering their semantics. In the property analysis,
it is impossible for each information-structural head to have a uniėed semantics and select a certain se-
mantic type (e.g. propositions) as its argument. One possibility is that there are multiple versions of each
information-structural head in the lexicon: one which takes propositions, another that takes sets of propo-
sitions, and another that takes properties. But this seems to be require unnecessary homophony, since
⁸See §2.3 for further detail on the pragmatic manipulation of properties in the analyses of Portner (2004a; 2007).
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topicalization and focalization markers are null in many languages, and in languages where they are overt
they do not typically change form based upon clause type. ĉe other possibility is to maintain that there
are single instances of each information-structural head, but they are pure identity functions, which are ag-
nostic as to the type of their argument. ĉis seems undesirable, because it requiresmore stringent syntactic
constraints on information-structural heads, since an untyped identity function could in theory take any
constituent as its argument, but Topic⁰ and Focus⁰ cannot freely appear at any position within the clausal,
verbal, or nominal domains.
Can the semantics of Jussive⁰ be isolated?
Independent of interactions with other positions, it remains to be shown that semantically typing imper-
atives by transforming propositions into properties can be done in a compositional manner. ZanuĨini
et al. (2012) gives a schema for the syntactic structure of a simple imperative, reproduced in (13), where
T/Jussive⁰ immediately dominates vP.
(13)
(25) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  la)
vP
subject
[person : 2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Unlike in many other languages, in Korean the Jussive head can also enter the derivation with a first person
feature value ([person : 1]i), yielding a promissive, or with a first person inclusive value ([person : 1 2]i),
yielding an exhortative.24 We take the sentence final particle -ma to be the overt morphological realization
of the Jussive head with first person value, and -ca to be the overt realization of the Jussive head with first
person inclusive value, respectively:
(26) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ma)
vP
subject
[person : 1]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
(27) T-JussiveP
T-Jussive0
[person : 1  2]i
[case : nominative]u
()  ca)
vP
subject
[person : 1  2]u
[case : nominative]u
v VP
Before we go on, we should mention that, while we focus on examples where the Jussive head is overt,
it can also be null. This is not surprising, if we think about interrogative clauses: though many languages,
including Korean, have an overt question morpheme, many do not, and it has long been argued that there is
a null Q morpheme in such cases (cf. Baker 1970, Cheng 1991). Even in Korean the Q morpheme can often
be covert. Similarly, the Jussive head is null in certain cases. For example, take the case of imperatives,
where a jussive particle can co-occur with a speech style particle: in (28a), we see the combination of the
speech style particle -e with the jussive particle -la:25
(28) a. Kongpuha-e-la!
study-SSP-IMP
‘Study! ’
24There are several possibilities as to how to represent the meaning of inclusive we in terms of person features. We opt to treat it
as a complex combination of first and second person, but one might also think of it as a distinct fourth person (Benincà and Poletto
2005) or as an instance of two distinct feature specifications ([person : 1], [person : 2]). Kratzer (2009) employs a 1st+2nd
feature similar to Benincà and Poletto’s fourth person, but also discusses the possibility of sum features.
25Phonologically, -ha-e becomes -hay.
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vP is taken to represent an ordinary proposition, such as𝜆𝑤 . 𝑥 jumps in𝑤, and the overall denotation
of the clause is supposed to be a property, such as 𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) . [𝜆𝑤 . 𝑥 jumps in𝑤]. However,
ZanuĨini et al. (2012) does not give a deėnition for the semantics of Jussive⁰ alone, but only states that it is
“an abstraction operator (i.e., a 𝜆, or a binding index in the framework of Heim and Kratzer (1998))”. But
the restriction of 𝑥 to addressees goes beyond ordinary Predicate Abstraction (14), which only requires
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that 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷.
(14) Predicate Abstraction (Heim and Kratzer 1998:186)
Let 𝛼 be a branching node with daughters 𝛽 and 𝛾, where 𝛽 dominates only a numerical index 𝑖.
ĉen, for any variable assignment 𝑎, ⟦𝛼⟧𝑎 = 𝜆𝑥 ∈𝐷 . ⟦𝛾⟧𝑎[𝑥⟶𝑖] .
Also of note is the interface requirement in (14): “𝛽 dominates only a numerical index 𝑖.” ĉus, in
order to invoke Predicate Abstraction, or even a variation that alters its restriction on 𝑥, the sister of the
propositional projection must be the binding index 𝑖. Despite the fact that ZanuĨini et al. (2012) claim
that Jussive⁰ itself is a binding index, it carries additional syntactic features which could disqualify that
interpretation. If Jussive⁰ does not meet the criteria imposed on 𝛽 in (14), then it will have to occupy the
next highest position in the tree (15) and act as a function from properties to properties ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩⟩ to
restrict 𝑥 further.
(15)
T/JussiveP
!x: x = addressee(c) & x ∈ D . [!w . x jumps in w]
T/Jussive0
!p!x: x = addressee(c) . p(x) 
k vP
!w . ⟦[person:2]k
 jumps in w⟧g,c
XP
!k: k ∈ D . ⟦[!w . k jumps in w]⟧g,c
Separating out subject abstraction and restriction to addresseemaynot be anundesirable consequence;
aěer all, limiting the subject in this way is an imperative-speciėc phenomenon.⁹ Only applying the 𝑥 ∈
⁹Or, as ZanuĨini et al. (2012) argue, at least a jussive-speciėc phenomenon in languages that allow 1st and 3rd person
jussives.
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𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) restriction to properties ensures that it will only occur in imperatives, under the property
analysis. However, it is unclear whether the combination of domain restrictions as shown in (15) is per-
missible in ordinary lambda calculus. Even if it is, specifying that 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) & 𝑥 ∈𝐷 is redundant,
since certainly the addressees are all individuals. ĉus this semantics for Jussive⁰ makes some good predic-
tions, but is suboptimal.
Another option is the one invokedbyZanuĨini et al. (2012): donot provide an independent semantics
for Jussive⁰, but instead posit a special abstraction rule that applies only to phrases headed by it (16). ĉis
requires a slightly diﬀerent syntactic representation than given in (15) above, albeit one that is closer to the
one that ZanuĨini et al. (2012) provides (13).
(16) Semantics for JussiveP (ZanuĨini et al. 2012)
For any phrase XP,
⟦Jussive⁰ [person: 𝑣]𝑘 XP⟧𝑔,𝑐 = [𝜆𝑥 : 𝑥 = ⟦[person: 𝑣]𝑘⟧𝑔,𝑐 . ⟦XP⟧𝑔[𝑘⟶𝑥],𝑐]
(17)
T/JussiveP
!x: x = addressee(c) . [!w . x jumps in w]
T/Jussive0
special abstraction rule k
vP
!w . x jumps in w 
" !w . ⟦[person:2]k⟧
g[k⟶x],c jumps in w
pro
[person:2]k
VP
!y!w . y jumps in w
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ĉemost curious part of this rule and its application is that it is deėned over any XP, despite the fact that it
ought to be restricted to propositional constituents, likely vP or TP. As deėned, Jussive⁰ can abstract over
any element, although its output may be incoherent if applied to a non-proposition, for example a DP.ĉe
ability to combine with various propositional projections, including information-structural projections,
could be an asset; unfortunately, ZanuĨini et al.’s (2012) syntactic analysis places JussiveP too low in the
structure for this to be possible.
ĉe special abstraction rule in (16) deviates fromHeim and Kratzer’s (1998) Predicate Abstraction in
oneotherway: in the conėguration given,𝛽 is Jussive⁰, a functional head, and𝛾 is XP, amaximal projection.
Predicate Abstraction is deėned to cover constructions such asWh-questions and relative clauses, in which
the 𝛽 operator occupies a Spec position. ĉere is no general prohibition against heads acting as operators,
rather thanmaximal projections, but this is a further reasonwhy the special abstraction rule (16) is not just
an application of ordinary Predicate Abstraction.
ĉese interface concerns are good cause for adopting the preference analysis over the property analysis.
Preference semantics oﬀers straightforward composition of force operators with their propositional argu-
ments, as well as a uniėed treatment of clause meaning. Treating all clauses as type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩ not only simpliėes
the pragmatic component of the grammar, but eliminates redundancy in the semantics of embedding verbs,
as shown in the next section.
5.3 Semantics for Illocutionary Embedding
Any semantic system that deėnes clausal meaning should also have an account for how clauses can be em-
bedded, both semantically and syntactically. ĉe property analysis allows for the possibility of embedding
imperatives (§2.3.3), but ZanuĨini et al. (2012) does not investigate its semantic consequences. Explain-
ing the embedding of diﬀerent types of clauses within the property analysis requires both semantic and
syntactic selection features, which will lead to diﬃculties with general-purpose embedding verbs like say.
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On the other hand, preference semantics is designed as a dynamic update semantics, so its primary pur-
pose is manipulating discourse representations with clause-level updates (§2.4.1). Due to the prevailing,
albeit inaccurate, view that imperatives cannot be embedded (§4.4), Starr (2010; 2012) do not deėne a se-
mantics for a verb that embeds an imperative clause. However, Starr (2010) does provide a deėnition for
an interrogative-embedding verb, wonder, upon which I will build a preliminary deėnition for imperative-
embedding verbs.
5.3.1 ĉe Impossibility of Embedding Imperative Properties
Under the property analysis of imperatives, each clause type denotes a diﬀerent semantic type, so any
embedding verb that can take various clause types as its complement must have multiple, homophonous
forms. For example, verbs of saying in Korean allow embedding of full clauses under the subordinator ko
(18). I will examine the English verb say, which can take a declarative, interrogative, or imperative (19)
clausal complement.
(18) Emma-ka
mother-NOM
Inho-eykey
Inho-DAT
kongpuha-la-ko
study-IMP-COMP
hasiess-ta.
said(honoriėc)-DEC
Mother told Inho to study. (ZanuĨini et al. 2012:1268, ex. 50a)
(19) John said [call Bill].
If we assume that themeaning of the embedded imperative in (19) is the same as amatrix imperative, under
the property analysis it would denote 𝜆𝑥 ∶ 𝑥 = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) . 𝑥 calls Bill in𝑤. Since said call bill consists
of the verb say and its complement, we can take it to form a VP, which should also be a property. ĉis
means that the verb say, when taking an imperative clausal complement, has to take a property and return
another property (which is to be later saturated by its subject). However, it is clear that say cannot take
131
any property-denoting XP as its complement.¹⁰ VP complements are impossible, and even non-imperative
XPs whose denotation is derived by predicate abstraction, such asWh-relatives (Heim and Kratzer 1998),
are as well.
(20) *John said [which Bill called]
Semantic selectionof a predicate-denotingXP is an insuﬃcient constraint on the types of complements
say can take. To compensate, a syntactic restriction could be posited: say only permits clausal constituents
as its complement. However, what qualiėes as a clausal constituent in the framework of ZanuĨini et al.
(2012)? Imperatives are JussiveP, except in Korean they can be dominated by a CP layer. Presumably
embedded declaratives introduced by that are also CPs. However, on the analysis of Heim and Kratzer
(1998), so are relative clauses, yet (20) is ungrammatical.
ĉis leaves only two possible solutions, neither ideal. ĉe ėrst option is that say must be sensitive to
the exact type of abstraction represented in its complement. Even if this could be implemented in traditional
lambda calculus, it would have to be done intensionally to correctly predict the corner case model where
{𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐)} =𝐷. ĉe superior option is to rely on the syntactic selection features of say. If only clausal
constituents contain SubP(allowing thepossibility that relative clauses and the likemay containForcePbut
not SubP), then syntactic selection can rule out ungrammatical cases like (20). However, while positing
structure of this sort is ideal for accounting for a variety of syntactic phenomena in imperatives,¹¹ it directly
contravenes ZanuĨini et al.’s (2012) structural claims. For this reason, to develop an accurate interface
account of imperative embedding, we must leave the property analysis behind.
¹⁰See (Starr 2012:10) for similar criticisms of determining the pragmatic role of a constituent solely by semantic type.
¹¹As discussed in Chapter 4, these include the mechanism and locus of clause typing (§4.2.2), information-structural
fronting possibilities (§4.3), and syntactic embedding and extraction phenomena (§4.4).
132
5.3.2 Embedding Imperative Preferences
In preference semantics (Starr 2010; 2012), all clauses are updates ã functions from preference states to
preference states ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩ãregardless of clause type. In §4.2, I argued that the only functional head that takes
a proposition as its argument and returns an update is Force⁰. Since both the semantic and syntactic forms
of clausal constituents are uniform, it is straightforward for embedding verbs to select them.
ĉe remaining question, then, is how to represent the semantics of the embedding verb itself. It is
clear enough what the meaning of a clausal update is in a matrix context, since it is passed to the pragmatic
component where it updates the current discourse state. It is also clear that an update cannot apply to a
lexical verb, so the reverse must be true; embedding verbs apply to their complement update. As such, a
transitive embedding verb is of type ⟨𝑟𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩.
What is the practical eﬀect of this semantic transformation? For one, it prevents the application of
the update to the current discourse context. With embedded questions, “aĨitude verbs like wonder may
be thought of as shiěing the evaluation of their complement from the information and issues representing
the discourse context to a body of information and issues representing the aĨitude subject’s doxastic state.”
(Starr 2010:112).
ĉe context shiě is achieved by pairing individuals with preference states, notated𝑅𝑤𝑎 , to indicate that
the state is assigned to the individual𝑎 inworld𝑤. Similar tohowconversational backgrounds can represent
diﬀerent types of modality in the system of Kratzer (1991), these indexed preference states can represent
diﬀerent bodies of information pertinent to an individual. In the case of embedding verbs of communi-
cationã those which introduce what many descriptive grammars quite aptly call indirect discourseã 𝑅𝑤𝑎
is a speaker-oriented discourse state, i.e. one which represents a discourse state in world 𝑤 where 𝑎 is the
speaker at all worlds in 𝑐𝑅𝑤𝑎 . I propose that embedding verbs of communication perform a similar shiě,
but rather than shiěing from the current discourse state to an individual’s internal state, it shiěs from the
current discourse state to another discourse state.
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With this interpretation of𝑅𝑤𝑎 , it is now possible to model a preliminary deėnition of embedding say¹²
on Starr’s (2010) deėnition for wonder. Paraphrasing the formal deėnition, [𝑎 wonders 𝜑] is true in the
worlds where 𝑐𝑅𝑤𝑎 supports 𝜑. Support, notated⊨, holds if updating 𝑅 with 𝜑 does not change 𝑅. When
considering discourse states, the simplest case in which this is true is the circumstance in which 𝜑 has al-
readybeenuĨered in thediscourse, so this iswhyusing support is a good (althoughnot completely airtight)
test for whether a certain uĨerance has been made at a given stage of a discourse.
ĉus I propose a preliminary deėnition of say for preference semantics in (21) below.¹³ As proposed,
say is a function fromupdates and individuals to sets ofworlds ⟨𝑟𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩ and returns the set ofworldswhich
have a discourse state that is indexed to the speaker and supports the update denoted by the complement
clause. ĉis does not capture any of the eventive or agentive aspects of an act of saying, but only encodes
the shiě from the current discourse context to the indirect discourse context. ĉe denoted proposition is
the set of worlds in which the subject of say is the speaker in a context that supports𝜑.
(21) Preliminary deėnition of say
𝜆𝜑𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑤 . 𝑅𝑤𝑥 [𝜑] = 𝑅𝑤𝑥 , where𝑅𝑤𝑥 is a speaker-oriented discourse state
Furthermore, since preference semantics as described by Starr (2010; 2012) is not a temporal semantics,
this deėnition does not capture the distinction between say/is saying/will say, but an extension of the se-
mantics where preference states can be indexed not just by worlds but by time/world pairs (𝑡, 𝑤) could
accomplish this.
With a deėnition for embedding say, it is now possible to show how it can combine with an imperative.
¹²I domaintain that there is some homophony/polysemy of say in English, namely between clausal embedding say, which
always takes an update as its complement, and direct quotation say. ĉe laĨer can take any unit of uĨered content as its
complement, e.g. John said, “I called Bill,” or John said “the”. One possibility for unifying direct discourse complements is
to treat them as nominalizations, paĨerning with John said many interesting things; this does not bear on the issue of clausal
embedding, so I do not pursue it further here.
¹³ĉis deėnition is informal insofar as it does not follow the logical syntax of Starr’s (2010) Logic of Mood (which does
not make any claims about linguistic syntax). I present it in this format insofar as it is more perspicuous for demonstrating
the composition of vP headed by say. (21) should still be compatible with a translation into the Logic of Mood.
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ĉe declarative sentence John said jump is an embedding of the imperative Jump!, whose structure and
meaning was shown in (12) above. Applying say to a clause and an individual gives the denotation of vP,
the proposition𝜆𝑤 . 𝑅𝑤𝑗𝑜ℎ𝑛[! 𝐽𝑢𝑚𝑝(𝑢)] = 𝑅𝑤𝑗𝑜ℎ𝑛. (22) shows the composition of this vPwithin the biclausal
sentence John said jump.
(22) John [𝑣𝑃 said jump].
ForceP
!Jump(u)
say휆휑휆푥휆푤 . 푅푤푥[휑] = 푅푤푥
VP휆푥휆푤 . 푅푤푥[!Jump(u)] = 푅푤푥John
vP휆푤 . 푅푤john[!Jump(u)] = 푅푤john
ĉe proposition denoted by vP in (22) can be notated in the same manner as any proposition in pref-
erence semantics, as a property applied to a name, here 𝑆𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐽𝑢𝑚𝑝(𝑗𝑜ℎ𝑛). ĉe assertion of this proposition
is performed in the same manner that any clause is typed, by Force⁰.
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(23) John said jump.
FinP
SaidJump(john)
ForceP▷SaidJump(john)
Force0
!p . ▷p
vP
SaidJump(john)(휆푤 . 푅푤john[!Jump(u)] = 푅푤john)
One ėnal fact about embedded imperatives that deserves examination is the interpretation of their null
subjects. Notice that in the representation in (22), there is no explicit link between𝑢 and either the current
discourse context 𝑅 or the shiěed discourse context 𝑅𝑤𝑗𝑜ℎ𝑛. ĉis is desirable, since 𝑢 can be interpreted as
the addressee of either context, as shown by the coherence of followup uĨerances that disambiguate its in-
terpretation. ĉis does notmean that its interpretation is unconstrained, since assigning it an interpretation
that does not correspond to the addressee in either context is infelicitous (24c).
(24) a. John said call him today. So I did.
b. John said call him today. So you’d beĨer do that.
c. John was talking to Bill and said call him today. #So I did. / ✓So you should.
ĉus preference semantics is capable of handling embedded imperatives without introducing addi-
tional complications. A single deėnition of embedding say can handle all types of clausal complements,
and its deėnition can perform context-shiěing by applying to preference states other than the current dis-
course state. Finally, it handles the ambiguity in interpretation of embedded imperative subjects in the
ordinary course of the semantic derivation.
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5.4 Summary
ĉis chapter has demonstrated that preference semantics is a superior framework for representing imper-
atives compositionally. ĉe semantics maps straightforwardly onto an articulated leě-peripheral structure
for imperatives and provides a uniėed type of meaning, updates ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩, for all clause types. ĉere is no need
for an imperative-speciėc position to derive imperative meaning. Like Force⁰ speciėed for other values,
imperative Force⁰ takes a propositional complement and outputs an update; it is therefore of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑟⟩.
As shown in Chapter 4, Force⁰ is also present in embedded imperatives, so they too are of type ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩. ĉus
clausal structure and clausal meaning are the same at both the matrix and the subordinate level. Updates
are either applied to the current discourse context or serve as an argument for an embedding verb. Fol-
lowing the unifying theme of preference semantics, all clausal embedding verbs can be uniėed under the
semantic type ⟨𝑟𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩. Derivation and manipulation of illocutionary meaning is straightforward under
the preference analysis.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
I have argued that a preference analysis of imperative constructions is superior for explaining their form,
meaning, anduse. What I havepresented in thepreceding chapters answersmanyof thebigquestions about
imperative constructions while raising many smaller questions that merit further aĨention.
ĉe decision to represent imperatives as preferences was motivated by the major shortcomings of the
prior accounts of imperative semantics, the modal analysis (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2011) and the
property analysis (Portner 2004a; 2007). ĉeglobal preferences contributedby imperatives are of the form
⟨𝑝, ¬𝑝⟩, so they are distinct from content contributed by declaratives and interrogatives (which only add
new preferences of the form ⟨𝑝, ∅⟩) and have directly accessible propositional content (their ėrst element,
𝑝). ĉese dual semantic beneėts, as discussed by Starr (2012), are reason enough to represent imperatives
with preferences. Chapters 3 and 5 showed that representing imperatives as preferences provides further
advantages at the interfaces with pragmatics and syntax.
In Chapter 3, I argued that representing the characteristic contribution of imperatives with preferences
explains their distribution in discourse. I subjected imperative uĨerances to direct and indirect challenge
tests, which diagnose at-issue and not-at-issue content, respectively. Since only propositions have at-issue
status, the imposition of a new obligation with an imperative cannot be challenged in any way; it is illo-
cutionary rather than propositional content. Imperatives diverge from performative declarative modals in
these tests, because modal propositions expressing obligations are at-issue.
I also used the propositional content of imperatives to compute whether they are Relevant, a necessary
condition for felicity. I concluded that if the propositional content of an imperative is a partial answer to
the current Question Under Discussion, then it is Relevant. Imperatives are sensitive to diﬀerent types of
QUDs, because the form of the QUD determines its potential answers; any response must be congruent
with the QUD (Roberts 1996). ĉere are still open issues in the general theory of Relevance, which also
apply to imperatives, including the issue of how to handle probabilistic answers to the QUD (see discus-
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sion in Simons et al. 2011). Also, the interactions between imperatives and modal QUDs requires further
study. A major step in this direction will be the completion of a full system of modality within preference
semantics.
Chapter 4 argued for a syntactic model of the clausal leě periphery that provides a clause-typing po-
sition (following Cheng 1991) compatible with aĨested word orders in imperatives, especially in English.
I adapted and modiėed the articulated leě periphery of Rizzi (1997) to account for several major clausal
features: matrix vs. subordinate status, clause typing, information structure, and subject licensing. I demon-
strated that the imperative verb must remain low in English imperatives, precluding an analysis of clause
typing that requires either phrasal or head movement, while also demonstrating that a rich leě-peripheral
structure must be present in English imperatives to host fronted elements. I explained the diﬀerences
between contrastive and non-contrastive topic fronting in English imperatives in terms of the location
of features that drive their movement; [Focus] is encoded as an independent head, while [Top] is en-
coded on a portmanteau complementizer with [Sub] and [Force] features. I gave preliminary evidence that
non-contrastive topic fronting in imperatives should be possible in languages which have an independent
Topic⁰. Conėrming the proposed model via crosslinguistic examination of similar interactions between
clause type and information structure is an area for much further research.
Adopting the extended articulated leě periphery for English also yielded new insights about the po-
sition of do-support in negative imperatives. ĉe syntax of negative imperatives has long been studied
(e.g Han 2000; ZanuĨini 1997), but the new framework will allow negative imperatives to be explained
in greater detail. English is oěen cited as being able to “directly negate” imperatives, but other languages
use indirect strategies. Languages like Italian, Spanish, andModern Greek require inėnitive or subjunctive
forms of the verb, while languages like Serbian, Welsh, and Latin require a dummy verb with imperative
marking. I believe that the clausal hierarchy I have proposed can be used to explain the former in terms of
intervention eﬀects, and the laĨer by providing a dedicated position for the dummy verb (similar to En-
glish). Again, as much as there is syntactic variation in the world’s languages, there is room to apply the
newmodel to them.
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I have shown that the extended leě periphery ought to be applied uniformly within a language, by ex-
amining how the structure of embedded imperatives mirrors that of matrix imperatives in English. Like
matrix imperatives, they have an open Spec CP position and, in general, permit extraction. ĉe same lim-
itations of movement within matrix imperatives apply to embedded imperatives, blocking some elements
from reaching the “escape hatch” position. Since these factors are what restrict extraction, imperatives do
not paĨern with either weak or strong islands, but have their own set of restrictions. ĉere is a noticeable
but subtle contrast between embedded imperatives (e.g. John said call him) and embedded inėnitivals that
are interpreted similarly (e.g. John said to call him). In the absence of negation, these constructions have
extremely similar surface forms, leading to some confusion about their relative acceptability. Conducting
quantitative research on the acceptability of these two constructions would provide a more solid basis for
an explanation of their syntactic characteristics.
Finally, I showed in Chapter 5 that the preference analysis is compositional. ĉe deėnition of illocu-
tionary relation ã a function which takes a proposition and a discourse state, and returns an updated,
structured context (Murray 2010) ã served as a model for the mapping of meaning to structure. Since
the discourse state “argument” of an illocutionary relation is supplied pragmatically, the semantic content
of a complete clause should be an update function from preference states to preference states ⟨𝑟𝑟⟩. Force
operators, which perform clause typing, are thus of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑟⟩ and occupy Force⁰. ĉe semantics of the
surrounding heads, Sub⁰, Top⁰, and Focus⁰ are such that they output an element of the same type as their
input, but more can be said about their exact contribution. A full semantics of information structure is
far beyond the imperative phenomena discussed here, but should be able to combine seamlessly with the
preference analysis. Additionally, extensions of preference semantics itself will improve the analysis. In par-
ticular, a full system of nominal quantiėcation within preference semantics will further explain imperative
subjects, which are limited in the present system to names or the special constant 𝑢.
I also applied the compositional analysis to embedded imperatives, proposing a new deėnition of verbs
that introduce indirect discourse, such as English say. Doing so requires that preference states can be in-
dexed to individuals, with variable interpretation. In the case of indirect discourse, they are treated as
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speaker-oriented discourse states. I proposed that say and similar verbs of communication are of type
⟨𝑟𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑠𝑡⟩, since their internal argument is a typed clause, which denotes an update. ĉere are several im-
provements that can be made to the deėnitions of these verbs, including the addition of a component that
captures the event and manner of communication; the current deėnition only speciėes the shiě from one
context of interpretation to another. Furthermore, there is theopen-endedquestionofwhat other phenom-
ena in natural language can be expressed with indexed preference states. My expectation is that explaining
imperatives is far from the only fruitful application of preference semantics.
ĉe connection of imperative syntax, semantics, and pragmatics that I have presented is only possi-
ble in a preference analysis. ĉe heart of the analysis is giving imperatives a unique semantic character
while leĨing them interact directly with other types of meaning. Since preference semantics uses update
rules that correspond to illocutionary relation, the semantics matches a syntactic theory that designates a
clause-typing position. Because preference semantics is dynamic, it allows direct computation of pragmatic
concepts such asRelevance. ĉese tools allowedexplanationof some long-standingproblems regarding the
form, meaning, and use of English imperatives. While there is much work still to be done on imperatives,
especially outside of English, the most promising way to do it ought to be within the framework of the
preference analysis.
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